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Abstract 
Wildland urban interface (WUI) communities are generally the most at risk of being 
impacted by wildfires. In order to assess the vulnerability of these communities, it is important to 
understand the impact that human behaviour in fire (HBiF) can have on wildfire evacuations, 
specifically in Canada where such data is lacking. To lay the groundwork for a comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment of a Canadian case study community, a conceptual model of protective 
action decision-making during WUI fires was created. This was used to develop a survey to 
understand the WUI fire awareness and experience as well as the anticipated protective actions of 
the case study community residents. The microsimulation software PTV VISSIM was used to 
model 10 evacuation scenarios to identify key evacuation modelling considerations and potential 
evacuation challenges faced by the community. In doing so, a framework for using HBiF to inform 
WUI vulnerability assessments and evacuations was developed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Wildfires and the Canadian Wildland Urban Interface 
Wildfires are an integral part of the Canadian ecosystem and are common occurrences, 
specifically during the summer months [1]. Over the last 20 years, an average of over 2800 
wildfires burned over 1.1 million ha of land each year [2]. In the last two years, this average was 
over 6000 fires and over 2800 ha burned. It is anticipated that in the coming years, the number of 
wildfires occurring in Canada will continue to increase in much of the country as a result of climate 
change [3], [4] and the increasing interaction between people and the wildland [5]–[7]. While the 
challenges resulting from this are increasing, Canadian wildland fire science and technology are 
struggling to keep pace [8].  
 Interactions between people and the wildland generally occur in what is known as the 
wildland urban interface (WUI). The WUI is identified as places “where humans and their 
development meet or intermix with wildland fuel” [9]. The WUI includes both intermix and 
interface communities, with varying densities, levels of remoteness, and interaction with the 
wildland [10]. Intermix communities include areas where wildland vegetation and housing 
intermingle, and interface communities are those that are in close vicinity to areas of large, dense 
wildland vegetation [5]. Given their proximity to the wildland, WUI communities are generally 
the most vulnerable to wildfires and the subsequent property damage and physical, social, 
environmental, and psychological impacts [5]. In addition, other vulnerabilities such as fewer and 
more dangerous egress routes and a lack of easily accessible firefighting resources contribute to 
the additional challenges faced by WUI communities [11].  
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While Canada continues to become increasingly urban, there are important growth trends 
that may correlate with the growth of the Canadian WUI. In an analysis of fire risk and population 
trends in the Canadian WUI, the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers identified that while the 
number of rural farming residents has declined over the past few decades, the number of non-
farming rural residents has increased [7]. The analysis identified three trends that are contributing 
to this. These include urban sprawl, demand for recreational property, and some growth in isolated 
communities [7]. Urban sprawl has resulted in an increase in people living in urban fringe areas 
(small urban areas close to but not part of the urban core). This can influence WUI risk when such 
areas are located in rural or semi-rural areas next to cities. Increases in demand for second homes 
or recreational properties which are often located in the WUI also contributes to growth in these 
areas. As the Canadian population ages, and retirees (and those planning for retirement) look to 
cabin and cottage country, this could be an increasingly important contributor to this growth [12]. 
Finally, the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers’ report noted that growth in some isolated rural 
areas, located primarily in the Canadian north, is also playing a role. Many of these communities 
have a strong Aboriginal presence, and as the Aboriginal population continues to grow, these 
communities may continue to do so as well [13]. 
In the first national study of its kind, Johnston and Flannigan 2018 created a map of the 
Canadian WUI [14]. The study found that the WUI covered 32.3 million ha, corresponding to 3.8% 
of the country’s land area and 5.8% of the country’s wildland fuel area. Most of the interface areas 
were found to be located in the southern portions of Canada, with Quebec, Alberta, Ontario and 
British Columbia having the largest areas. Very limited interface areas were identified in the 
northern regions of the country, in part due to the location of human settlements and the nature/type 
of wildland fuel in these areas. While 3.8% may seem like a small percentage of the country as a 
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whole, given the size and the distribution of people within the country it is important to consider 
this area in relation to human settlements (cities, towns, reservations, etc.). Of the 544 ‘Populated 
Places’ mapped in the study, 96% of them had at least some WUI within 5-km and 60% had more 
than 500 ha of WUI within 5-km. Figure 1.1 below shows the location of the Canadian WUI and 
Figure 1.2 shows the Canadian WUI in relation to populated areas.  
 
Figure 1.1: Canadian wildland urban interface [14] 
 
Figure 1.2: Interaction between ‘populated places’ and the Canadian wildland urban interface where Population 
Class 4 = more than 1,000,000 people, Population Class 3 = 100,000 – 999,999 people, Population Class 2 = 
10,000 – 99,999 people, and Population Class 1 = 1 – 9999 people  [14]  
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It is important to note that the relationship between ‘populated places’ and the WUI does 
not necessarily correlate to the fire risk of these places (where risk is a defined as the product of 
potential exposure and vulnerability). A community’s vulnerability and therefore risk is influenced 
by many interconnected factors, such as social factors (resource dependence, social capital, 
attitudes toward and perceptions about fire, etc.) [15] and environmental factors (climate/weather, 
topography, ecology/fuels, etc.) [16]. Johnston and Flannigan 2018 cross-referenced the number 
of fires and area burned with interface areas, though this again only looks at the potential exposure 
portion of risk and not vulnerability (Figure 1.3a and b).  
 
Figure 1.3: Maps of relationship between percentage of interface area in each cell and either burned area (as a 
percentage of land area in cell (a)) or number of fires (total number of fires in each cell (b)). Categories for 
interface areas are high (>6%), medium (<1-6%), and low (≤1%).  Categories for fire area burned include high 
(>30%), medium (>2%-30%) and low (≤2%). Categories for number of fires are high (>100), medium (6-100), and 
low (≤5). Grey cells indicate cells with zero burned area or zero fires [14]. Fire data is from the NFDB for the years 
1980-2014). 
1.2 Canadian Wildfire Evacuations 
1.2.1 Emergency Management and Wildfire Evacuations 
In every jurisdiction, Canada has taken an “all hazards” approach to emergency 
management [17]. Within the system, vulnerabilities to both natural disasters and hazards 
(tornados, floods, wildfires, etc.) and human-made disasters and hazards (such as chemical, urban 
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fires, terrorism, etc.) are addressed [17], [18]. In addition to the Emergency Management Act [19], 
Canada created An Emergency Management Framework for Canada in 2007 (revised in 2011, 
2017) which “establishes a common approach for a range of collaborative emergency management 
initiative in support of safe and resilient communities” [17].  
In looking at wildfires and WUI fire evacuations specifically, many different agencies are 
involved in the process of administering and executing an evacuation. The variation in the nature 
and frequency of WUI fire evacuations across the country (and within provinces) as a result of 
different patterns in wildfire activity, vegetation type and population density add to the complexity 
of WUI fire and evacuation management. Evacuation decisions are based on information about the 
fire, fire suppression capabilities, egress routes and the community threatened. The number and 
type of agencies involved in carrying out an evacuation can vary depending on the characteristics 
of the population in need of evacuation (location, size, etc.) [20]. Generally, civil authorities must 
work in collaboration with provincial/territorial fire management agencies when WUI fire 
evacuations are necessary. There are some areas where provincial/territorial agencies do not have 
the legislative authority to order evacuations, including on federal lands, Department of National 
Defense reserves, and Indian reserves [21].1 If local capacity is not sufficient to manage 
evacuations, civil authorities can ask for assistance from mutual aid organizations or provincial 
emergency measures organizations [20]. A state of emergency can also be declared, giving the 
declaring agency wide-ranging powers under the Emergency Program Act, including requesting 
assistance from the Department of National Defense [21]. When WUI fires cross regional, 
provincial or even federal boundaries, agencies and authorities within each must also work 
                                                 
1 Provincial/territorial agencies can advise people living on these lands to evacuate and police series can help 
promote this message, but an official evacuation order cannot be given [21]. 
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together. Organizations such as the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre (CIFFC) and 
agreements such as the Canada/United States Reciprocal Forest Fire Fighting Arrangement 
(CANUS) can aid in this collaboration, as can having a standardized command-and-control 
structure (or incident command system (ICS)) [21].  
1.2.2 Characteristics of Canadian WUI Evacuations 
As in any country with frequent and intense wildfires, evacuations in the Canadian WUI 
are to be expected. However, there are several factors which have, historically, differentiated 
Canadian WUI fire evacuations from those in other fire-prone places such as the United States and 
Australia, specifically when it comes to life and property loss. In their study of WUI fire 
evacuations in Canada between 1980 – 2007, Beverly and Bothwell identified several key 
characteristics and trends that characterized such evacuations during this time [20]. A few of these 
are summarized below: 
• Despite the prevalence of WUI fires, relatively few people were impacted each year. The 
greatest number of evacuations occurred in the boreal ecozones which see some of the 
highest percentages of area burned each year but have relatively low population densities.  
While fires in the southern parts of the country were less common, wildfires in these areas 
impacted large numbers of people resulting in larger evacuations (low probability, high-
consequence locations). 
• The number of evacuees varied greatly from year to year, ranging from 40 people to over 
50,000, with 70% of evacuations involving less than 300 people. The annual average was 
over 7400 people and the median was over 3500 people. Nearly one third of evacuees were 
in British Columbia.  
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• Similarly, the number of wildfire evacuations varied greatly each year, ranging from one 
to 53 (median: 13, average: 20). Most of these evacuations occurred in the provinces of 
Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba and Alberta. 
• Most WUI fire evacuations were in response to direct fire threat (not smoke) and were 
prompted by fires less than 10km from the evacuation site and over 1000 ha in size.   
• During this timespan, only one civilian casualty was documented in direct relation to a 
wildfire. 
1.2.3 Recent Changes in Canadian WUI Evacuations  
Since Beverly and Bothwell’s study of 28 years of Canadian wildfire evacuations, the 
number of people evacuated annually due to WUI fires has increased. Between 1980 and 2007, the 
total number of evacuees per year surpassed 10,000 evacuees six times, generally as a result of 
evacuations in multiple provinces and/or fires threatening densely populated areas [20]. In looking 
at the 10 years since 2007, seven years surpassed 10,000 annual wildfire evacuees [22], [23].2 
Figure 1.4 shows the number of wildfire evacuations between 1980-2015, and Figure 1.5 shows 
the number of evacuees from 1980-2017 as recorded in the Canadian Forest Service Wildfire 
Evacuation Database [22], [23].  
                                                 
2 It is important to note that collecting information about the number of evacuees during WUI fire events is 
challenging, and it is likely that this, combined with changes in information medium and accessibility will have an 
effect on the accuracy of exact evacuee numbers.  
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Figure 1.4: Number of wildfire evacuations in Canada between 1980-2015 [22], [23] 
 
Figure 1.5: Number of wildfire evacuees in Canada between 1980-2017 [22], [23] 
Given the relatively short period of time that these evacuation and evacuee numbers were 
determined for (35-37 years), and the fact that evacuations of largely populated areas can cause 
spikes in the number of people evacuated, it is important that assumptions not be made about 
changes in the underlying mechanisms influencing wildfires (and therefore evacuations). 
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However, as was discussed in Section 1.1, the number of fires and the number of people in the 
WUI does appear to be increasing and this could be contributing to the increased number of annual 
evacuees. It is also possible that more fires are occurring in and around the low-risk, high-
consequence areas that are more densely populated as compared to in previous decades. A better 
understanding of the reasoning behind the increased number of WUI fire evacuees in the past 
decade will be important in moving forward with assessing the vulnerability of different WUI 
areas and communities. 
1.3 Summary of Important WUI Fires 
In recent years there have been several significant and in some cases deadly wildfires that 
have impacted communities around the world. A select number of these fires are detailed below. 
If possible, official reports and investigations were sourced, however, in the cases of the most 
recent fires, information was obtained from news reports alone.3  
1.3.1 North America 
Wood Buffalo Wildfire (Fort McMurry Fire), Alberta, Canada, May 2016 
On May 1, 2016, a small wildfire was noticed seven kilometres outside of the Urban Area 
of Fort McMurray [24]. The fire growth was prompted by a dry winter season, strong winds and 
high temperatures [25]. Evacuation warnings were issued to nearby campgrounds and a state of 
emergency was declared in the area [26]. The warning levels were reduced the following day after 
wind conditions changed and were blowing away from the city of Fort McMurray. However, the 
conditions changed again on May 3rd, pushing the fire into the community and prompting the 
                                                 
3 Only official and news reports written in English were referenced for this summary. 
10 
 
evacuation of tens of thousands of people. The changing conditions led to some evacuation shelters 
set up during the initial stages of the fire to be also evacuated, and by the end of the day, over 
60,000 people had been evacuated (including over 100 patients at the local health centre). The one 
road leading in and out of the community experienced extensive congestion during the evacuation, 
with some vehicles being abandoned after running out of fuel after sitting in traffic for hours [27]. 
A provincial state of emergency was declared the following day, with 1600 structures destroyed, 
10,000 ha burning, and evacuation orders issued for 80,000 people. On May 5th, 4000 people were 
airlifted from work camps north of the city and on May 6th, an additional 8000 oilsands workers 
were evacuated. A number of First Nations communities were also evacuated during this time [26]. 
While there were no fatalities directly associated with the wildfire, two people were killed as a 
result of a car accident during the evacuation. By the end of the fire event, over 88,000 people had 
been evacuated [24]. It is estimated that the response and recovery costs from the fire exceeded 
740 million Canadian dollars [24]. 
The Camp Fire, California, USA, November 2018 
 Early in the morning on November 8th, around 6:30 am, a wildfire was reported in Northern 
California near the towns of Pulga and Paradise. The Butte County Sheriff issued evacuation orders 
for Pulga half an hour after the fire was reported and for Paradise one hour later [28]. Strong winds 
and dry conditions aided in the fire’s propagation, with the fire moving through Paradise quickly, 
making evacuation difficult and destroying most of the town [29]. The fire, which burned for over 
two weeks, destroyed nearly 14,000 homes, burnt over 62,000 ha and forced the evacuation an 
estimated 52,000 people [30]–[32]. The fire was the deadliest and most expensive in the state’s 
history, resulting in the deaths of at least 85 people and an estimated 16.5 billion US dollars in 
total losses [32], [33]. 
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1.3.2 Australia  
Victoria Bushfires (Black Saturday Bushfires), Victoria, February 2008 
On February 7, 2009, after a severe and prolonged heat wave the month before, wildfires 
broke out across the state of Victoria, Australia [34]. Leading up to the day of the fires, severe 
bushfire warnings had been issued, with residents of high-danger areas being advised to evacuate 
pre-emptively. With temperatures above 40oC on the day of the fire, strong winds and very dry 
fuels fed over 300 rapidly burning fires (15 of which were significantly damaging). Winds carried 
firebrands for kilometers, resulting in spot fire burning far from the main fire fronts. Five of the 
fires were fatal, resulting in 173 fatalities, making it the deadliest fire in the country’s history. In 
addition to the devastating loss of life, hundreds of people were injured, around 3500 structures 
were destroyed, 450,000 ha of land was burned, and it is estimated that the fire had an economic 
cost of 4.4 billion Australian Dollars [25].  
1.3.3 Europe 
Pedrógão Grande, Portugal, June 2017 
On June 17th and 18th, during a severe heatwave, over 50 wildfires broke out across the 
country [35]. Several fires occurred in central Portugal near the Pedrógão Grande area. Here, fires 
burned quickly and resulted in 66 fatalities, making them the deadliest fires in the country’s history 
[36].  Most of the casualties occurred on a rural road while people were trying to evacuate [37]. 
Hundreds more people were injured, with numerous small communities in the area being affected. 
The fires in Pedrógão Grande burned over 53,000 ha of land (20,000 ha of forest), cost farmer and 
businesses tens of millions of Euros, and destroyed nearly 500 houses [36]. Problems with 
12 
 
communication during the fire have been noted as contributing to the high death toll, with the fire 
destroying phone lines and communication towers thwarting early efforts to notify the public [38], 
[39]. 
Attica Wildfires, Greece, July 2018 
On July 23rd and 24th, 2018, numerous wildfires broke out along the coast in the Attica 
region of Greece, northeast of Athens. The fires occurred during a summer heatwave impacting 
much of Europe, with high temperatures, strong winds and dry conditions [40]. Driven by the 
wind, the fires burned quickly and impacted the areas around Kineta, Penteli, Neos Voutzas, and 
Rafina among others, with the greatest loss occurring in the village of Mati [40], [41]. A popular 
tourist area, the fires forced thousands of tourists and locals alike to evacuate with little to no 
warning, with many fleeing to the sea [42]. The fire was the country’s deadliest in decades and 
resulted in the death of around 100 people, most of whom died while trying to evacuate on foot or 
in cars [43]. Hundreds more people were injured and more than 2000 homes were destroyed [41], 
[42].  
1.4 Tools for Improving WUI Evacuations 
Fires such as those summarized above highlight the growing need to better prepare for and 
manage WUI fire evacuations. WUI evacuations are complex, requiring the collaboration of 
numerous agencies and adaptability to the nature of the fire and the environment, as well as the 
characteristics and number of people who need to evacuate [20]. Given this complexity, it is 
necessary for all the influential elements to be understood, and for people from various disciplines 
(engineering, urban planning, policy, social science, fire science, emergency management and fire 
services, etc.) to work together to tackle the challenges posed by such evacuations. 
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Researchers and practitioners in many different fields are looking to develop new and 
innovative ways to tackle the challenges posed by wildfires and wildfire evacuations, seeking to 
design better systems, tools and methods to plan for and manage these events. One of the key 
outcomes of the 2017 workshop sponsored by the International Association for Fire Safety Science 
(IAFSS) was the identification of the need to have an IAFSS working group dedicated specifically 
to looking at Large Outdoor Fires and the Built Environment [44]. The National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) is currently in the midst of a multi-stage project to develop a comprehensive 
WUI evacuation model that would take into account pedestrian behaviour, traffic movement and 
wildfire dynamics [25]. In support of the creation of standardized guidelines for more effective 
alerting systems, researchers in the Fire Research Division (FRD) at the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) recently conducted a review of short message alerts and public 
responses [45]. These are just a few examples of work being done to improve WUI fire safety and 
evacuations. 
One technical tool that can be used to help improve WUI fire evacuations is traffic 
simulation models. Traffic models are commonly used in fields such as traffic engineering and 
transportation planning, and have also been used to help improve emergency evacuations. Such 
models can simulate different evacuation procedures and strategies or specific evacuation 
scenarios, and the subsequent outcomes can be analyzed to better plan for and manage evacuations 
[46]. By conducting such analyzes, these tools can also aid in assessing the vulnerability of WUI 
communities. Given that conducting community fire evacuation drills is not as simple (or practical) 
as conducting evacuation drills in buildings, and that analyzing egress routes and traffic congestion 
during or after actual community evacuations is challenging if not impossible, modelling provides 
an alternative evaluation and analysis method. There are important considerations that need to be 
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made when modelling evacuations, as such scenarios differ from standard traffic modelling. 
Evacuation models need to consider how travel demand, trip distribution, traffic assignment and 
the behaviour of travellers will differ under abnormal conditions (such as in the case where a 
wildfire is threatening a community). As such, whether using a standard traffic model or one 
developed specifically for evacuations, it is important that the nuances of an evacuation be 
represented, and the limitations of the model be understood and explained.    
1.5 Human Dimensions of WUI Fire Evacuations  
One important component that can be overlooked when striving to improve WUI fire 
evacuations is the role and impact that human behaviour can have on the success of an evacuation. 
Human behaviour in fire (HBiF) is a multidisciplinary field of study that looks at human response 
to fire events [47], [48]. Though historically undervalued, the acceptance of HBiF as one of the 
key pillars of fire safety engineering has grown in recent years [49]. While typically associated 
with fires in the built environment (office buildings, apartments, houses, etc.), the study of HBiF 
is closely related to the field of disaster research, where researchers have sought to understand the 
ways people respond to natural and technological disasters such as tornados, volcanos, hurricanes, 
floods and more recently, wildfires. The way that people respond to these events will impact their 
evacuation decisions. With a more thorough understanding of the decision-making process and the 
factors that impact how people behave and act, researchers and practitioners can design and assess 
systems, messages, procedures and communities to support safer and more effective WUI 
evacuations. 
The study of human response and decision-making during wildfires has grown over the 
past few decades, primarily in the United States and Australia [50]. Despite this growing 
momentum, there are few Canadian studies looking at the impact of human behaviour on WUI fire 
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evacuations and the studies that do exist are focused primarily on aboriginal communities [51]–
[53]. While many similarities do exist between countries with respect to people’s response to fire, 
and applicable insights can be gained from international research, it is also important that the 
nuances of each country (or region or community) be understood. Differences in population 
density, demographics and in historic evacuation and fire management practices and policies can 
impact the way WUI evacuations are conducted and how people respond. Given the diversity of 
the Canadian WUI, it is important to look at different types of communities such as seasonal 
communities located in Canadian cabin and cottage country, growing urban centres such as Fort 
McMurry that develop around natural resource extraction, and tourist communities such as those 
in the Rocky Mountains.  
1.6 Motivation and Research Objectives 
Given the importance of understanding human responses to WUI fires and the current lack 
of diverse, Canadian-specific research in this area, this research is a first step in moving towards a 
more comprehensive understanding of this discipline in Canada. The research seeks to answer the 
following question: How can human behaviour in fire be used to inform Canadian WUI 
evacuations?  
More specifically, the research investigates: 
• How can HBiF help predict when/if people decide to evacuate? 
• How can HBiF help improve notification and communication during WUI fire 
evacuations? 
• How can an understanding of the factors that influence protective action decision-making 
improve the accuracy of evacuation traffic simulations?  
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These questions are investigated generally and in the specific context of a Canadian case 
study community: a small, seasonal WUI community located in the Canadian Interior. Given the 
variable Canadian climate, seasonal communities are generally comprised of cabins and cottages 
where people spend time during the warmer summer months, which corresponds to the Canadian 
fire season [54]. These communities are popular with local and foreign tourists alike and generally 
see large population fluctuations over the course of the year. As the Canadian fire season is 
changing and more of these communities become at risk of being impacted by a wildfire threat 
[14], there is a growing need to understand the many factors that contribute to communities’ 
vulnerability so that their WUI fire vulnerability can be assessed and reduced. HBiF is one such 
factor and it will be the focus of this thesis, which will lay the groundwork for the implementation 
of a vulnerability study for the case study community.  
1.7 Research Focus and Scope 
The research conducted as part of this thesis comprises the beginning stages of a larger 
vulnerability assessment that will be conducted in the case study community over the coming 
years. These stages involve the creation of a conceptual model of protective action decision-
making during WUI fires, the creation of a survey to be distributed to the case study community 
to understand the WUI fire awareness and the expected protective actions of residents, and the 
modelling of an evacuation of part of the community. It was the initial intention that the survey 
would be distributed, and the results analyzed as part of this stage of the project, however, due to 
time constraints (particularly from the required timeframe for highly complicated ethical 
clearances with the university and community agency partner) this was not possible. Assessing 
other factors that contribute to the case study community’s vulnerability such as those that 
contribute to wildfire dynamics (weather, topography, and fuel – moisture, physical properties and 
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arrangement) or the type and layout of the structures within the community were outside the scope 
of this current thesis. These will, however, be important to consider in the next stages of the project 
as it continues. A summary of the chapters within this thesis are provided below: 
1.7.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
The introduction provides an overview of the Canadian wildland urban interface, and the 
state of wildfires and WUI evacuations in Canada. It summarizes key global WUI fire events and 
provides context as to the need for a more comprehensive approach to WUI fire evacuations. It 
will identify new trends as well as gaps in WUI fire evacuation research and discusses the 
important role that HBiF plays in the development of comprehensive and effective tools to aid in 
improving wildfire evacuations.  
1.7.2 Chapter 2: Human Behaviour and Protective Action Decision-Making During 
Wildfires and Hurricanes 
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive literature review of wildfire and hurricane evacuation 
literature looking at the factors that affect the decision to evacuate. Given that the body of related 
literature is very small in Canada, the review focuses on wildfire literature from the United States 
and Australia. Hurricane literature from the United States is also reviewed to supplement the 
wildfire findings given that the field is more developed. The factors identified in the literature 
review were used to create a first-stage conceptual model for evacuation decision-making during 
wildfires using the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) as a framework [55]. This 
conceptual model is a first-step in improving the fire safety engineering community’s 
understanding of the factors that have the greatest impact on the different stages of the decision-
making process: pre-decision, credible threat and risk assessment, and protective action decision. 
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For completeness, a summary of the few Canadian studies is also given, however, they were not 
used in the creation of the conceptual model. 
1.7.3 Chapter 3: Communication and Notification During Hazards – Considerations for 
Canadian WUI Fire Evacuations 
Chapter 3 focuses on an important element identified by the conceptual model, namely, 
notification and communication. It explores the current Canadian public alerting system, with a 
focus on its new wireless alert component that allows messages to be sent to cellular devices. An 
exploratory case study analysis of the wireless system’s first official use in 2018 for an Amber 
Alert and the corresponding public response was conducted using Google Trends data. The 
implications of the findings from this case study are also discussed in the context of WUI fire 
evacuations. 
1.7.4 Chapter 4: Canadian Case Study 
Chapter 4 applies and further develops the insights gained in the previous two chapters to 
a Canadian WUI case study community. The chapter is broken into two main parts: the creation 
of a quantitative survey and an evacuation traffic simulation of the case study community. 
Part 1: Survey Creation and Data Collection Preparation 
The aim of the survey is to collect information about the factors influencing protective 
action decision-making within the context of a seasonal Canadian WUI community that does not 
have a recent history of a wildfire evacuation. As such, it is written to collect information about 
expected actions and behaviours, and how long people anticipate spending on specific pre-
evacuation tasks. Given that Canadian policy and practice heavily favours evacuation over staying 
and defending (and this is the most common practice seen in past Canadian WUI evacuations), the 
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survey questions primarily relate to evacuation and less so to staying and defending during a fire. 
The survey is based on the findings from Chapters 2 and 3, and incorporates questions looking at 
elements common to most of the literature reviewed as well as questions aiming to fill some of the 
current knowledge gaps. 
Part 2: Traffic Simulation  
 The traffic microsimulation software PTV Vissim was used to model an evacuation of part 
of the case study community. This software allows for dynamic traffic assessment, thereby 
enabling interactions between evacuees and the traffic environment, such as making enroute travel 
decisions, to be modelled. As microsimulation models are computationally more demanding given 
their level of detail, a specifically vulnerable area of the case study community was modelled (as 
opposed to the entire community) at this stage. Several simulations were run to see the impact that 
the number of evacuees and the speed of the evacuation had on the nature of the overall evacuation 
(total and individual evacuation times, location and degree of congestion).  
1.7.5 Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and discusses their impact on 
WUI fire safety and evacuations in Canada. It will discuss the limitations of the work along with 
recommendations for undertaking similar work in the future. Future work necessary for the 
continued advancement of the study of HBiF within a Canadian WUI fire context is addressed, 
including the next stages of the Canadian case study vulnerability assessment project.  
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Chapter 2: A First-Stage Conceptual Model of Human Behaviour in Response 
to Wildland Urban Interface Fires  
Research relating to WUI fire evacuations was collected to identify the factors that 
influence protective action decision-making and responses during these events, specifically 
whether someone chooses to evacuate or not. To supplement the findings, related hurricane 
evacuation literature was also reviewed for such factors. These factors were organized according 
to the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) and form a first-stage conceptual model of 
human behaviour during the initial stages of WUI fire evacuations. The goal of this chapter is to 
understand the factors that can affect protective action decision-making and their corresponding 
impact on public responses such that they can be accounted for in the creation of comprehensive 
evacuation strategies and modelling tools. 
2.1 Introduction and Purpose 
With more frequent and destructive wildfires occurring in the growing WUI as discussed 
in Chapter 1, the ability to ensure the safe evacuation of potentially large groups of people is of 
increasing importance. This is a challenging task made only more difficult by the fact that there is 
often little warning and that evacuations often need to take place in a short period of time. The 
creation of credible and effective evacuation models is needed within the fire safety engineering 
community to help address this challenge and has been called for by organizations such as the 
NFPA and IAFSS. Although potentially difficult to represent, a critical component in developing 
such models is the consideration of what people will do in response to a WUI fire. 
Modelling tools are available to simulate components of evacuations; however, some gaps 
in capabilities exist. Current modelling tools are either statistical or empirical in nature and/or 
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feature only one aspect of the incident; e.g. the fire development, the emergency response, the 
evacuation response, etc. [25]. As such, these models are incapable of explicitly representing the 
temporal and the highly coupled nature of an incident. Having a type of time-based, inclusive 
simulation approach would better enable the vulnerability of communities to be assessed. This 
would not only be beneficial for WUI evacuations, but for other types of community evacuations 
as well. 
Additionally, current evacuation simulation tools focus primarily on people or traffic 
movement, and in turn, neglect to simulate evacuation decision-making and behaviour that would 
prompt or prohibit evacuation movement to take place. Instead, a model often represents the 
probability of a particular response rather than representing the decision-making process through 
which an individual passes before selecting a response. In order to create such comprehensive 
evacuation tools, it is necessary to understand what factors affect evacuation decision-making and 
what information is necessary for evacuation models to be useful and effective. This understanding 
of evacuee decision-making comes from exploring existing research on public response to WUI 
fires and other disasters. 
The majority of current and past research on the factors that affect WUI fire protective 
action decision-making – sociodemographic factors, social and environmental cues, preparation 
and experience, risk assessment, etc. – available in English originates from the United States and 
Australia. There currently exists only a small body of such literature in Canada. Behavioural 
research on WUI fires is relatively new compared to research looking at other disaster types, and 
therefore a smaller amount of data has been collected. Fortunately, despite the differences among 
disaster types, there are several similarities which enable our understanding of WUI fire 
evacuations to be enhanced through an understanding of public responses to other disaster types. 
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For example, with respect to evacuations, there are similar challenges among longer-duration (or 
slow-onset) disasters regarding notification, timing, ingress and egress decisions and actions [56]. 
There is a substantial body of research that looks at such challenges and the factors that affect them 
with respect to disasters in general [57]–[61]. Additionally, the overall process that one goes 
through to make decisions and respond to natural or technological disasters is ultimately the same 
[55]. As such, looking at research relating to other disasters can further our understanding of how 
people will act and behave during WUI fires. 
While looking in detail at research from all disaster types (floods, earthquakes, man-made 
disasters, etc.) would provide the most comprehensive understanding of evacuation factors, it was 
within the scope of this thesis to compare two disaster types. Relevant U.S. and Australian WUI 
fire4 research was identified and reviewed along with hurricane research from the United States to 
determine potential environmental and social factors that affect protective action decision-making 
and response. Hurricane evacuations were chosen to maximize the amount of information available 
for comparison given the wealth of United States’ hurricane literature (available in English). 
Focusing on American studies also meant that additional cultural and political influences would 
not need to be considered (within this study). Although there are differences between wildfires and 
hurricanes, there are many similarities that make their focus in this review a reasonable exercise, 
e.g.:  
• the movement of wildfires and the track of hurricanes are dependent on many factors, 
making prediction difficult; 
                                                 
4 WUI fire research include that which referred to wildfires, bushfires and forest fires.  
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• both hazards provide similar timeframes for notification – including public alerts and 
warnings, in that they begin in one location and have the potential (over time) to negatively 
impact communities in its path; 
• both hazards have the capacity to displace large groups of people; and 
• both hurricanes and wildfires have the potential to change course or direction without 
warning, therefore potentially decreasing the time available to make protective action 
decisions. 
The factors identified by this review are organized according to the Protective Action 
Decision Model (PADM) to better understand what factors affect the different stages of the 
decision-making process [55]. From these factors, and their organization in the PADM, a first-
stage conceptual model of protective action decision-making for WUI fires has been developed. It 
is the intent that the collection and analysis of this information, and the development of a first-
stage conceptual model, will help to inform the development of broad and all-inclusive WUI fire 
evacuation models.  
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Evacuation Modelling 
In any WUI evacuation model, certain key components need to be addressed in order to 
simulate WUI fire scenarios to an acceptable degree of detail. In reference to the evacuation model, 
vehicle evacuation – including both private vehicles and public transportation – is the primary 
transport mode for affected populations during WUI fire incidents. This reliance on vehicles is 
often due to the scale of these incidents, the distances that need to be covered, the trend in 
household units to evacuate together, and the fact that the transport of goods/provisions (in addition 
to the evacuees) are often required during evacuations. Therefore, WUI evacuation models should 
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be capable of simulating the movement, route choice, and route destination of vehicles of varying 
capacities, which is covered in depth by the field of traffic modelling (see [25] for more details). 
It is important to understand that traffic performance (and modelling) is not independent 
of the actions of individuals (referred to here as pedestrians). Pedestrian decision-making and 
preparation will determine the time at which household units decide to initiate their evacuation as 
well as the time that they move from their starting location (e.g., home, business, hospital, care 
homes, school, etc.) and eventually enter the traffic system. For more information about pedestrian 
decision-making and evacuations in long term care and retirement homes, see Appendix F. This 
aspect of individual/household decision-making in WUI fire events is less developed, and in turn, 
not well represented in current disaster-based evacuation models. What is required are large-scale 
evacuation models that account for individual/household protective action decision-making before 
vehicular evacuation begins. Protective action decision-making is defined here as the process by 
which people make decisions based on the cues/information available (i.e., threat conditions) to 
protect themselves, others, and/or their property in the event of a WUI fire. Furthermore, current 
evacuation and traffic models could be improved if they were better able to account for behavioural 
choices of individuals/households based not only on threat conditions, but the interactions between 
individuals as well. A number of studies have previously explored the benefits of including such 
components into existing models [61]–[66].   
The first step in accounting for individual/household decision-making during WUI fires is 
made in this chapter. From a review of WUI fire and hurricane literature, a first-stage conceptual 
model of decision-making for WUI fires has been developed. The PADM is used as the foundation 
for the development of this model and is discussed in the following section.  
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2.2.2 Behavioural Modelling 
Over the last 50 years, numerous empirical studies have sought to systematically chart the 
social processes involved in human responses to emergency incidents [67]–[69]. Of these, the 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) is selected here as it provides a framework to 
understand how people protect themselves and one another in response to cues from a disaster 
event [55], [70]. This model was deemed most appropriate for the task of categorizing the factors 
affecting the different stages of the decision-making process to create a behavioural conceptual 
model for WUI fire evacuations.  
 
Figure 2.1: Protective Action Decision Model Framework (adapted from [55]) 
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The PADM asserts that the process of protective action decision-making begins when 
people are first presented with any kind of environmental cue, including physical and social cues 
and information. The introduction of these cues initiates a series of stages through which an 
individual passes prior to performing protective actions; e.g., initiating evacuation or deciding to 
stay and protect one’s home. These stages are split into pre‐decisional processes, which determine 
whether a decision‐making process commences (Pre-Decision in Figure 2.1), and into the key 
components of the decision‐making process itself (Credible Threat, Risk Assessment and 
Protective Action Decision in Figure 2.1).  
 Initially, the individual needs to receive a cue, pay attention to it, and comprehend the 
meaning associated with the cue (e.g., hearing an alerting signal, seeing flames, or smelling 
smoke). These represent the three pre‐decisional stages of the PADM (Pre-Decision 1‐3 in Figure 
2.1), the stages that determine whether external information is processed such that it can inform 
the decision-making process [55]. Given that this information is processed, it then needs to be 
assessed to determine whether the information provided is credible (Credible Threat in Figure 
2.1). At this stage, the individual decides if there is actually something occurring that may require 
action.  
If the individual considers there to be a threat, they next determine whether the threat is 
relevant to themselves (Risk Assessment in Figure 2.1), known as personalizing the threat (or risk). 
Research has shown that a person’s perception of personal risk, or “the individual’s expectation of 
personal exposure to death, injury, or property damage” is highly correlated with taking protective 
action [55], [68], [71], [72]. The individual tries to gain insight into the potential outcomes of the 
disaster and what those potential outcomes mean to his or her safety. If the cues are deemed to 
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relate to them, the individual then determines whether it is relevant and pressing. This then requires 
the individual to determine the nature of the response required at that point in time.   
At this stage (Protective Action Decision in Figure 2.1), the individual engages in a 
decision‐making process to identify a set of possible protective actions from which to choose. 
When it comes to taking protective actions in response to a WUI fire threat, there are ultimately 
two choices, to stay or to leave. Within the option of staying, households may choose to actively 
defend their home and property, or passively shelter in place (SIP), i.e., in their home, another 
location on their property or in their community. After establishing at least one protective action 
option, an individual engages in protective action assessment of these options and their current 
action. 
If at any stage the individual is uncertain about the situation, the individual engages in 
additional information-seeking actions or they simply wait until additional information is provided 
to them. If seeking information, they may search for other sources (e.g., websites, media, etc.) 
and/or reach out to other people to discuss the situation and what to do (also known as the milling 
process) [73], [74]. The greater the ambiguity involved in the situation, the more likely that 
individuals will search for additional information that can guide their actions [75], [76]. 
Information seeking is especially likely to occur when individuals think that time is available to 
gain additional insight. The individual continues in this action until sufficient information is 
available or time runs out [55]. During an incident, information received can be incomplete, 
ambiguous, or contradictory, causing uncertainty in understanding the nature of the event and the 
actions necessary [77], [78]. In these cases, progress in the stages of the PADM can be significantly 
delayed and/or promote inefficient or unsafe protective action behaviour. 
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2.3 Methodology 
The first-stage conceptual model discussed in this chapter was created by reviewing 
literature related to evacuation decision-making during WUI fires and hurricanes. This includes 
literature from various databases including Web of Science, Google Scholar, the NIST Research 
Library, and the York and Carleton University Libraries. The literature was obtained from peer-
reviewed journal articles, conference proceedings, book chapters, government agency and 
university reports. The literature includes both qualitative and quantitative studies, as well as 
related literature reviews and compendiums. A set of key search terms was identified, and 
additional terms were added as the research progressed. These terms included: Wildfire, Bushfire, 
Forest Fire, Wildland Urban Interface, WUI, Hurricane, Evacuation Behaviour/Decision/ 
Actions/Alternatives, Decision-Making, Evacuation Modelling, Shelter-In-Place, Protective 
Actions, Affecting/Influencing, and Risk Perception. The review includes primarily post-2000 
literature as the majority of related research for WUI fires and hurricanes was conducted during 
this time, however, a small number of commonly referenced hurricane research papers from the 
1990s were also included. The selected studies were reviewed to identify the factors deemed 
influential in the protective action decision-making process. The factors included in this chapter 
are those that were found by the authors of the reviewed literature to be significant based on each 
study’s own criteria. In the case of quantitative studies, these include factors that were deemed 
statistically significant. For the qualitative studies, these factors included those that were deemed 
notable by the researchers, based on the analysis methods employed. 
WUI fire literature from both the United States and Australia has been included, while the 
hurricane literature was limited to the United States. Given the limited and narrow nature of the 
research relating to the factors affecting protective action decision-making in a Canadian WUI fire 
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context, the few identified studies are not included in the creation of this first-stage conceptual 
model. However, Canadian-context considerations are discussed in Section 2.6.3. It is important 
to note that Australia and the United States have historically had very different approaches to 
wildfire policy. Australia’s policy of “prepare, stay and defend or leave early” and later “Prepare. 
Act. Survive,” allows for the practice of staying and defending one’s home. Conversely, in the 
United States, evacuating all people threatened by wildfires has been the long-accepted practice. 
Given these differences between Australian and U.S. wildfire policies, it is acknowledged that the 
findings given in the respective literature would have been influenced by the varying perspectives 
about wildfire safety and the role of evacuations. It is also understood that additional factors, both 
technical and non-technical, may exist that have an impact on the protective action decision-
making process. This is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The methodologies employed in the reviewed material differed, as some studies collected 
purely qualitative data, quantitative data, or a combination of both. Within these studies, some 
conducted correlation analysis, while others also utilized regression analysis. Varying sampling 
techniques and strategies were used, including surveys, questionnaires, interviews and focus 
groups. The size and nature of the samples also varied, with some sample groups having a greater 
awareness and interest in the risk posed to them by the hazard in question. Some studies collected 
post-disaster data, whereas others looked at intended actions. The definition of terms such as 
evacuation, as well as other aspects of the process, may have been different and in turn, measured 
differently between the studies. In addition, each paper discussed its own limitations within the 
context of the individual study. Commonly mentioned limitations included the accurate 
representation of a target population, survey response rate, hindsight bias, and issues related to the 
reliability of behavioural intention studies.  
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2.4 Factors Influencing Protective Action Decision-Making During WUI Fires 
This section details the factors identified in the literature relating to protective action 
decision-making during WUI fire events. A summary of the identified factors can be seen in 
Section 2.6.1, Table 2.1. Section 2.4.1 focuses solely on the factors affecting threat identification 
and risk assessment, since minimal to no data was found relating to the pre-decisional phases of 
the PADM (i.e., perception, attention, and comprehension). Next, Section 2.4.2 addresses factors 
affecting the decision to evacuate or not. Finally, Section 2.4.3 details additional factors relevant 
to delay, delay time and the specific types of actions undertaken. 
2.4.1 Credible Threat and Risk Assessment 
WUI fire literature was identified that discussed factors that affect the following PADM 
processes: identification of a credible threat and risk assessment. A few studies identified 
sociodemographic and cue-related factors, but the majority of factors were related to location, 
preparation and experience. 
One WUI fire study identified sociodemographic factors and their impact on threat and risk 
identification. Mozumder et al. [79] found that having a higher income or level of education was 
related to an increased level of concern that one’s home may be threatened by a wildfire. 
Additional studies explored the role of environmental and social cues in decision-making. In 
several studies, a fire cue was often noted to be a trigger that indicated a credible threat and a high 
level of risk inciting evacuation. This trigger could be the sight of others leaving [80]; sensory cues 
such as visible smoke, embers or flames; or information from trusted sources about the location 
and intensity of the fire [80], [81].  
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Studies also identified residence, location, knowledge and experience with WUI fires as 
influential to threat identification and risk assessment. First, the length of time a household lived 
in the area; i.e., residence time, was found to relate to the level of perceived wildfire risk. Newer 
residents were more likely to be concerned that their home was endangered, whereas long-term 
residents were more likely to feel that their property was safe [79], [82]. However, if a household 
had experienced previous property damage due to a wildfire, they were more likely to be concerned 
that their home would be endangered again [79]. Similarly, a household’s knowledge of previous 
fires in their community and area led to greater concern that wildfire may endanger their own 
home, impacting their assessment of risk and leading to a higher likelihood of evacuation [79], 
[83]. In a study looking at Australia’s 2009 Black Saturday Fires, it was also found that one’s 
location had an impact on their risk perception, as many people living in suburban locations had 
not considered themselves at risk to wildfire [84].  
2.4.2 Protective Action Decision 
The vast majority of WUI fire literature focused on identifying the factors that influence 
the protective action decision itself; i.e., the decision to stay or go. These factors were grouped 
into categories relating to sociodemographic factors, environmental and social cues, experience 
and preparation, familial and societal responsibilities, place/location, and credible threat and risk 
assessment.  
Sociodemographic Factors 
One of the most commonly cited demographic factors affecting the likelihood of 
evacuation was gender. Numerous pre- and post-disaster studies indicated that women were more 
likely than men to decide to evacuate, and that men were more likely than women to stay in place 
[79], [84]–[90]. On a similar note, Proudley [91] found that the roles people play within a family 
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had a large role in how people respond and behave during a WUI fire event. Among those who 
chose to stay, women were found more likely to report that they thought it was too dangerous to 
leave or that their attempt to leave had been unsuccessful [87]. The study found that protecting 
property was more often cited by men as their reason for staying, however, this was also a major 
reason for women as well.  
Additional sociodemographic factors that influenced evacuation decisions included 
political leaning, age, income and occupation. Mozumder et al. [79] found that in the United States, 
Democrats were more likely than Republicans to evacuate under both voluntary and mandatory 
evacuation orders. The average age of those who chose to stay and defend during the 2009 Black 
Saturday Fires was slightly higher than those who evacuated (51.5 years vs. 48.4 years), suggesting 
that age could be a potential factor [90]. One study found that people with a higher income were 
more likely to evacuate, and those employed by the wood products and insurance industries were 
more likely to stay and defend (implied by the authors as being potentially a result of having greater 
knowledge or skills related to wildfire management or danger) [89].  
Environmental and Social Cues 
The nature and number of cues received about a wildfire threat have been found to 
influence the protective action decision made. Rates of evacuation have been found to be higher 
when people receive multiple warnings from more than one source [83], and receiving advice to 
leave from friends, family, neighbours and emergency services was also found to influence 
evacuation (more so for women than men) [87]. However, Strawderman et al. [83] found that these 
sources had less impact than a more formal warning from authorities. McLennan et al. [90] found 
that a greater percentage of those who chose to evacuate had received information about the fire 
from neighbours or emergency personnel in a face-to-face setting. Similarly, receiving a voluntary 
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or mandatory evacuation order was found to increase the likelihood of evacuating, with the latter 
having a greater effect [79]; however, this may not always be the case [92].  
Preparation and Experience  
Preparation for WUI fires and experience with these events can also influence protective 
action decisions. Commitment to a previously developed plan to stay and defend, coupled with a 
belief that preparations taken were sufficient to meet the perceived level of risk, was a principal 
factor in staying and defending [80], [81], [90], [93]. Similarly, a lack of preparedness and planning 
to stay has been found as influential on evacuation decisions, showing that levels of wildfire 
preparedness and knowledge were higher among those who chose to stay and defend versus those 
who evacuated [90]. Having a plan to evacuate made people less likely to consider staying and 
defending and more likely to evacuate [89], [94]. Additionally, studies found that those who 
intended to stay and defend had greater confidence in their perceived physical readiness and ability 
to successfully defend their homes than did those who intended to evacuate [90], [95], [96].  
In reference to previous experience, Whittaker and Handmer [84] found that previous false 
alarms – i.e., evacuations or evacuation orders later deemed unnecessary – led people to be less 
likely to evacuate in the future, while Benight et al. [82] found that such experience did not have 
a negative impact on future evacuation intentions. Other studies found that those who had 
evacuated in previous WUI fire events were more likely than those without such experience to 
evacuate in the future [83]. This variation in the influence of previous evacuations was also noted 
by Cohn et al. [85], who found that for some, previous experience motivated immediate 
evacuation; for others, it resulted in evacuation after a longer period of time, and for others still, it 
made them less inclined to evacuate at all as they deemed it unnecessary. 
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Familial and Social Responsibilities 
Various studies show that there are several factors related to familial and social roles and 
responsibilities that influence protective action decisions. It was found that having children in a 
household not only influenced evacuation behaviour, but it also prompted a quicker response – 
either immediately upon threat awareness or under a voluntary evacuation order [90], [96]. 
Conversely, those with pets or livestock were more likely to wait and see or stay and defend than 
those without [79], [90], [96]. The impact that having livestock had on decisions to stay was found 
to be stronger than the impact of pets [79]. As noted by Tibbits and Whittaker [93], focus groups 
revealed that for many farmers and people whose livelihoods depend on their livestock, there was 
a feeling that they had no choice but to stay and defend, for economic reasons as well as for the 
welfare of their animals.  
For those who choose to stay and defend, connections to their community and emotional 
attachment to their property were found to be motivating factors [81], [90], [94]. Studies found 
that concerns about personal and family safety were motivating factors for people intending to 
evacuate [94], [96], whereas a desire to protect property with the acceptance of some personal risk 
was found to motivate those intending to stay and defend [85]. Another reason Cohn et al. [85] 
identified for staying was the concern about an inability to return for an extended period of time. 
According to Tibbits and Whittaker [93], people’s confidence in their own ability to defend their 
property was influenced by active emergency and firefighting officials in the area, as well as by 
having more than one able-bodied person in the home to help defend; however, other studies found 
no such evidence [90]. Paveglio et al. [89] found that the belief that residents who live near forests 
should accept the likelihood of some level of potential property damage was found more 
commonly among those who choose to stay and defend [89]. Similarly, McLennan et al. [81] found 
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that some of those who chose to stay and defend during the Black Saturday Fires of 2009 were 
more likely to believe that they were to some extent responsible for protecting their own property, 
as opposed to relying entirely on emergency personnel. 
Place and Location 
The decision to evacuate has been shown to be influenced by the location and 
length/frequency of residence. Some residents of rural areas have been found to decide to stay in 
place as they deem it impractical given the time and distance required to reach a safe area [89], 
[93]; however, other studies found no effect of property location on protective action decision-
making [90]. In a more general sense, the belief that evacuation was no longer safe was found by 
McLennan et al. [80] to be a factor contributing to the decision to stay and defend in some cases. 
Conversely, Strawderman et al. [83] found that those living in a rural area or on a farm were more 
likely to evacuate than those living in subdivisions or urban areas. Paveglio et al. [89] noted that 
full-time residents were less likely to evacuate than part-time residents.  
Credible Threat and Risk Assessment 
The assessment of risk was identified by various studies as being an important factor in the 
decision to evacuate [79], [83], [94], though not universally across all studies [89], [95]. For those 
who intended to evacuate, “risk” could be defined as a concern that one’s life and home would be 
endangered [79], [94]; for those who intended to wait and see or stay and defend, “risk” 
corresponded to danger associated with leaving unnecessarily and having to drive through 
hazardous conditions [94], [97]. McLennan et al. [94] noted that while those intending to leave 
were more likely to report higher levels of concern about wildfire danger, they were no more likely 
than those intending to stay to believe that they were at greater risk than others.  
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Delay and Actions 
A number of factors have been identified which affect the time it takes to make a decision. 
The decision to ‘wait and see’ has been shown to be influenced by people’s perception of their 
capability of successfully defending their home/property against spot fires [98]. It has been 
indicated by Paveglio et al. [89] that in the United States, those planning on employing shelter in 
place are likely to ‘wait and see’ how bad the fire gets, and potentially evacuate if conditions 
degrade. McNeill et al. [99] found that the biggest cause for decision delay is a lack of distinct 
attractiveness of one option over another. That is, both the option of evacuating or staying and 
defending are similarly appealing. They found this to have more of an impact on decision delay 
than a lack of perceived risk, sociodemographic or responsibility avoidance. Additionally, Rhodes 
[97] notes that ‘waiting and then leaving when threatened’ is seen by some to be an acceptable 
strategy that allows for the increased chances of protecting property and life safety. Individuals 
who ‘wait and see’ do not necessarily see their actions as being risky [98]. In their review of 
literature from the United States, Canada and Australia, McLennan et al. [50] found that many 
people are likely to delay leaving (because they want to protect their property or avoid the costs of 
evacuating – financial burden, dangers during evacuation) and therefore it should not be assumed 
that all those threatened by a WUI fire will evacuate immediately upon receiving an evacuation 
order or warning.   
There are also a number of factors that influence the actions people take once they have 
decided to evacuate. Often times, people prepare, including collecting their belongings and 
packing vehicles, before evacuating; especially in cases where pre-fire preparations are lacking 
[82], [83] and even among those who originally chose to stay and defend, but considered 
evacuation as a last-minute possibility [93]. Also, families tend to leave together as a group, 
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sometimes with neighbours and extended family as well [85]. Evacuees will often search for others 
and inquire about what they have heard about the event before packing up and leaving [85]. These 
actions have the potential to increase the time it takes to evacuate. 
2.5 Factors Influencing Protective Action Decision-Making During Hurricanes 
This section details factors influencing protective action decision-making during 
hurricanes as found in the related literature. Table 2.1 is Section 2.6.1 provides a summary of these 
factors in comparison to those identified in the WUI fire literature. As with the WUI fire data 
discussed in Section 4, there was no discussion of factors affecting the pre-decisional phases of 
the PADM, and because of this, only those factors that influence threat identification and risk 
assessment are discussed (Section 2.5.1). Additionally, Section 2.5.2 discusses factors that 
influence the decision to act, i.e., stay or go. Finally, factors relating to delay, delay time, and 
specific types of actions taken are discussed in Section 2.5.3. 
2.5.1 Credible Threat and Risk Assessment 
Literature was found that identified factors that influence threat identification and risk 
assessment. These factors include sociodemographic factors, as well as those relating to 
environmental and social cues, place/location, and experience. 
First, sociodemographic factors were identified as influential to threat identification and 
risk assessment. In their analysis of gender roles in hurricane evacuations, Bateman and Edwards 
[100] found that women were more likely than men to perceive higher levels of risk. Even more 
complicated is that studies have found the perception of risk to be a mediating variable between 
gender and evacuation behaviour – in that while men were less likely to perceive risk, men who 
did perceive risk were more likely than women (with comparable levels of risk) to evacuate.  
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Environmental and social cues have been identified by several studies as playing a role in 
the identification of a credible threat and assessment of risk. Storm intensity and severity were 
found to be of primary concern and were seen as key indicators of personal risk [101], [102]. 
Additionally, the perceived potential for flooding was found to influence the perception of risk 
more than forecasts for high winds [102] or the risk of storm surge [103]. Huang et al. [104] found 
that in addition to environmental cues, social cues also had an impact on risk assessment. Official 
warnings were determined to have a positive effect on both the identification of a credible threat 
and risk assessment.  
Studies also identified location and experience in hurricanes as influential to threat 
identification and risk assessment. Surprisingly, it was found that those farther from the coast 
perceive more severe storm characteristics, potentially as a result of the types of environmental 
cues faced by residents in different locations [104]. For example, Stein et al. [103] found that there 
was a heightened perception of risk due to the wind rather than flooding or storm surge for 
residents outside of the evacuation zone. Additionally, having previous hurricane experience has 
been shown to increase the perception of credible threat and risk [104]. However, experience with 
unnecessary evacuation was found to have an impact on lowered risk levels, leading to the belief 
that previous positive outcomes indicated positive outcomes in the future.  
2.5.2 Protective Action Decision 
As was found when looking at the WUI fire literature, most of the factors discussed in the 
hurricane literature were found to influence the actual protective action decision. These included 
sociodemographic factors, and those relating to environmental and social cues, experience and 
preparation, familial and societal responsibilities, place/location, and credible threat and risk 
assessment. 
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Sociodemographic Factors 
It was noted by a number of researchers that females were more likely than males to 
evacuate [105]–[108]. However, other studies found that when other factors, such as roles and 
responsibilities within the family and location within the risk areas were taken into account, the 
effect of gender on evacuation decision was insignificant [100], [104]. In general, the likelihood 
of evacuating has been found to be higher among younger individuals [100], [106], with the 
exception of those who classified themselves as retirees who have been found to be more likely to 
evacuate [100], [109] (even more so with women than with men [100]). It should be noted that 
other studies found no significant association between age and evacuation [109], [110]. Conflicting 
results have been found for other socio-demographic factors such as income, education, marital 
status, and race. Some studies have found these factors to have a significant influence on 
evacuation [102], [105], [110]–[113], while other studies have found that these factors do not play 
a significant role [100], [109], [114].  
Environmental and Social Cues 
Receiving information about a hurricane threat or an evacuation notice from a trusted 
source, particularly from family, peers or authorities, tended to lead to a higher likelihood of 
evacuation [106], [112]. Other sources of information such as national television stations, were 
also identified as influential and, depending on the situation, could have a greater impact on 
evacuation decisions than other information sources [114]. One of the most influential social cues 
on the decision to evacuate was receiving an official evacuation order or warning [104], [106], 
[109]. Both voluntary and mandatory evacuation orders have been found to increase the likelihood 
of evacuation, with the latter having a greater effect [102], [111], [112], [115], [116].  
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It has been found that one’s location inside or outside of an evacuation zone can impact the 
outcome of such evacuation orders. For example, those located outside of the evacuation zone 
were less likely to evacuate, unless they received information about the evacuation order from the 
media, which then prompted them to evacuate unnecessarily [103]. The effect of the news media 
was found to have a minimal impact on those inside evacuation zones. Conversely, Lazo et al. 
[107] noted that perceived evacuation zone did not have a significant impact on evacuation 
behaviour.  
The type of information disseminated about the storm was also found to play an important 
role in the decision to evacuate. Dow and Cutter [115] noted that the probability and location of 
hurricane landfall were important factors affecting evacuation decisions. Information on wind 
speeds [116], storm strength [108], [111], [114] and storm severity [109], [115] were also 
identified as influential to the decision to evacuate. However, location, such as coastal proximity, 
and the fact that public officials tend to disseminate stronger messages during stronger storms, can 
mediate the influence of such storm indicators [106], [109]. The mediation effect caused by other 
factors was also noted when it came to the effect of observing others. Observing neighbours and 
peers leaving, or the absence of neighbours who have already left, has been shown to increase the 
likelihood of evacuating [100], [106], particularly in the case of residents in non-evacuation zones 
[103]. However, other research found that neighbourhood evacuation was strongly related to high-
risk areas and with actions taken by officials, therefore making it difficult to identify the 
independent strength of this factor [109]. 
Preparation and Experience  
Previous experience with hurricanes and hurricane evacuations is a potentially influential 
factor in hurricane evacuation decisions [105]. Numerous studies have found such experience to 
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lead to increased likelihood of evacuation [101], [107], [110], [113], [114]. Petrolia and 
Bhattacharjee [116] found that past storm experience had a significant impact on future evacuation 
intention; however, the nature of the experience determined whether the person was inclined to 
stay or go.  For example, past experience has been found to negatively impact evacuation in 
instances where past evacuations were viewed as unnecessary [104], [112]. It should be noted that 
other studies have found the impact of past experience to be insignificant [106], though others 
point out that it can contribute to awareness of the hazard and potentially produce a greater 
appreciation for the danger it may pose [109]. Murray-Tuite et al. [110] noted a level of consistency 
between previous evacuation actions, with 70% of study respondents making the same protective 
action decisions for both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ivan.  
People who had created a household evacuation plan were more likely to evacuate [100], 
[107] and those who had spent more money on household storm preparation and planning were 
less likely to evacuate [114]. Increased knowledge about hurricanes was not found to impact 
evacuation decisions [109].  
Familial and Social Responsibilities 
The strength and viability of one’s social network have been found to have an impact on 
evacuation decisions, with those who have stronger social support being more likely and able to 
evacuate [113], [117]. Riad et al. [113] noted that it was a weaker social network, and not poverty, 
that was the greatest obstacle to evacuation for those with fewer resources.  
The desire to keep one’s family safe was identified as being one of the strongest influences 
on evacuation intention [107]. In line with this, research has found family size and the presence of 
children to impact the decision to evacuate. However, this impact varies. Studies have found that 
having children in the household can positively impact evacuation [106], [108], [112], [114], 
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negatively impact evacuation [110], or have no effect at all [100], [109]. Similarly, the impact of 
family size is unclear [100], [110], [114].  
Work responsibilities and the potential loss of income due to evacuating have been found 
to significantly impact the decision to stay [112], [115]. Additionally, wanting to protect property 
from the storm and/or from looters [109], [111] and having pets or livestock decreased the 
likelihood of evacuation [102], [111], [114]. Concerns regarding perceived evacuation 
impediments, including traffic congestion, reduced the likelihood of evacuation [104], [115]. In 
line with this, people tended to consider a wide variety of indirect costs associated with evacuation 
such as travel costs, care for pets, and potential difficulties with re-entering the evacuation zone 
[115].  
Place and Location 
The vulnerability of one’s home to hurricanes has been shown to impact the likelihood of 
evacuation, though the strength of this factor varies depending on the study. In the case of 
hurricanes, vulnerability is most often classified as living in a mobile home, and for those who do, 
studies show that they are more likely to evacuate [100], [108]–[110], [114], [116]. Conversely, 
some research indicated an insignificant correlation between evacuation and mobile home 
residence [106].  
Other research on place and location has found that living in multi-family dwellings can 
increase the likelihood of evacuation [110]; however, not all studies agree [111]. Homeownership, 
compared with renting, is also identified as an influential factor for non-evacuation in some studies 
[108], [112], [114], with longer-term residents being less likely to evacuate than shorter-term 
residents [113]. However, not all studies found significant results [109]. The belief that one’s home 
was a safe place was identified by Dow and Cutter [115] as being the first consideration in deciding 
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to stay, followed by traffic, work responsibilities and the likelihood that landfall would be nearby. 
In line with this, living near the coast or bodies of inland water, or in flood areas has been shown 
to lead to increased levels of evacuation [100], [104], [106], [109], [114]. However, context matters 
here. The factors of the population within the coastal communities, e.g., income and other 
demographics, should also be taken into account [110].  
Credible Threat and Risk Assessment 
As the PADM model shows, risk perception is a critical factor that influences protective 
action decisions. Those who felt safe in their home were more likely to stay, and those who felt 
unsafe were more likely to leave [101], [109], [113]. Individuals who were concerned about costly 
damages favoured evacuation [109], [111], as did those who perceived personal vulnerability to 
wind and storm surge [107].  
Delay and Actions 
Some research found that those living farther from the coast were more likely to wait before 
making their decision to evacuate compared to those closer to the coast [116]; however, they were 
more likely to take less time to prepare – i.e., spending less time protecting their property, packing 
and securing their home [106], [118]. Not having an evacuation destination identified ahead of 
time (pre-storm) was identified as contributing to added confusion and subsequently delay as a 
result of not knowing what protective action decision to make [116]. Additionally, large 
households tended to evacuate later and took more vehicles, whereas older adults tended to 
evacuate earlier [118].  
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2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1 Similarities and Differences Between WUI Fire and Hurricane Factors 
For this chapter, the factors mentioned in Section 2.4 and 2.5 above, for WUI fire and 
hurricane events respectively, are structured according to the PADM framework. This allows for 
a more comprehensive understanding of how a given factor will affect the evacuee decision-
making process and how this effect might propagate through this process, potentially affecting the 
time it takes to respond and the outcome of the response. As will be shown in the discussion below, 
it was often found that a particular factor influenced more than one part of this process. A summary 
of the identified factors is presented below in Table 2.1. Factors that were identified solely in 
qualitative studies are denoted with an asterisk (*), all other factors were found in quantitative 
studies or in both qualitative and quantitative studies.  
For both hurricanes and WUI fires, very little research was found that identified the factors 
affecting the pre-decisional phases (i.e., receipt of, attention paid to, and comprehension of cues 
and information). The only study identified discussed how hot weather may have prevented 
awareness of the Black Saturday Fires as the heat prompted people to stay indoors [86]. Identifying 
additional factors that affect the pre-decisional phases will enable WUI evacuation models to more 
effectively and comprehensively represent potential obstacles to resident fire threat awareness. 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 2.1: Hurricane and WUI Fire PADM Factors  
PADM Stage Wildfire Hurricane 
Pre-Decision Weather [86]* Not Applicable 
  
Credible Threat and 
Risk Assessment 
    
Income/Education  [79] Coastal proximity [103], [104] 
Trusted sources [80], [81]* Environmental cues [101]–[103] 
Length of time lived in area  [79], [82] Gender [100] 
Location  [84]* 
Observe others [80]* 
Previous hurricane experience, unnecessary 
evacuations [104] 
Previous experience with wildfires, knowledge of 
other fires [79], [83] 
Social cues [104] 
Trusted sources [104] 
Sensory – environmental [80], [81]*  
    
Protective Action 
Decision 
Sociodemographic Factors  Sociodemographic Factors  
[79], [82], [84]–[91] [100], [102], [104]–[114] 
● Age ● Education 
● Gender ● Gender 
● Income ● Income 
● Occupation ● Marital status 
● Political leaning ● Race 
  ● Retired 
    
Environmental/Social Cues  Environmental/Social Cues  
[79], [83], [87], [90], [92] 
[100], [102]–[104], [106]–[109], [111], [112], 
[114]–[116] 
● Evacuation order ● Environmental cues 
● Multiple sources ● Evacuation order 
● Telling other people ● Observing neighbours 
● Trusted source ● Trusted source 
● Wait and see  
 
    
Preparation/Experience  Preparation/Experience 
[80]–[85], [89], [90], [93]–[96]   
[100], [101], [104]–[107], [109], [110], [112]–
[114], [116] 
● Belief in capacity/survivability ● Plan 
● 
● 
Commitment to plan 
Preparation and knowledge 
● Previous experience (hurricane and/or 
evacuations) 
● Previous evacuation/fire experience   
    
Familial and Societal Responsibilities  Familial and Societal Responsibilities 
[79], [81], [85], [89], [90], [93], [94], [96] [100], [102], [104], [106]–[115], [117] 
● Attachment to home/community/ desire to 
protect property 
● 
● 
Protect property (from storm and looters) 
Keep family safe (children, family size) 
● Children ● Pets/livestock 
● Pets/livestock ● Social network 
  ● Work responsibilities  
    
Place/Location  Place/Location  
[80], [83], [89], [90], [93] [100], [104], [106], [108]–[116] 
● Distance to neighbours ● Dwelling type (mobile home, multi-family) 
● Full time vs. part time residents ● Coastal/water proximity 
● Rural vs. suburban ● Home as a safe place 
  ● Home ownership and length of residence 
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Table 2.1: Hurricane and WUI Fire PADM Factors (continued) 
PADM Stage Wildfire Hurricane 
Protective Action 
Decision (cont.) 
Risk Assessment/Credible Threat  Risk Assessment/Credible Threat  
[79], [83], [89], [94], [95], [97] [101], [107], [109], [111], [113] 
● Assessment of effectiveness ● Risk of flooding, high cost damages  
● Concern   
● Risk/danger (staying or leaving)   
        
Delay and Actions Families stay together [85]* Age  [118] 
Gathering physical possessions [82], [93]  Evacuation destination  [116] 
Indecision  [99] Household size  [118] 
Wait and see [50], [89], [97], [98] Location [106], [116], [118] 
        
 
With respect to the threat identification and risk assessment stages of the PADM, similar 
factors were identified in the hurricane and WUI fire case studies. Within the sociodemographic 
factor category, income, education and gender were identified as having potential impacts on the 
assessment of threat and risk in both the WUI fire and hurricane literature. Similarly, within the 
environmental and social cue category, triggers were important factors identified for both hazards. 
For instance, for WUI fires, environmental cues consisted of smelling or seeing flames, embers or 
smoke; and for hurricanes, environmental and social cues consisted of storm intensity and severity, 
as well as the risk of flooding due to heavy rain or storm surge. Both data sets found that social 
cues, such as observing others leaving, receiving information from trusted sources, or receiving an 
evacuation order increased the credibility of a threat and the perception of risk. Place and location, 
as well as preparation and experience, were also factor categories found to play a role in threat and 
risk assessment in both hazards. In both cases, it is important to note that previous experience alone 
was not enough to influence behaviour. This factor is more nuanced in that the type of experience 
(e.g., positive or negative), is what influenced threat identification and/or risk assessment.  
Most of the factors identified in this literature review played a role in the protective action 
decision-making stage of the PADM. With respect to sociodemographic factors, gender was found 
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to be the most commonly discussed factor for both WUI fires and hurricanes. In both cases, it was 
predominantly the case that women were identified as being more likely than men to evacuate. 
These findings must be taken in context, as when other factors associated with gender roles were 
considered (e.g., roles and responsibilities within the home), the impact of gender became 
insignificant in some studies. Moving forward, it would be beneficial to delve further into the role 
of gender in evacuation decision-making and response. Additional sociodemographic factors such 
as age and income were mentioned in both WUI fire and hurricane research, but they were 
identified less often, and/or their influence was often contradicted by findings from other studies.  
In a general sense, environmental and social factors that influenced evacuation decision-
making were similar in both the WUI fire and hurricane literature; i.e., observing others; receiving 
warnings from multiple sources, especially from trusted sources; and receiving evacuation orders 
(especially those mandatory in nature) tending to result in a decision to evacuate.  Place and 
location were also identified in both data sets as influential to evacuation decision-making. 
Influential factors identified were locations (i.e., rural versus suburban), residency, neighbour 
proximity, home vulnerability, home ownership, length of residence, and proximity to the hazard 
(i.e., the coast in reference to the hurricane studies and proximity to the fire front in a WUI fire). 
It is important to note; however, that the findings were not consistent across the studies, making it 
even more important for additional research to be performed on evacuation behaviour in response 
to hazards.  
Researchers identified that preparation and previous experience influenced protective 
action decision-making for both WUI fire and hurricanes. Similar to its impact on threat 
identification and risk assessment, the effect of previous experience is complex, requiring an 
understanding of the type or nature of the experience (i.e., positive or negative). Familial and 
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societal responsibilities also affected decision-making in both WUI fires and hurricanes. Having 
children, a need to protect the family, family size, and owning pets and livestock were found to 
influence evacuation behaviour. The influence of pets and livestock might be influenced by 
restrictive shelter policies and/or boarding facilities requiring proof of vaccination (which 
evacuees are unlikely to have with them). Additionally, having a connection to one’s community, 
wanting to protect property, and believing that one could successfully do so were also factors that 
were discussed along with the impact of one’s social network and work responsibilities. Similarly, 
factors highlighting the important role of threat credibility and risk perception in evacuation 
decision-making was found in both data sets. The risk to life versus property, as well as the 
likelihood of evacuation being the safest option (versus being potentially dangerous), were 
examples of risk assessment impacts on WUI fire evacuation. The hurricane data showed that the 
risk of varying types of storm-related impacts such as flooding, storm surge and wind influenced 
people’s likelihood of evacuating.  
Lastly, factors influencing delay, delay time, and specific types of actions included 
confidence in one’s capability to defend one’s home in the face of a WUI fire, coastal proximity, 
age, family size and having (or lacking) a destination choice. Post-decision actions were identified 
by a few WUI fire papers and these included collecting belongings, checking on and waiting for 
family/friends, and deciding on the evacuation destination and travel routes to get there.  
The factors identified in Table 2.1 aid in the development of a conceptual model of 
protective action decision-making in WUI fires. Factors have been linked with various stages of 
the PADM, to create the framework for a model that can conceptually explain eventual decisions 
to evacuate or stay in place (either to defend the home or to shelter in place). The factors identified 
from the hurricane studies fill in gaps left behind by the WUI fire studies to develop a more 
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comprehensive model. The framework, or conceptual model presented in Table 2.1, can be further 
developed, quantified, calibrated and validated with actual data on protective action response from 
a WUI fire event to eventually create a computational simulation of a WUI fire evacuation. 
2.6.2 Conceptual Model Considerations 
The conceptual model presented here has several limitations. First, individual study 
conditions can vary by hazard conditions, populations, and community environment, which in turn, 
can affect the factors identified as influential to evacuation decision-making and response. Also, 
the WUI fire studies reviewed focused on U.S. and Australian populations, which can differ by 
evacuation policy, preparedness and experience. Within both Australia’s former wildfire 
evacuation policy and its current one, there is a greater acceptance of staying and defending, while 
in the U.S., community officials almost exclusively disseminate mandatory (and sometimes 
voluntary) evacuations to threatened communities5. Delays (or “wait and see” behaviours) still 
occur in U.S. fire evacuations; however, issues of data applicability lie in the final decision to stay 
or go. Policies in one country may affect evacuee perception of viable evacuation alternatives 
and/or their experience or knowledge with such evacuation alternatives (which then influences the 
eventual decision). Very little data (in English) is available on evacuation decision-making and 
behaviour during WUI fires in countries other than the United States and Australia. Studies of 
WUI fires in other countries would strengthen and broaden the scope of the conceptual model 
developed here as would collaboration with researchers from multiple countries so that research 
in languages other than English could be included.  
                                                 
5 Despite the practiced policy of evacuation in the United States, a number of studies suggest a growing number of 
people do not want or intend to evacuate automatically in the event of a wildfire and a small number of communities 
have looked into implementing a version of evacuation alternatives, primarily shelter in place [79], [92], [135], 
[181]. With that said, such cases are very rare and such methods are still typically seen as a last resort if evacuation 
is not a possibility. 
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2.6.3 A Canadian Context Exploration 
As noted earlier, there is little research looking at WUI fire protective action decision-
making in Canada. The majority of Canadian wildfire research is focused on wildfire mitigation 
(e.g.,  [119]–[121]), wildfire risk management and assessment (e.g., [122]–[124]), and the impact 
of climate and climate change (e.g., [125]–[127]). As noted in Chapter 1, there has been one study 
looking at WUI evacuations in Canada between 1980 and 2007 which focused on the number of 
wildfire events and evacuees, their location, the timing of the evacuations (season and duration), 
the characteristics of the wildfire, the weather, the vegetation, the spatial variation, the impact of 
smoke, the loss of structures, the number of fatalities and the quality of the available data [20].  
The small body of research that has been conducted about factors influencing WUI fire 
evacuation decisions in Canada has focused primarily on First Nations and Metis communities 
[51]–[53]. These identified studies were qualitative and generally had a small sample size. Often 
the communities studied were very isolated. One study found that residents had to be evacuated 
via plane or helicopter as there was no direct road access [53]. This increased the complexity and 
challenges associated with the evacuation, including having to evacuate people in small groups 
following a “risk triage protocol” (most vulnerable first – those with respiratory issues, the elderly, 
pregnant women, etc.) and therefore having to separate families or social units. This was identified 
by the authors as increasing peoples’ reluctance to evacuate. In another study looking at a First 
Nation community that evacuated due to smoke from a nearby wildfire, it was found that over half 
of those interviewed did not want to evacuate [52]. This included “residents who did not want to 
leave pictures and other precious belongings behind; perceived the fire risk to be low; wanted to 
stay home and carry out their usual activities; felt uncomfortable staying in a town or evacuation 
centre; and wanted to obtain firefighting work” [52]. Of those who did not want to evacuate, a few 
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ended up leaving for the sake of children, at the insistence of a friend or when escorted by the 
police. In a study that looked at intended and preferred evacuation actions, all participants indicated 
that they would prefer to stay and defend as opposed to evacuating [51]. It was noted that the 
perceived safety of the participants’ properties contributed to this intention. The participants were 
concerned about leaving their homes unprotected, about the spoiling of food stocks and what they 
would do with livestock and dogsled teams if they left. For the majority of the participants, their 
confidence in their ability to defend their property was found to be dependent on the severity of 
the fire, with most stating that they might consider leaving their properties if a fire became too 
extreme. This is reflective of findings from some Australian and American studies discussed 
earlier in this Chapter. It was also found that participants had little to no wildfire experience and 
were unsure what to expect should they stay and defend during a wildfire event. All participants 
felt that sheltering in place seemed counter-intuitive and over half said that they would not feel 
comfortable passively sheltering in their home during a wildfire. This draws attention to the 
important distinction between the intention to passively shelter or actively defend one’s property.   
With respect to Canadian studies looking at more populous and non-Indigenous 
communities, only one study was found. This study looked at Fort McMurray residents’ 
experiences with the 2016 wildfire evacuation [128]. Through an online survey one month after 
the fire, it was identified that prior to the fire, most respondents felt that the threat of a wildfire 
was low. They became aware of the fire through many different means, ranging from seeing the 
fire to hearing about it on the radio or from a family member.6 In looking at the time between 
notification and evacuation, the study found that 11.7% of respondents had to leave immediately, 
                                                 
6 The paper does not discuss if multiple sources were used to get information about the fire or how different sources 
impacted evacuation decisions or actions. 
52 
 
while most people (52.7%) spent between 15 and 60 minutes getting ready to leave. It was also 
noted that over half of respondents had trouble leaving their neighbourhood and the city due to 
congestion or not knowing which direction to go. 
Given the occurrence in recent years of WUI fires that have resulted in multiple and mass 
evacuations such as those in Alberta [24] and British Columbia [129], it is important that more 
research into evacuation decision-making in Canada is undertaken. Such research should look at 
both the general populous and specific groups, and at both small and large communities. This 
would allow planners, government agencies and emergency management personnel to have a 
better understanding of Canadians’ responses to WUI fire events in different parts of the country 
and would improve the accuracy of future egress models to represent Canadian WUI fire 
evacuations as well as the ability to assess WUI community vulnerability. 
2.6.4 Future Model Development and Research Needs 
As mentioned earlier, Section 2.6.1 and Table 2.1 provide the first-stage conceptual model 
of protective action decision-making in WUI fire (and hurricane) events. Factors are identified as 
influential to each step of the PADM (noting that there is little research that identifies influential 
factors of the pre-decisional phases). The next step in conceptual model development is to identify 
the ways in which the factors that influence the same decision-making phase interact with one 
another in a more integrated manner. In reality, many of these factors are highly coupled and this 
may affect the outcome in complex ways (i.e. additive, counteractive and multiplicative). 
Reconciling these interactions is not a trivial task (and one that requires additional empirical 
support), but it is necessary for the continued development of this type of conceptual model. For 
instance, Dash and Gladwin [105] identified risk perception as having a greater impact on 
hurricane evacuation than negative past experience such as traffic delays. Similarly, it was found 
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that risk perception could have a bigger impact than evacuation warnings if people believed their 
homes were safe as they were less likely to interpret such warnings or orders as being directly 
applicable to them and their situation [109]. This was also shown to apply in the reverse where 
environmental cues led people to evacuate even when they were not under an evacuation order 
[103]. For these reasons, understanding factor interactions at each decision-making phase of the 
PADM will be vital when translating these concepts into a quantitative model. 
This work has focused on establishing a qualitative first-stage framework identifying the 
social and environmental factors to be considered within a WUI evacuation model. For 
implementation within a computational platform, this framework would need to be quantified. 
Work is currently underway by researchers to create a quantitative modelling framework (based 
on the framework adopted and developed here) to simulate householder risk perception given a 
WUI fire event and to predict householder protective actions [130]. Such predictions could be 
embedded within a simulation tool to make time-based estimations of the consequences of the 
decisions made by residents in conjunction with the resources available, the fire incident 
conditions and the existing physical infrastructure. An understanding of such consequences would 
be of great benefit in planning and design, vulnerability assessment, emergency response, and in 
post-incident investigations when attempting to assess the effectiveness of the emergency plans 
enacted. Provided here is a list of research gaps that need to be addressed to facilitate the 
development and validation of the conceptual model described above and the subsequent 
implementation within a simulation tool: 
1. The factors that influence the three pre-decisional phases, including perception, attention, 
and comprehension. 
2. The relationship between previous experience and PADM processes and mediating factors. 
54 
 
3. A more current representation of the relationship between gender and PADM processes 
and mediating factors. 
4. The factors that influence specific actions taken before evacuation movement begins, as 
well as the time to complete those actions. 
5. The factors that influence evacuation decisions, such as route choice and choice of final 
evacuation destination. 
6. An understanding of the interaction of factors and their resulting outcomes. 
7. Data from studies on WUI fires from populations in countries outside of the U.S. and 
Australia. 
8. The influence of changing demographics of people living in the WUI on evacuation 
decision-making and response (e.g. new WUI residents and long-term aging WUI 
residents). 
9. The influence of a changing WUI landscape (e.g. environmental conditions) on evacuation 
decision-making and response, especially where communities are now vulnerable to WUI 
fires for the first time.   
2.7 Summary 
The increasing prevalence of large and destructive wildfires is an issue of growing concern. 
With more people living in the wildland urban interface, being able to evacuate potentially large 
groups of people with little warning and in a short amount of time will continue to become a more 
pressing and challenging task. One of the ways that the fire protection engineering community is 
addressing this more credibly and effectively is through the use and development of 
comprehensive WUI fire evacuation models.  
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A key component that must be considered in these models is protective action decision-
making and behaviour in the WUI; i.e. what people do in response to the fire. Choosing to evacuate 
or taking another protective action is a complex process influenced by several diverse factors 
including sociodemographic factors, social and environmental cues, preparation and experience, 
familial responsibilities, location, and credible threat and risk assessment. Although challenging, 
it is important to represent these factors within WUI fire evacuation models, as they influence 
if/when people choose to evacuate and where they will go. At this stage, identifying the factors 
that influence evacuee decision-making during WUI fire events and characterizing the nature of 
this impact is a key step – a step that has been addressed in this chapter. The factors identified as 
influencing evacuee decision-making and response to WUI fires and hurricanes have been 
collected and categorized according to the PADM framework. The first-stage conceptual model 
developed represents a qualitative description of the evacuation decision, delay and actions taken 
before vehicular movement begins. This represents an important foundation on which to build.  
Broadening the scope of this conceptual model to include research from WUI fires and 
hurricanes was necessary given the limited information available; it also generated ideas for future 
research into the factors influencing the decision to evacuate or not in WUI fires. This approach 
provided the opportunity to see how factors might vary given different incident scenarios, 
strengthened the findings that some specific factors were particularly influential, and identified 
gaps in our current understanding that should be explored in future research.   
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Chapter 3: Communication and Notification During Hazards – 
Considerations for Canadian WUI Fire Evacuations 
3.1 Communication Systems During WUI Fire Evacuations 
Recent Canadian wildfires such as the 2016 Fort McMurray Fire and the British Columbia 
fires of 2017 resulted in the evacuation of tens of thousands of people. Within the summer months 
of 2018, wildfires in the western provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba resulted in numerous communities being evacuated or put on evacuation notice. The 
deadly November 2018 wildfires in California led to hundreds of thousands of people being 
evacuated. As more frequent and large-scale wildfires such as these occur in the increasingly 
populated WUI, it is of growing importance to be able to safely evacuate potentially large groups 
of people. One key component of this is communication.  
When a wildfire threatens populated areas, a lack of useful information can compromise 
the ability of people to manage, fight and escape from the fire. Information affects the ability of 
agencies to manage the event and it impacts the ability of those threatened by the fire to adapt to 
the risk and take the appropriate actions (when to leave, where to go, etc.) [131]. However, given 
the complexity of wildfires and wildfire management and evacuations, disseminating this 
information can be challenging. There are multiple agencies involved, fires can occur at night 
when people are sleeping or during the day when they are at work, and often those who are most 
at risk may have limited access to information sources (cellular and internet service, radio, 
television, etc.). The fire itself can also interfere with communication further, disrupting telephone 
and power lines. In addition, the severity of a WUI fire and the speed at which it can develop and 
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travel not only adds to the importance of prompt evacuation notification but also highlights the 
challenge of doing this successfully. 
Given this complexity, the dissemination of WUI fire information often takes a 
multipronged approach. Evacuees can be notified in person by police officers going door-to-door 
in communities under mandatory evacuation orders, television and radio stations can broadcast 
evacuation orders (along with general coverage of the event) and reverse 911 can be used to make 
notify people via landline phones. More informally, people may turn to their friends, family and 
neighbours for information, as well as to social media and internet news sources. A relatively new 
means of communicating information about hazardous events such as wildfires is through the use 
of mobile devices and wireless technology. Given the growing prevalence of smartphones, the 
ability for the government and agencies to officially alert the public about a WUI fire threat via 
their wireless device provides a new opportunity to reach large groups of people quickly. Several 
countries, including Canada, are taking note of this. 
Wireless components of national hazard and threat notification systems allow governments 
and approved agencies to send out text-like messages to the public’s wireless cellular devices. 
These messages are meant to be geographically relevant, using cell towers in the vicinity of the 
event to notify those in the area under threat. In the United States, a Wireless Emergency Alert 
(WEA) system has been in place since 2012. Since its installment, WEAs have been used for over 
33,000 alerts [132]. During the California Wildfires of 2017, the WEA system was used 20 times, 
with county governors reporting that the alerts helped move people in their communities to safety 
[133]. Over the past few years, Canada has also been developing its own wireless alert system, 
expanding its existing National Public Alerting System to include a wireless device notification 
component. This will be discussed further in Section 3.3.1. Given its recent implementation, the 
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Canadian wireless alert system has not been used for wildfire evacuation orders or notification as 
of the writing of this thesis.  
The effectiveness, reliability and success of emergency notification systems are dependent 
on many factors, including the ability of the system to function properly, the alert to reach its 
intended audience, the message to convey the necessary information and the public to act 
accordingly. These factors must be considered and addressed if emergency communication 
systems are to be effective. This chapter will focus on the new wireless component of Canada’s 
emergency alert system and how these factors and challenges can manifest within it. Given that 
the Canadian wireless alerting system is still in its infancy, a number of these challenges have been 
made apparent by the few system tests and recent official uses over the past year. One specific 
incident, an Amber Alert in May 2018, will be discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2, as will the 
lessons that can be learned and their implications for WUI fire notification.  
3.2 The Role of Human Behaviour in Fire in Emergency Communication 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the first step in protective action decision-making is receiving, 
perceiving and comprehending a cue about the hazard. Not only this, but the literature reviewed 
prior by the author, showed that information seeking occurs at each stage of the decision-making 
process and that the nature of the source and whether it was trusted or not could affect its impact 
(with information coming from trusted sources, especially in the form of evacuation orders, having 
the strongest impact). Additionally, receiver characteristics such as prior experience, pre-existing 
beliefs, cost of compliance and demographic variables can also play a role in how people react to 
information about a hazard [134]. Given that information and information seeking plays such an 
important role in the decision-making process and therefore in the potential outcome of an event, 
the timeliness and accuracy of the available information are critical. One study comparing the 
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nature of evacuation communication during two different wildfires noted that people felt safer and 
had greater trust in the fire management agencies when communication was frequent, detailed, and 
open during wildfire evacuations [135]. When communication was limited between the 
community and the fire management agencies, residents turned to the media for information 
(which was often conflicting or inaccurate) and years after the fire expressed fear about wildfires 
and distrust in the fire management agencies. Other studies have found that one of the most 
significant challenges noted by wildfire evacuees is a lack of up to date information about the fire 
activity and impacts [135].  
One of the reasons officials are sometimes hesitant to issue multiple, detailed alerts is the 
perception that people will panic if they have too much information. Panic, or the loss of social 
order and selfish competition [136], is a phenomenon often noted by media and public officials, 
as well as by the people involved in a stressful incident such as a wildfire evacuation itself. 
However, as noted by Kuligowski in her discussion of  “discarded theories” in human behaviour 
in fire, research does not support the idea that people respond to fire stimuli by behaving in self-
destructive or “animalistic panic-type” ways [47]. When people report having experienced or 
witnessed panic, they are often referring to emotions such as fear or anxiety, emotions which are 
natural in threatening situations. These emotions, however, do not equate to the behaviours 
associated with panic. In contrast to behaving irrationally, research has shown that in many disaster 
situations people tend to first assume that nothing is wrong, a concept referred to as normalcy bias. 
Particularly when faced with ambiguous or contradictory information, people have a tendency to 
believe the less distressing option [137]. This reinforces the importance of accurate and detailed 
information about a fire event given that people are unlikely to act in the desired, self-protecting 
way unless they believe that they are truly in danger.  
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Alarm fatigue, or desensitization, is another element that can impact the effectiveness of 
notification systems and messages as a result of human behaviour. It is a phenomenon initially 
observed in medical care, where numerous and repetitive loud alerts or notifications from medical 
monitoring devices overwhelm and desensitize the staff to these alerts. Staff members 
experiencing alarm fatigue may then miss, ignore or disable alarms, particularly if the alarm in 
question has a high false positive rate [138]. Alarm fatigue is not limited to the medical profession; 
it has played a role in rail, aviation and industrial accidents as well [139]. Studies have shown that 
a common problem leading to alarm fatigue is that people learn to distrust the alarm systems set 
up to assist them due to their high frequency of activation and/or high false positive rates [138]. In 
the context of disaster alerts, a high frequency could mean that the public is receiving multiple 
messages from multiple sources, potentially with little to no new or helpful information. A false 
positive in this case would not only include the reporting of a false event (false alarm), it could 
also be the reporting of events that seem irrelevant to the recipient due to their proximity to the 
threat. It should be noted that there is a limited body of research looking at alarm or warning fatigue 
in the context of disaster research specifically and that it has shown the concept to be nuanced, a 
function of the disaster type and the frequency and timing of the warnings [140]. One study looking 
at warning fatigue in the context of Australian bushfires found that warning fatigue was influenced 
by five aspects – trust and credibility, over-warning, false alarms, skepticism and helplessness 
[140]. This study also noted that unofficial warnings including media stories also influenced alarm 
fatigue responses (not just official warnings). Alarm or warning fatigue is therefore something that 
should be studied further to better understand its role in the response to WUI fire alerts and should 
be considered when developing an approach to WUI fire notifications.  
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3.3 National Public Alerting in Canada 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Canadian WUI is somewhat different from other countries. 
While the density of the Canadian WUI is less than places such as California [20], the isolation 
and often small size of WUI communities can pose unique challenges when looking to notify 
people about an impending wildfire and when trying to evacuate these communities. This makes 
having a multipronged notification approach all the more important as not all methods will be 
useful for all WUI communities. In some of the larger WUI communities such as Fort McMurray, 
Alberta, the potential of wireless alert systems for wildfire notification and evacuation has great 
potential. This is also true for smaller, more isolated WUI communities provided that there is 
adequate cellular service, a complementary component to this system that needs to be better 
understood.  
The following sub-sections will look at the history of public alerting systems in Canada, 
including the birth of its new wireless alert component, and will discuss a case study looking at 
one of the first official uses of the wireless system, the lessons learned from this use and how these 
lessons can help inform the system’s continued improvement and use for WUI fire alerts.  
3.3.1 History 
In 2007, Canada initiated its National Public Alerting System (NPAS) [141]. The purpose 
of the system is to enable emergency management organizations in all provinces and territories to 
promptly warn the public of “imminent or unfolding hazards to life” [142]. Such hazards include 
fire events, natural disasters, terrorist threat, civil emergencies or biological, explosive, and 
environmental threats [18]. As noted in Chapter 1, emergency management functions are shared 
between the Federal-Provincial-Territorial (FPT) governments and industry partners, and this 
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applies to the NPAS as well. The former includes the Government of Canada, federal agencies, 
provincial and territorial governments, and authorized municipal agencies. These institutions are 
responsible for creating and issuing the alerts. The latter includes companies such as Pelmorex 
Corp which owns and operates the National Alert Aggregation and Dissemination (NAAD) 
System that provides the central technical infrastructure necessary for collecting and validating the 
alerts and disseminating them to the public [142]. Figure 3.1 below shows the timeline of a NAPS 
alert.  
 
Figure 3.1: National Public Alerting System (NPAS) alert timeline  [142] 
Over the past decade, FPT governments have been working together as part of the Senior 
Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) forum to improve and expand the 
NPAS. A summary of key events as detailed by Public Safety Canada [141] can be seen below: 
• 2007 – The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) 
agrees to remove regulatory barriers to alert services. Radio and television broadcasters 
can volunteer to take part in the distribution of public alerts.  
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• 2009 – Pelmorex Corp (owners of the Weather Network / MétéoMédia television channels) 
is approved by the CRTC to launch the NAAD System. FPT governments begin working 
with Pelmorex and private sector broadcasters to make the NAAD System operational. 
• 2010 – The NAAD System is officially launched, providing the technical infrastructure of 
Canada’s NPAS. All provinces and territories agree to issue and accept emergency alerts 
via their Emergency Management Systems through the NAAD system. Environment and 
Climate Change Canada also agree. 
• 2014 – The CRTC requires television and radio broadcasters, cable and satellite companies 
to distribute NPAS emergency alerts. The Wireless Public Alerting System (WPAS) begins 
as a three-year pilot project, seeking to create and showcase effective solutions for 
emergency public alerting using Long-Term Evolution (LTE) based technology  
• 2015 – Alert Ready is launched as a public awareness and education campaign about NPAS 
(becoming the public-facing brand name for the NPAS initiative).  
• 2017 – WPAS pilot study is successfully completed. After consultation with key 
stakeholders and the public, the CRTC mandates that wireless service providers implement 
the NPAS into their LTE wireless networks by April 2018. 
• 2018 – FPT governments, Pelmorex and wireless service providers work to meet the 
requirements of the CRTC mandate to enable authorized government agencies to alert 
Canadians on compatible wireless devices. Each alerting authority begins using this new 
method as it builds the capacity to do so. Building the success of the ongoing Alert Ready 
campaign, Pelmorex and Public Safety Canada work with provinces and territories to 
launch a wireless public alerting campaign to inform the public about the new wireless 
alerts.  
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Thus far, there have been two official tests of the wireless alerting system, one in May 2018 
and one in November 2018. Previous tests of the non-wireless elements of the system have also 
taken place in some provinces [143]. As a whole, the system has only been used a few times for 
official alerts, including tornado warnings in Manitoba (2015) and Ontario (2018) [144], [145] and 
several Amber Alerts [146]–[148], one of which will be discussed in greater detail as a case study 
below. It should be noted that there is not an easily accessible or publicly available list of the 
system’s history of use (when, where and why it was used). As such, most of the information about 
specific incidences where it has been used comes from media coverage of the events.   
Given that alerts issued via the Alert Ready system have the potential to reach large groups 
of people and deliver critical and time-sensitive information, it is important that these alerts are 
clear and effective. As discussed in Section 3.2, human behaviour is one of the things that must be 
considered when implementing such a system as it can influence people’s responses to an alert and 
therefore the outcome of the event. Though not a wildfire incident, the case study of the May 2018 
Amber Alert issued in Ontario provides an opportunity to identify factors that should be considered 
in the endeavor to successfully notify people using this alerting system and therefore improve the 
system for all future alerts, including those relating to wildfires.  
3.3.2 Alert Ready Case Study: Thunder Bay Amber Alert 
Introduction 
On May 14, 2018, an 8-year-old boy was reported missing near Thunder Bay, Ontario. At 
11:35 AM, a subsequent Amber Alert was issued. Amber Alerts are a critical and important method 
of communication that is used to notify the public of missing children. Normally in Canada Amber 
Alerts are broadcast on TV, radio, and/or billboards. However, this Amber Alert was different, as 
it was also sent using the new wireless component of the Alert Ready system. The system had been 
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tested nationwide for the first time less than a week prior. The system sends emergency text-based 
messages accompanied by a loud siren-sounding alarm tone which overrides device volume 
settings to the loudest setting to better attract people’s attention. The wireless system is cell tower 
based, allowing alerts to be sent out to devices connected to towers in the areas affected by the 
emergency or hazard. This means that any compatible cell phone, regardless of number, area code 
or service provider, will receive the alert if it is within the designated area [149].  
The emergency alert on May 14th was sent out across Ontario, reaching as far as the cities 
of Ottawa and Toronto, nearly 1500 km away from Thunder Bay. The Amber Alert consisted of a 
total of three messages sent out through the Alert Ready wireless system over the course of two 
hours (see Figure 3.2). As each of the alerts was sent, the effect that they had on Google-search 
behaviour could be seen via the internet communication tracking software Google Trends. Google 
Trends allows the popularity of certain search terms to be examined and compared over a selected 
time period. This provides insight into the relative popularity of specific search terms and when 
people are searching for a specific term. In the context of the Amber Alert, the data generated can 
provide insight into how the Alert Ready wireless system was being perceived during this event 
and how effectively it communicated its message. Through conducting a small, exploratory study 
of specific search terms, a general understanding of people’s reaction to the alert and new wireless 
alerting system could be gained. 
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Figure 3.2: Three Alert Ready messages sent on May 14, 2018 
Methodology 
Data was gathered for three search terms over the 24 hours following the alert (11:30 am 
on May 14th to 11:30 am the following day). The terms included “Disable Amber Alerts”, “Disable 
Emergency Alerts”, and “Amber Alert Ontario” [150]. The three terms were specifically chosen 
to represent three different levels of response to the alerts, namely: “Amber Alert Ontario” to 
observe general information seeking about the Amber Alert; “Disable Amber Alert” to see 
potentially negative responses to the use of the system for Amber Alerts; and “Disable Emergency 
Alerts” to gauge the popularity of negative responses to the system as a whole. Bearing in mind 
the concept of alarm fatigue discussed above, this brief and exploratory study was conducted to 
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see if indications of a trend existed between the number of alerts and the popularity of search terms 
related to the type of information being sought. It was hypothesized that the popularity of each 
search term would change over the course of the three alerts, that the number of searches would 
increase each time for the search terms related to disabling the alert, and that the searches would 
spike each time an alert was received. 
Limitations of Google Trends 
The data provided by Google Trends shows the relative popularity of search terms for the 
time period over which the data set was taken. For example, a value of 100 would be the most 
popular search time for a term in that 24-hour period, corresponding with the highest volume of 
search traffic, whereas 50 would be half as popular, at half the volume. The data is aggregated 
over 8-minute periods (for a 24-hour time period) and as such times shown may be ± 4 minutes. It 
is important to recognize that Google Trends does not display the volume of searches, and that the 
use of the popularity scale means it is not possible to compare data taken on different days or times 
outside of the 24-hour period (while retaining the 8-minute time resolution). Google’s popularity 
scale sets the highest search volume to 100, regardless of whether the highest search volume for 
the time was 10 or 10,000 searches. In this case, all data was recorded and visualized on 
comparison graphs generated by Google Trends, all within the same 24-hour period, thus keeping 
the data on the same scale.  As no count was provided, a traditional baseline could not be used. 
For the purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that because the event and subsequent reactions 
were covered by several reputable national media agencies, there were enough people searching 
for these terms to make this exploratory study worthwhile.  
Another limitation of using Google Trends is that the popularity of each search term is 
represented individually, and it is impossible to amalgamate multiple similar terms into a group. 
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This means that similar terms such as ‘Disable Emergency Alerts’ and ‘Disable Emergency Alert’ 
are considered two separate terms and are shown independent of each other. If undertaking a more 
comprehensive study using Google Trends, one would need to look at a greater number of search 
terms, including slight variations of the same term. In order to compare search volumes, a different 
toolkit would need to be used. This toolkit would need to monitor and convert the normalized data 
back into search volumes and amalgamate similar terms, allowing improved comparison over 
multiple days, events or time periods. Given that this study was small, and its intent was to 
investigate if a potential trend existed within a single 24-hour period following an unanticipated 
event, it was deemed that the selected open-source tool was sufficient for this purpose.  
Findings 
Figure 3.3 displays the relative search popularity for “Amber Alert Ontario” over a three-
and-a-half-hour period encompassing the time during which the alerts were issued. The search for 
information regarding the Amber Alert itself was by and large the most popular of the three terms, 
with three sharp peaks corresponding to the time of the alerts being sent out. The high popularity 
of this search term seems to indicate that the message largely had the desired effect as it prompted 
people to seek more information about the alert. There is also a small increase in the popularity of 
the search terms observed around 1:00 PM, which may correspond to lunch hour for those working.  
The data regarding “Disable Amber Alerts” and “Disable Emergency Alerts” is too close 
to the axis to be shown on the same graph as “Amber Alert Ontario” as their relative popularity 
was much lower, but the timing of the spikes indicate people did react to the system similarly each 
time an alert was issued (see Figure 3.4). Much like Figure 3.3, there are three peaks, each 
corresponding to an alert being received. However, in this case, the highest peak corresponds not 
to the first, but to the second alert. The first alert triggered the lowest peak in popularity for 
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disabling the alerts (both Amber and Emergency), whereas the second and third messages sparked 
more searches, indicating an increased (and unintended) negative response to the messages. 
 
Figure 3.3: Search popularity for “Amber Alert Ontario” 
 
Figure 3.4: Search popularities for just “Disable Amber Alerts” and “Disable Emergency Alerts” 
 
The effects of the three alerts sent and the relevance of the three search terms investigated 
can be examined through online media and news reports. When the first alert sounded, it sparked 
a search for information, reflected in the strong popularity of the term “Amber Alert Ontario”. This 
suggests an initial success of the alert system. The alerts had caught people’s attention, and people 
were searching for more information regarding the Amber Alert. However, as reported by local 
media, a few complaints were posted on social media from those wearing headphones or driving 
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while connected with Bluetooth [8]. With respect to the search popularity of the three terms, there 
were fewer searched for “Disable Amber Alerts” as compared to those who searched for “Disable 
Emergency Alerts” at the time of the first alert, however, both were less popular than later searches 
for these terms. 
The second alert was sent half an hour after the first. This alert was effectively the same as 
the first one, only written in French, Canada’s second official language (with Francophones 
making up approximately 4.1% of the total population in Ontario) [152].  This second alert sparked 
significantly more backlash, as noted by the media and supported by the search term popularities. 
Some people in Toronto and Southern Ontario reported being annoyed that they were receiving 
multiple Amber Alerts for “an issue [that was] hundreds of miles away” [153]. Others noted being 
irritated by the fact that the French and English alerts were being sent individually, doubling the 
number of alerts received, and that they were sent half an hour apart [153]. Given the increased 
popularity of the search terms “Disable Amber Alerts” and “Disable Emergency Alerts” following 
the second alert, it is possible that this alert – which provided little to no new information, occurred 
30 minutes after the first, and detailed an incident some people deemed geographically irrelevant 
– initiated the possible beginnings of alarm fatigue in those people searching for a way to disable 
the system in its entirety. 
At around 1:30 pm the third alert was sent out. This one was different from the first two as 
it contained a message which stated that the missing child had been found and the alert was over. 
Like the first two messages, this one was accompanied by a loud alert tone. With this use of the 
Alert Ready mobile system (and corresponding loud alert) for a non-emergency all-clear message, 
searches for disabling both Amber and emergency alerts spiked once again. This time 
corresponded to the highest percentage of searches for “Disable Amber Alerts” over the studied 
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24-hour period, with these searches almost equalling the number of searches for “Disable 
Emergency Alerts”. Although the third alert sparked a lower number of “Disable Emergency 
Alerts” searches, it was offset by the increase in searches for “Disable Amber Alerts”. Taking the 
relative sum of the two terms, the search popularity of “Disable” terms following the third alert 
was marginally higher than the popularity of these terms following the second alert. This may 
suggest the existence of a trend and the need for additional research on Canadian’s responses to 
these alerts. 
The official Alert Ready website was updated to take general public feedback following 
the event. Accounts in Canadian media indicated numerous complaints regarding the system in the 
wake of the event. Amongst them were quotes from users saying that they “want out” of the 
system, and that the repetitive use and geographic irrelevance of the system had “trained [them] to 
ignore emergency alerts” [153]. Media also reported complaints being received by police 
departments and 911 operators, prompting police officials to issue statements clarifying that they 
have no control over the alerts, and asking upset callers to stop calling the police [147]. 
Discussion 
As is shown by this small study of Google searches and the media coverage of this event, 
the wireless alerts sent out via the Alert Ready system prompted mixed reactions. In large part the 
system was successful, prompting people to look for additional information about the Amber Alert. 
Of the three search terms, “Amber Alert Ontario” was by far the most popular, with the two search 
terms relating to disabling the alerts not exceeding 2% of the maximum popularity of “Amber 
Alert Ontario”. It should be noted that it is not known if these alerts contributed to finding the 
missing child and therefore their effectiveness in this regard cannot be judged. 
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When just looking at the search results for “Disable Amber Alerts” and “Disable 
Emergency Alerts”, the three peaks and the change in search popularity over the course of the 
three alerts can provide insight into potential consequences that should be considered when using 
this and similar systems for future threats and emergencies. Much like with the searches for 
“Amber Alert Ontario”, the greatest number of searches corresponded to the time immediately 
following the alert. However, unlike “Amber Alert Ontario”, the peaks are less steep following the 
initial spike, with a relatively high percentage of searches continuing for 15 minutes after the alert. 
This is particularly true for searches following the second and third alerts. The most notable 
difference between the two “Disable” alerts and the “Amber Alert Ontario” alert is the distribution 
of searches. While the first alert prompted the most searches for “Amber Alert Ontario” (with 
subsequent alerts prompting only half as many alerts), it was the second and third alerts that 
prompted the greatest number of searches for “Disable Amber Alerts” and “Disable Emergency 
Alerts”.  
In looking at the increase in searches for “Disable Amber Alerts” and “Disable Emergency 
Alerts” following the second and third alert, we can turn to one of the key HBiF concepts identified 
earlier for insight into potential future consequences. In response to the relatively high number of 
alerts that were sent out in a short period of time and the fact that the alerts were delivered to 
mobile devices in a very large geographic area, news reports and the exploratory search term study 
conducted seem to indicate that many people became annoyed with the alerts and the wireless 
alerting system as a whole. While it is currently impossible for general consumers to prevent their 
mobile devices from receiving the Alert Ready alerts (aside from muting the phone completely or 
disconnecting it from a network supporting the system), it is possible that this event contributed to 
the beginnings of alarm or warning fatigue for some people. Though a relatively small group of 
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people (as related to the number of people looking for general information about the Amber Alert), 
the people who sought to learn about disabling the alerts (and others who felt this way and 
potentially searched for related terms not covered in this study or used another search engine or 
did not actively search for more information during this time) represent a group of people who 
may choose to ignore or disregard future alerts sent to them via this system. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, people can react this way when they distrust the validity and necessity of alarms as 
a result of their high frequency and/or high false positive rate. In the case of the Amber Alert, both 
the potential geographic irrelevance of the alerts (as deemed by the alert recipients) and the number 
of alerts (received in a short period of time, not providing new information), have the potential to 
contribute to this.  
It is important to remember that creating and disseminating messages about emergencies 
and threats is a challenging endeavor, and often conflicting concerns need to be considered 
simultaneously. As has been noted in some of the literature and as was indicated by this exploratory 
study, too many alerts may prompt people to try to disable alerts or potentially ignore them if they 
cannot be disabled. However, as the study of normalcy bias has shown, people can be slow to 
believe that an incident poses an actual threat and often need more than one alert to prompt action. 
While this is hard to grasp in the context of an Amber Alert, it is easier to understand in the context 
of an alert about a natural threat such as a tornado or wildfire. In September 2018, the Alert Ready 
system was used to notify those in the Ottawa area about the threat of a tornado. Following the 
event, CBC News spoke with people who noted that it was not until they had received multiple 
alerts that they felt there was truly a threat that required action [154]. While this is just one case, 
it does showcase the potential importance of having multiple alerts. As such, there can be a fine 
line between having too many alerts and not providing enough information, and it is a line the 
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must be tread carefully when creating or using notification systems such as Alert Ready. Though 
daunting, by better understanding how and why people respond to these alerts (ex. information not 
being deemed relevant), more effective alerts and alerting systems can be created.  
As was noted earlier, the Amber Alert on May 14, 2018, was the first official use of the 
Alert Ready system and in the months since then, changes have been made to further improve the 
system. During the second national test of the system in November and during the aforementioned 
Ottawa-area tornado alert, the English and French alerts were sent together (see Figure 3.5).7 Just 
prior to the wireless component of the system being launched, a revised version (Version 2.0) of 
the “National Public Alerting System: Common Look and Feel Guidance8” document was released 
and for the first time included guidance for a wireless public alerting system [155]. Given that this 
document has been revised four times over the course of five years as Canada’s NPAS has 
expanded, it is likely that future versions will continue to build upon the lessons learned from the 
application of existing guidelines.9 This, in combination with increasingly accessible LTE 
technology required for the wireless system to work, will help to make the Canadian Alert Ready 
system more effective and enable alerts sent out via its wireless system to reach more people.   
                                                 
7 The system was also used for a Toronto area Amber Alert in February 2019 and the French and English messages 
were also combined. The Peel Region Police indicated that an arrest was made as a “direct result” of the alerts [182]. 
However, there were still numerous people who called 911 to complain about the alerts and who posed about their 
frustration with the system on social media [182]. Additionally, the alert was received by some Manitoba residents 
who were outside of the alert area (were not supposed to have received the alert) [183]. 
8 This document is “the current collection of specifications, policy decisions and recommended practices related to 
the Common Look and Feel (CLF) of public alerts associated with the National Public Alerting System (NPAS) 
initiative” [155]. 
9 The current version even notes that guidelines for the use of social media and other new distribution methods can 
be expected in future versions. 
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Figure 3.5: Second test of Alert Ready wireless system (November 2018) 
Study Limitations 
 The findings of this study do not conclusively evaluate the use of the Alert Ready wireless 
system (holistically or during the case study event). Instead, they provide insight into how HBiF 
can impact the reception of alerts and emergency notification systems, something that needs to be 
considered when assessing the likelihood that such alerts will provoke intended responses. This in 
turn, along with an awareness of the available means of emergency alerting, can have an impact 
on the vulnerability of an at-risk area (such as a WUI community). In addition to the limitations 
of Google Trends discussed earlier, there are several other limitations to this study which impact 
the completeness of the findings and discussion. These include: 
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• The project was undertaken immediately in response to the event, therefore there was no 
time spent prior to the incident planning for how to best capture the public’s response to 
the alerts.  
• Data for only three search terms was collected, resulting in a limited picture of possible 
responses to the alerts. 
• It was not possible to tell if the same people were searching for each/any of the three terms 
nor if people searched for the same thing multiple times. 
• Given the resources and information available, it was not possible to tell who received the 
alerts and therefore how factors such as their location affected the searches. For example, 
it is not possible to tell if more people in urban centres such as Toronto or Ottawa received 
the alert (due to better cellular service) as opposed to people located in potentially more 
isolated areas in closer proximity to the incident (Thunder Bay). 
3.3.3 Discussion - WUI Fire and Evacuation Considerations in Relation to the NPAS  
The considerations discussed in the case study are not only relevant to Amber Alerts, but 
they can also impact other types of alerts, including those related to WUI fires and evacuations.  If 
multiple alerts regarding a wildfire are sent to too large of an area, people may feel that the alerts 
are irrelevant to them and their location and therefore ignore or dismiss future alerts. This could 
result in situations where they may not read messages involving new emergencies, such as a new 
encroaching fire threatening their region, or a mandatory evacuation order. Those who dismiss or 
ignore the alerts could therefore be putting themselves at greater risk. However, as there is very 
little research looking specifically at alarm or warning fatigue in a WUI fire context, further 
research in this area would enable a better understanding of its existence and impact.   
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It is also important to consider the effects of perceived public responses to alerts on 
emergency managers. A concern held by some emergency managers and officials is that by 
informing too many people or too large a region about a WUI fire, there could be unnecessary 
voluntary evacuations, leading to traffic congestion and negative impacts on fire service personnel 
responding to the fire. Such concerns can be exacerbated if there are limits to alert length (and 
therefore the amount of information and level of detail that can be conveyed) and were in-part 
behind officials deciding not to use WEAs during the deadly October 2017 wildfires in Sonoma 
County, California10. In a report issued about the public alerting program in Sonoma County by 
the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services in response to the these WUI fires, it was 
concluded that emergency manager’s decision not to use WEAs was based on their “experience, 
previous policy discussions, and perceived knowledge about the situation” [156]. It was also noted 
that the emergency manager had a limited understanding and awareness of the WEA system and 
was working off outdated information regarding its technical capabilities. Given the relative youth 
of the Canadian wireless alert system and its limited use thus far, it is important that there is 
continued education for both emergency managers and alert issuing bodies as well as the general 
public about these alerts. That way, when situations arise in the future for which it would be useful 
or necessary to use the wireless alerts, people will be better prepared to use them and to respond 
to them effectively. 
In early 2018, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United 
States released a report entitled Public Response to Short Messages Under Imminent Threat with 
the aim to help provide evidence-based guidance in the development and use of public alerts, 
                                                 
10 During the 2018 Camp Fire in California, officials also chose not to use the systems, opting instead for emails, 
reverse-911 calls and text messages sent out via the county’s opt-in CodeRed alerting system [29]. While county 
officials have not officially stated why WEAs were not used, there is speculation that it was in part due to a lack of 
familiarity with the system. 
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including short messages such as WEAs [45]. The report was created in part in response to the 
expanded capabilities of WEA alerts (by mid-2019),  announced by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) in 2016, which include expanding the length of WEA messages from 90 to 
360 characters, supporting alerts in Spanish, and enabling ULRs and phone numbers to be 
embedded in the alert [157]. In comparison, the Canadian “National Public Alerting System: 
Common Look and Feel Guidance” document states that a single wireless message can be up to 
600 characters, regardless of if the message is in English, French or both languages11 [155]. The 
findings of the NIST report, which focused on improving messages such that they can reach a 
wider audience, increase comprehension and increase perceived credibility, can be used to help 
inform the creation and use of Canadian alerts as there currently does not exist extensive literature 
of the sort in Canada.  
When looking at the application of Alert Ready wireless alerts in a Canadian WUI fire 
context, it is important to keep in mind a number of logistical factors. Given that Canadian WUI 
communities (whether seasonal or permanent) are often located in more isolated, northern regions, 
access to reliable LTE cellular service which is required to receive the wireless alerts is not 
guaranteed. This can be seen when looking at Figure 3.6 showing the combined service maps for 
three of Canada’s largest cellular network providers (Rogers, Bell and Telus). Once again, this 
highlights the importance of having a multipronged approach to notifying people about 
emergencies or threats as not all will work for all people in all communities.  
                                                 
11 This character maximum also includes “language demarcation symbols” if an alert is issued in both languages.  
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Figure 3.6: Coverage areas for Bell, Telus and Rogers in Canada, modified  [158]–[160]  
For WUI communities that do have the reliable service necessary to receive Alert Ready 
wireless alerts, such alerts have great potential. For seasonal communities, where residents may 
only be there during the summer months or tourists may be visiting for the first time and are 
generally unfamiliar with the area, this alerting method could be very beneficial. The Alert Ready 
system does not require people to opt-into the system and it is based on using cellular towers in 
the area under threat and therefore can reach all those with compatible devices regardless of if they 
are a long-time resident or a first-time visitor. In time-sensitive events such as a WUI fire, such 
alerts are also one of the fastest ways to notify people, as opposed to reverse 911 calls or having 
police officers go door-to-door notifying people.  
3.4 Summary  
The ability to notify people of a threat or emergency is an important component in 
managing complicated and dangerous events effectively and safely. Given the complexity of such 
events, it is important to have a coordinated, multi-pronged approach to provide information and 
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warning to those most in need.  In Canada, the NPAS, also known as Alert Ready, has an important 
role to play in this approach. With the ability to send out alerts via radio, television and wireless 
messages (that cannot be disabled), it can reach people in large or very targeted areas quickly. 
Though it has yet to be used in response to a WUI fire, the system has application in the 
increasingly important realm of wildfire notifications and evacuations. The development and 
understanding of wildfire evacuation communication methods such as the Alert Ready system is 
an important element in the widespread and growing need for more comprehensive tools to manage 
and handle wildfire evacuations.  
Just as when looking at other components of responses to WUI fires, it is important to 
understand how human behaviour will influence how people respond to a message about a wildfire 
threat or evacuation. Though not a fire incident, the information-seeking behaviours and 
unintended consequences observed as a result of the Amber Alert sent out in Ontario via the new 
wireless messaging component of the Alert Ready system on May 14th, 2018 provides insight into 
some of the challenges and considerations that should be kept in mind when using mass 
notification systems. It highlighted the role that message relevance (geographical, etc.) plays in 
people’s perception of the necessity and usefulness of an alert, and it provided an opportunity to 
discuss the challenges associated providing the right amount of information. By better 
understanding the interplay between behavioural trends and responses to emergency alerts such as 
those shown in this exploratory study, messages and communication systems can be better 
designed and utilized.   
Moving forward, there are several important areas that should be pursued to better 
understand how to create and use emergency notification systems more efficiently. Further 
research looking at alarm and warning fatigue in natural disaster type situations, and WUI fires in 
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particular, would aid in understanding if and how it presents itself and what factors combine to 
result in this response. In a Canadian specific context, cross-referencing the location of WUI 
communities with access to reliable cellular service could provide a better understanding of the 
potential impact of using Alert Ready wireless alerts for WUI fire notification. This in turn could 
be a factor considered in a comprehensive vulnerability index or assessment of Canadian WUI 
communities.  
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Chapter 4: Canadian Case Study – Resident Survey and Evacuation Modelling 
The previous chapters draw attention to the importance of understanding human behaviour 
during WUI fire evacuations and the need for more Canadian-specific information. This chapter 
will discuss the groundwork laid for the analysis of a Canadian case study community through the 
creation of a detailed survey and the modelling of several evacuation scenarios in the community 
using the traffic modelling software PTV VISSIM. Section 4.1 will provide an overview of the 
case study community and Section 4.2 will detail the creation of a survey asking about expected 
evacuation actions that will be distributed to the case study community in the coming year.  Section 
4.3 then details the modelling and analysis of 10 evacuation scenarios of the community using 
PTV VISSIM, and a discussion about key information and considerations necessary for using such 
models to assess WUI fire vulnerability. 
4.1 Case Study Community 
4.1.1 Location and Population 
The case study community is a seasonal summer community located within a forested area 
surrounded by agricultural land in Manitoba on the southern shores of a lake [161]. The population 
of the community fluctuates greatly over the year, with thousands visiting in the summer months 
and very few living there permanently year-round. Since the community was first developed in the 
early 1900s, it has grown to include four primary areas as shown in Figure 4.1: a cabin area; a 
cottage area; a campground; and a commercial area consisting of retail, vacation accommodations, 
and restaurants. The cottage area to the east is considered low-density with larger lots 
(approximately 250 lots) while the cabin area to the west is high density with small lots and 
portable cabins [161]. This latter area was originally laid out as a transient campground in the early 
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1930s. When another campground was opened in the community in the mid-1960s, the former 
became a seasonal cabin area where cabins had to be moved out of the park each winter until 1988 
[162]. The area is now comprised of 530 permanent cabins (the majority of which have individual 
water, sewage and electrical connections). There remain several communal facilities such as 
woodsheds, toilet buildings and kitchen shelters. This area will be the focus of the initial case study 
(survey and traffic modelling) and is referred to as the cabin area.  
 
Figure 4.1: Four primary areas of case study community 
 The current campground has around 500 sites, and the commercial area is comprised of 
over 30 businesses. There are also numerous parks, boat launches, swimming docks and trails in 
and around the community. Visitor surveys for the area in the 1980s and 1990s showed that people 
were spending more time in the area and that the number of first-time visitors increased with most 
being from out of province [161].12  
                                                 
12 More recent data could not be found.  
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4.1.2 Surrounding Ecosystem and Vegetation 
The community is located in a heavily treed environment, characterized primarily by aspen, 
mixed hardwood forests, spruce and prairie grasslands [161]. In addition to the forest which 
characterizes most of the surrounding area, the community itself has maintained a high percentage 
of vegetation. With respect to wildfire occurrences, few fires have impacted the area surrounding 
the community, none of which prompted evacuation (one fire in 2017 did prompt the temporary 
closure of a highway near the site) [163]. The overall lack of fire, in combination with the extensive 
plantation of coniferous trees in and around the community, has led to a large build-up of volatile 
fuels [161]. Some prescribed burning and thinning of dense spruce plantations have been 
undertaken in the surrounding area to reduce the risk of wildfire potential.   
The climate in the area is continental, with cold winters, hot summers and relatively little 
precipitation [161], [164]. The summer months are warm due to prevailing air masses from the 
south/south-west, and the winter months are cold due to cold fronts coming from the 
north/northwest [161].  The winds in the community are weaker than in other areas as a result of 
the forest cover, and the presence of lakes and the turbulence generated by the Manitoba 
Escarpment resulting in increased cloud cover and showers during the summer months [161]. 
4.1.3 Perceived Community and Focus Area Vulnerability 
While the case study community has not experienced the need for a WUI fire evacuation 
in recent years, community and agency partners have expressed concern about the community’s 
potential wildfire vulnerability given it’s WUI intermix location, the community layout and the 
changing fire season. The cabin area specifically has been identified by the community as having 
a potentially high WUI fire vulnerability. One of the objectives outlined in the most recent 
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community plan for the site was improving fire protection and emergency access for the cabin 
area. Goals included developing a plan for emergency evacuation, designating an old access road 
(not currently in use) as an emergency egress route for the back cabin area, and providing an 
emergency egress route for the front cabin area [161]. In looking at the layout of the community, 
it can be seen that the current ingress/egress routes in the community are rather limited. A single 
highway is the only way to travel to/from the community (see Figure 4.2), and there are three 
collector roads connecting the community to the highway. A single road branches off one of these 
three main roads and serves as the only access to the cabin area. The two sections of the cabin area 
are each accessed by their own roads (one each) leading off this access road. The two cabin areas 
are otherwise separate from each other (no internal vehicular connections). 
 
Figure 4.2: Case study community and primary access route via highway 
As mentioned earlier, the cabin area is densely occupied, with 530 cabins located in less 
than 0.15 km2 (~14 ha).  The back cabin area is home to 285 cabins and the front cabin area is 
home to 245 cabins. According to agency sources, the cabin area is fully occupied multiple times 
during the summer months, corresponding with the wildfire season. As shown in Figure 4.3, the 
cabins are located in very close proximity to each other, often with decks or vegetation between 
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them. The water and sewer system within the cabin area is shallow (3 feet) and in some places is 
above grade. The main water line runs along one of the primary north-south roads and feeds fire 
hydrants located along it [161]. The nearest fire department is volunteer-based and is 
approximately 5 minutes away from the community (6-8 minutes from the cabin area).13  
 
Figure 4.3: Cabin area properties 
 While these factors are all likely to contribute to the overall vulnerability of the case study 
cabin area, the degree of their impact and that of additional factors yet unknown need to be 
understood in order to provide a comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the community. In 
order to lay the groundwork for such an assessment, more information is needed about the residents 
and their potential protective action decisions, and a base model of what an evacuation might look 
like should be created. The work undertaken as part of this thesis to build this foundation are 
detailed in the following sections. 
                                                 
13 The fire department is equipped with a pumper and tanker truck, as well as a first response vehicle and a mosquito 
truck used for grass and brush fires [184]. 
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 4.2 Evacuation Intentions Survey 
4.2.1 Purpose 
An important step in assessing the vulnerability of the case study community is 
understanding the factors likely to impact protective action decision-making in a WUI fire scenario 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). To do this, a survey was created based on the conceptual model 
developed in Chapter 2, the factors found to have an impact on evacuation decision-making, and 
the gaps in knowledge identified during the literature review. For example, it was found that most 
of the factors in the studied research focused on the third stage of the PADM, the protective action 
decision itself. Therefore, in addition to seeking information about the decision to evacuate or not, 
the survey seeks to gain more information about the factors that influence the pre-decision phase 
and the credible threat and risk assessment phase of the PADM. Furthermore, the survey seeks to 
gain information about the amount of time people anticipate spending on pre-evacuation tasks.  
4.2.2 Scope 
The survey is specifically tailored to collect data about the expected evacuation actions of 
residents in seasonal communities without a recent history of wildfire threat, however, it could be 
modified for use in other types of communities (non-seasonal, indigenous, etc.). The survey will 
be piloted this summer in a separate seasonal community and then distributed to residents in the 
cabin area in the coming year, with the potential to distribute it more widely in the community or 
in other communities in the future.  
4.2.3 Methodology 
The goal of the survey is to gain insight into the anticipated actions of residents in the cabin 
area and the factors that impact their decisions. Dillman’s Tailored Design Method was used for 
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guidance on question formatting, wording, and arrangement [165]. Inspiration for questions was 
drawn from the 2016 Canadian Census, specifically with respect to the wording of demographic 
questions [166]. The 2009 Bushfire CRC Survey administered after the 2009 Black Saturday Fires 
in Australia was used as an example of a wildfire specific survey (seeking in some capacity to gain 
information about protective action decision-making) [167].  
A quantitative survey method was chosen to allow for statistical analysis to be performed 
on the collected data. A combination of closed-ended questions with unordered and order response 
was used in addition to a few partially closed-ended questions allowing respondents to specify an 
alternative answer. Space is provided at the end of the survey to allow participants to provide 
additional information that they feel is important, such as expected evacuation responses, 
additional previous experience or evacuation constraints.  
The survey is divided into five main sections seeking to gain different types of information. 
These include: Cabin Information and Visits; Previous Experience; Warnings and Information 
Sources; Expected Actions; and Household Information. Questions were arranged this way so as 
to increase the likelihood of people responding to the survey, with less personal, easy to answer 
questions at the beginning and more personal questions at the end. The survey is designed with the 
understanding that the case study community has not been impacted by a wildfire in recent history. 
Given this and the fact that wildfire response and policy in Canada strongly favours evacuation, 
more questions focused on information about evacuation expectations than staying and defending. 
This decision was also influenced by findings from previous studies that have shown that people 
are less likely to stay and defend if the property threatened is not their primary residence [89].  
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4.2.4 Survey Creation 
Each of the five main question groups are detailed below with example questions. The 
created survey can be found in Appendix A.   
Cabin Information and Visits 
This section asks the least personal, presumably easiest to answer questions. Questions 
seek to gain information about how often and for how long respondents visit their cabins, the type 
and reliability of services available at their cabins and the number of people and pets typically at 
their cabin. Distinctions are made between an average visit and a busy visit to the cabin so as to 
understand how much the cabin occupancy varies and to get an idea of how many people might be 
present should an evacuation occur. These questions also allow for comparisons to be made 
between expected evacuation decisions disclosed later in the survey and the information collected 
in this first section.  
Some of the questions in this section can also help to fill several gaps identified in the 
literature in Chapter 2, specifically, factors that affect the first stage of the PADM, the pre-
decisional stage. Figure 4.4 shows one of the questions in the survey seeking to understand if 
respondents have reliable access to services that could impact their ability to receive or be exposed 
to a cue. Given the relative remoteness of the community, it is important to understand if people 
would be able to receive a message or cue delivered via a means requiring one of the services 
listed, such as an Alert Ready message discussed in Chapter 3. If a person does not have reliable 
access to the listed services, they may be unable to receive such an alert. It could also impact their 
ability to search the internet or receive news updates. It is important to note that a wildfire can 
further impact these services. This question therefore acts as a means of establishing a baseline for 
service accessibility in the cabin area of the case study community.  
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Figure 4.4: Survey question asking about access to services that could impact being able to receive an alert about a 
wildfire threat or evacuation notice 
Previous Experience 
 Questions in this section seek to understand if respondents have had past exposure to and 
experience with WUI fires, evacuations, and the Alert Ready system. Given that the community is 
seasonal and has not been threatened by a WUI fire in recent years, the questions ask about 
experience both at the cabin and at other residences. Figure 4.5 below is an example of one of the 
questions in this section.  
 
Figure 4.5: Survey question asking about previous experience with wildfires, evacuation and emergency notification 
systems 
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Warnings and Information Sources 
 As indicated in Chapters 2 and 3, information seeking and emergency notification is a very 
important part of understanding and predicting WUI evacuation decision-making. The questions 
in this section aim to understand which sources respondents would be inclined to use and the 
degree of they would trust information about a WUI fire from different sources. Figure 4.6 is an 
example of one of the included questions. Additionally, there are questions in this section that ask 
about the degree to which the respondent has thought about WUI fires and their awareness of 
prominent Canadian and international WUI fires.  
 
Figure 4.6: Survey question asking about the order the respondent would use different sources to seek information 
about a WUI fire  
Expected Actions  
This section contains questions asking about what protective action respondents expect 
they would take during a WUI fire event and what cue would prompt them to take this action. In 
addition, questions in this section seek to understand how long people think that they would spend 
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on certain pre-evacuation tasks. Figure 4.7 is an example of a question seeking to do this, 
specifically in the context of the respondent having decided to evacuate immediately (other 
timeframes/levels of urgency are also explored). The categories of pre-evacuation tasks were 
created after looking at similar questions asked in other disaster research studies.14 This 
information is important when trying to understand potential trip generation times, a component 
of traffic modelling that will be discussed in Section 4.3. It is, however, important to understand 
the limitations of this question. The amount of time people expect to take is not necessarily the 
same as the amount of time they will actually take to complete pre-evacuation tasks during an 
evacuation. Some hurricane evacuation literature has compared expected and actual evacuation 
time estimates and found that answers for some tasks were similar (time to gather household 
members and pack travel items) while others were quite different (time to protect property) [168]. 
Given the current lack of time estimates (expected and recollected) for WUI fires in general and 
specifically from similar communities, the information gained from these questions is more 
exploratory than quantifiable. The times reported in this question could, however, be used in an 
evacuation model to see what impact it could have on an evacuation so long as these limitations 
were understood.  
                                                 
14 In the case of nuclear power plant incidents, the categories used included: warning receipt, preparation to leave 
work; return from work; and prepare to leave home [185]. In hurricane literature, studies have asked residents in 
hurricane-prone areas about their intended evacuation actions, asking about the amount of time they anticipate 
spending on preparing to leave work, travel from work to home, gathering household members, pack travel items, 
protect property from storm damage (ex. install storm shutters), and secure their homes before evacuating  [168], 
[186]. 
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Figure 4.7: Survey question asking about how much time people anticipate that they would spend on pre-evacuation 
actions if they were planning to evacuate immediately 
Household Information 
Demographic questions are a staple of disaster research questionnaires as noted in Chapter 
2. Questions in the last section collect such information about the respondents as well as people 
who would typically be at the cabin with the respondents, specifically those who might require 
additional assistance to take protective actions during a WUI fire. Given that Canada is home to 
people from many different countries, is popular with tourists and has two official languages, 
several questions inquired about language comprehension so as to better understand the 
respondents’ ability to comprehend emergency notifications (a component of the pre-decisional 
phase of the PADM). Figure 4.8 shows one of the language questions asked.  
 
Figure 4.8: Survey question asking if respondents feel comfortable conducting a conversation in Canada’s official 
languages 
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4.2.5 Survey Administration: Next Steps 
 The next step in the data collection process is to conduct a small pilot study or pretest of 
the survey to evaluate the reliability and utility of the methods used (types and format of questions) 
and to get feedback on the clarity of the survey. This will also help to gauge how the survey will 
be received and if respondents understand the information being sought. Based on the pilot study, 
necessary modifications can be made to improve the survey before it is distributed to the entire 
cabin area. This pilot study should be conducted with a small sample of the residents within the 
same community or from a similar community (ex. a small, seasonal community in a forested area) 
[169]. This is planned for the coming summer. 
 It is important to consider and plan for how the survey will be distributed to the case study 
community. Generally, a drop-off pick-up approach has the highest response rate, however, it can 
be very time intensive and expensive [170]. Web-based surveys are the fastest growing form of 
surveying as it is low cost and fast. Though the most convenient, their response rate is generally 
lower. Mail-out surveys tend to also have a relatively low response rate. To combat this, a mixed 
mode methodology can be adopted where multiple types of survey distributions are used. Given 
that the case study community is seasonal and most densely populated on summer weekends 
(particularly long weekends), the drop-off pick-up method may be difficult to do on its own. If the 
resources were available, the survey could be distributed in person at the beginning of a long 
weekend and collected at the end. This could be paired with an online or mail-out survey sent to 
residents who were not present at the time of the survey distribution. In order to decide on the best 
method, more information about the occupants of the cabin area and the resource limitations will 
need to be obtained.  
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 The findings from this survey can be used to inform a traffic model of an evacuation in the 
community (such as that created in Section 4.3) as well as helping in the development of a more 
comprehensive modelling approach with a behavioural model component. 
4.3 Community Evacuation Modelling 
4.3.1 Overview  
Being able to predict what an evacuation would look like is an important step when 
assessing a community’s wildfire vulnerability. As interest in offering community WUI fire 
vulnerability assessments grows within engineering consultancy, having an understanding of the 
complexity of such an undertaking and of the type and amount of information necessary to create 
an evacuation model is critical. Having a framework which identifies and addresses the many 
factors that can impact an evacuation would greatly benefit parties seeking to conduct such 
assessments. 
In order to begin developing such a framework (to both aid in the movement towards 
comprehensive evacuation modelling and to caution against conducting ill-informed vulnerability 
assessments), several evacuation scenarios were modelled and analyzed using the traffic 
simulation software PTV VISSIM. The purpose of this was to create a baseline analysis of what 
an evacuation in the case study community might look like, given relatively limited information 
(a site visit was not possible and information from reliable sources was difficult to obtain).  While 
this is not ideal for a comprehensive evacuation analysis, it is not unlike what many consultancy 
companies might face when asked to conduct a vulnerability assessment. As such, in addition to 
identifying points of congestion and gauging how different factors affected total and individual 
evacuation times within the case study community, the analysis of the evacuation model and results 
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will help to identify key information that is required to conduct a more comprehensive analysis. 
This knowledge will not only benefit the next stages of this vulnerability assessment research 
project within the community but will also help to provide a first-stage framework for others (either 
researchers or consultants) wanting to undertake such assessments.   
4.3.2 Evacuation Modelling 
As noted in Chapter 1, evacuation modelling is a tool that can be used to help plan for and 
execute evacuations.  Through the simulation of human decision-making and behaviour as well as 
wildfire dynamics and traffic flow, a comprehensive evacuation model could help to tackle the 
challenge of creating safer communities in the changing WUI. While such a model does not exist 
currently, there is work being done within the fire safety engineering community to create one 
[25], [44], [171]. There are modelling tools which do already exist that focus on simulating one of 
these primary components necessary for a comprehensive model, to varying degrees of complexity 
and granularity. Examples of such models are discussed in detail in an NFPA report on building a 
WUI fire evacuation modelling framework [25].  In looking specifically at existing traffic models, 
they can be used to simulate different evacuation procedures and strategies and/or specific 
evacuation scenarios. There are, however, important considerations that need to be made when 
modelling evacuations using standard traffic modelling software as WUI evacuation scenarios 
differ from standard traffic conditions. Some examples of potential differences include the degree 
to which evacuees are familiar with what they should do, where they should go, and how they 
should get there; driving behaviours; primary one-way flow; and greatly overloaded networks. As 
such, these existing models need to be able to replicate how network conditions and traveller 
behaviour will differ given these “abnormal” conditions. It is also important that the limitations of 
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the model with respect to the degree it can replicate and account for these unique conditions be 
understood and clearly defined.    
4.3.3 Traffic Modelling 
Within traffic engineering, there are four primary steps involved in traffic modelling: travel 
demand; trip distribution; modal split; and traffic assignment. Common methods used to model 
each of these steps as well as considerations that should be made in the context of modelling 
evacuations specifically are detailed below.15  
Travel Demand 
Traffic demand modelling is used to determine the traffic load on the transportation 
network. In the case of an evacuation, this relates to the number of people who will evacuate (trip 
generation) and when the evacuees will depart from their initial location (departure timing). For 
trip generation, the area/region that needs to evacuate must be determined followed by the number 
of people within that area who will evacuate (as opposed to staying-and-defending or sheltering-
in-place). This determines the number of trips that will depart from an origin (a house, a 
neighbourhood, a city, etc.) and end up at a destination (generally represented using an origin-
destination (OD) matrix). There are several different ways that trip generation can be determined, 
including descriptive models (regression analysis, cross-classification/category analysis, etc.) and 
random utility models.16 
                                                 
15 In the field of evacuation modelling, some steps have been researched more than others which will impact the 
level of understanding of these steps and the ability to accurately model them.  
16 As trip generation is not something that needs to be determined via these means for the model of the case study 
conducted as part of this thesis, the details of these sub-models are not provided here. However, such details can be 
found in Ronchi et al. (2017) [25]. 
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Evacuation participation and evacuation departure timing are generally modelled in one of 
two ways, sequentially or simultaneously [46]. The sequential approach separates trip generation 
and departure timing into two separate steps. Once the area to be evacuated is identified, the share 
of the people in that area who will evacuate is determined via descriptive or random utility 
modelling. The departure timing is then determined, often using varying forms of response curves 
(instantaneous departure, uniform distribution, Rayleigh distribution, Poisson distribution, 
Weibull distribution, sigmoid curve, etc.) which identify the percentage of departures in each time 
interval [46]. While a sequential modelling approach is used most often (due to its relative 
mathematical simplicity and less site-specific data requirements [172]), one of its main drawbacks 
is that there is no real behavioural basis on which to justify the response curves [46]. In contrast, 
a simultaneous travel demand model uses a repeat binary logit model to determine the share of 
people who will choose to evacuate and leave at that time or will postpone the evacuation decision. 
This process is repeated multiple times at set intervals. The choice made at each interval is 
determined based on the differential utility associated with evacuating which is based on the 
prevailing conditions [46]. The factors discussed in Chapter 2 are examples of factors that could 
be chosen by modellers to impact the decision to evacuate.   
Comparisons between the sequential and simultaneous modelling approaches have shown 
that the latter more closely represents observed evacuation travel demand behaviour as its 
flexibility allows it to estimate how evacuees respond dynamically to changes in hazard and road 
conditions as well as evacuation orders [46]. However, simultaneous models require more 
calibration and data. As such, the method chosen for a WUI evacuation model will depend on the 
purpose of a comprehensive evacuation model (real-time use, planning, etc.) and the corresponding 
time and data limitations.  
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Trip Distribution 
 Trip distribution modelling is used to represent how trips (or tours) are distributed 
throughout the transportation network, both spatially and temporally. This involves determining 
evacuees’ destinations and whether there will be sub-destinations within the overall evacuation. 
The simplest and most popular approach to choosing evacuee destinations is to use proximity or 
other criteria such as destination attraction potential to assign evacuees to a destination [46]. This 
is generally done using gravity-based distribution, however, multinomial logit models can also be 
used [25], [65].  
Depending on the purpose and number of trips taken by evacuees, either a trip-based or 
activity-based modelling approach can be used [25]. With the former approach, evacuees are 
modelled travelling directly from A to B (origin to destination – home to an evacuation shelter, 
home to relative’s house, fire station to a threatened neighbourhood, etc.). With an activity-based 
approach, intermediate activities are represented (travelling from office to school to home to 
evacuation shelter, etc.) and therefore tours, or chains of trips, are modelled.  The approach chosen 
should therefore reflect the evacuation scenario that is being modelled (ex. evacuating during the 
middle of the night vs. mid-afternoon), keeping in mind the amount of time and computing power 
necessary to run the simulation.  
Modal Split  
Modal split determines which modes of transportation will be used during the evacuation 
(personal vehicle, public transportation, etc.). Many factors such as the characteristics of the 
disaster, the distance to safety, mode availability and access, evacuee location at the time of an 
event, and population groups can all impact the transportation modes used during an evacuation 
[65]. Given the characteristics of WUI fire evacuations, private vehicles and potentially buses are 
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the modes most likely to be used [25].  In addition to the type of mode, the number of modes used 
by a single household is also important as it can impact the number of vehicles in the transportation 
network during the evacuation.  
There are various ways that modal split can be modelled. The simpler models estimate the 
mode choice independently of the other steps (heuristic and random utility models) [25]. 
Alternatively, integrated modelling simulates step choices (such as distribution and mode) 
simultaneously. While such models have the potential to provide a more accurate modal split, there 
is the potential to make assumptions which simplify the modelling process depending on the 
evacuation scenario being modelled (given the modes most commonly used during WUI 
evacuations). 
Traffic Assignment 
 Traffic assignment modelling is used to assign evacuees to routes, thereby modelling route 
choice decisions [46]. Two of the primary factors involved in traffic assignment are how a route 
is assigned (static or dynamic) and when the route is assigned (pre-trip or enroute).17 When using 
static assignment, steady-state network conditions are assumed and assignment is based on a user 
equilibrium approach [25]. In contrast, dynamic assignment assumes that the system changes over 
time as a result of various factors such as the number of users in the network and path choices 
[173]. Dynamic assignment can use either a deterministic or stochastic route choice model, 
depending on the nature of the variables used.  
Pre-trip assignment means that a route is assigned at the origin before the trip begins. In 
this case, either a single path from origin to destination is determined (fully pre-trip, with no 
                                                 
17 Others include capacity restraints, approach used for studying supply-demand interactions, segmentation of 
demand based on different user classes, and elasticity of demand [25].  
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changes made during the trip), or decision strategies for enroute choices are determined [173]. 
With enroute assignment, trip decisions are made during the trip based on information received 
while travelling. In both cases, trip decisions are made by considering the cost attributes (time, 
distance, financial cost, etc.) of different paths from origin to destination. To simulate these 
choices, random utility models, specifically deterministic or stochastic (probabilistic) choice 
models are used. With a deterministic choice model, travellers will choose the path that has 
maximum average utility (a path can only be used if the cost associated with it is the lesser of all 
alternative paths) [173]. A stochastic route choice model assumes that the perceived utility of a 
path is a random variable. Therefore, it expresses the probability that users will choose each 
available path [173]. Given that conditions can change quickly during an evacuation, a dynamic, 
enroute assignment approach is generally viewed as the best option. 
Modelling Scope 
 The scope of a model, or the level of detail that can be simulated, should be determined 
based on the intended purposed of the model as the type of information obtained and the 
computational power/time required can vary greatly. The scope effects how vehicles are 
represented and how interactions between vehicles (and between vehicles and the network) are 
represented. There are three primary scales: macroscopic, mesoscopic and microscopic. 
Macroscopic models use a fluid analogy approach, looking at parameters such as volume, speed, 
and density within a road section and the relationships between them [25]. At the other end of the 
spectrum are microsimulation models which represent the individual choices of each traveller 
(vehicle) and the interactions between different travellers and between travellers and the 
environment [25].  Different parameters can be assigned to each traveller (vehicle characteristics, 
driver reaction time and aggressiveness, etc.) and sub-models are used to model traveller choices 
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and interactions (car-following, acceleration/deceleration, lane-changing, etc.) [25].  Mesoscopic 
models combine some properties of micro and macroscopic models to create an intermediate scale 
of modelling. Packages of vehicles are modelled as opposed to individual vehicles and traffic flow 
is simulated based on the interactions between packages [25].  
4.3.4 PTV VISSIM Traffic Modelling Software 
PTV VISSIM is a microsimulation traffic simulation software commonly used in the 
transportation engineering and planning field. It is capable of modelling pedestrians in addition to 
multimodal traffic [174]. The model is based on several mathematical sub-models relating to car 
following, lateral movements (lane selection, lane changing, etc.), tactical driving behaviour, 
pedestrian modelling, fixed routes, and dynamic routing and assignment [175]. It is commonly 
used for corridor studies on motorways, signalized intersection performance and adaptation, and 
traffic calming to name a few applications [175]. Though not common, the software has also been 
used in a research capacity to model hurricane evacuations [176]–[178]. To the awareness of the 
author, no previous wildfire evacuation applications were identified in the available literature, 
however, VISSIM was one of the software packages reviewed in the NFPA Framework for 
Modelling Wildfire Urban Evacuation [25].  
4.3.5 Scope 
It was within the scope of this community evacuation simulation and analysis to provide a 
baseline which will be used for the development of a more comprehensive and accurate evacuation 
model within the next stage of the community vulnerability study. A site visit was not possible 
during the time of this project and as such the model is based on the information that could be 
obtained online and from a contact within a community agency. The main area of interest within 
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the community is the cabin area located on the west side (as identified in Section 4.1). A total of 
10 different evacuation scenarios were modelled, with variations being made to the evacuation 
timeframe, number of evacuees and evacuation destination. The analysis focused on the evacuation 
from the cabin area to the highway which serves as the only road into/out of the community. In 
addition to the vehicles evacuating from the cabin area, evacuation traffic originating from the 
other parts of the community (cottage area, campground, commercial/retail area) was also included 
to create a more realistic representation of a potential evacuation. Additional traffic on the highway 
caused by evacuations upstream was not considered, nor was background traffic within the 
community or trips made by people trying to enter the community. For a comprehensive analysis 
these would be important to consider, however, they were outside the scope of this analysis. Figure 
4.9 outlines the community, the modelled area and the focus area analyzed in this study.  
 
Figure 4.9: Case study community, modelled area and focus area 
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4.3.6 Methodology 
Model Development 
To create the model space within VISSIM, the network geometry was created using a series 
of Links which represent roadways and intersections. A Google Maps satellite view image of the 
site was scaled within VISSIM and set as the background image used to trace roads within the 
community. As the road widths were not known, a value of 2.5m was assumed and used for roads 
within the cabin area, and 3.0m was used for the remaining roads based on approximate 
measurements taken by the author from Google Maps.18 Exact metrics can be made in future site 
assessments, for now these are suitable assumptions for first-stage modelling. All intersections 
within the study area were unsignalized, therefore, all intersection interactions were modelled 
using VISSIM’s Stop Signs, Priority Rules and Conflict Areas functions. Speed limits within the 
community were determined using Google Maps Street View. Given that dynamic assignment was 
going to be used for the analysis, Parking Lots served as the origin and destination points of the 
simulated vehicles. These were assigned to different Zones which corresponded to those in the OD 
matrices used for traffic generation. Each branch of the road network within the cabin area was 
designated as a different zone (total of 19). A zone was created to represent the rest of the 
community and one was created for each evacuation destination on the highway (one for 
evacuating South-West and one for evacuating East). Reduced Speed Areas were used at sharp 
turns in the road network to temporarily slow traffic down and Desired Speed Decisions were used 
when speed limits within the network changed. Figure 4.10 shows the modelled network in 
VISSIM.  
                                                 
18 Given the modelled scenario, the road widths did not have an impact on the simulation. 
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Figure 4.10: Case study community road network in VISSIM 
Several network simplifications were made to make modelling more efficient. Instead of 
representing each individual cabin as its own parking lot on its own link, four small links were 
created to represent the cabins off each branch of the road network within the cabin area. Two 
were created near the middle/front of each branch and two were created near the back of each 
branch. This was done so that the simulation could better represent likely routes taken by evacuees, 
specifically those located farther along the branch roads (ex. might be more inclined to loop around 
and exit via another branch). As each branch was classified as a zone (corresponding to the OD 
matrix), the total trips leaving each cabin area zone was split between the four parking lots, with 
30% coming from each front parking lot and 20% coming from each back parking lot. This 
distribution was chosen given the location of the links representing cabins. As the community was 
not modelled in full, the traffic coming from the community zone was distributed between three 
primary roads leading out of the community towards the south. The traffic was distributed to these 
three roads based on what was assumed to be the most likely egress route for evacuees leaving the 
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community (60%, 20% and 20%).  This assumption was made based on the location of cottages 
and the campground within the community.19  
Running Simulations  
To see the impact that the number of evacuating vehicles and the duration of evacuation 
initiation timeframe had on the evacuation of the cabin area, 10 different scenarios were simulated. 
These are detailed in Table 4.1. They are meant to help gain a better understanding of the potential 
worst-case-scenarios and the factors that contribute to them. Scenarios 1 and 2 act as base cases 
where only the cabin area is evacuated (no traffic from the rest of the community). This allowed 
the impact of such traffic to be analyzed by comparing later scenarios with community traffic 
(Scenarios 3 and 4) to these base cases. Scenarios 5 through 8 allow for the analysis of the impact 
that modifying one factor (or all factors) had on the evacuation (number of vehicles from the cabin 
area, number of vehicles from the community, evacuation initiation timeframe). Scenarios 9 and 
10 were modelled to see how substantially increasing the evacuation initiation timeframe would 
impact the evacuation in comparison to shorter timeframes. It is acknowledged that alternative 
and/or additional scenarios could have been modelled, however, given the lack of information 
about the site and the current scope of this research, these scenarios were deemed sufficient to 
provide a good baseline for future analysis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 The campground (over 450 sites) is accessed exclusively off one of the modelled roads. The main body of the 
community can be accessed by all three roads. The two-lane road onto which the campground exits was therefore 
given a greater distribution of traffic. 
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Table 4.1: Modelled evacuation scenario descriptions and number of error-free simulations run 
Scenario No. Description 
Number of 
Simulations Run 
1 
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
0 cars from community 
5 
2 
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
East evacuation 
0 cars from community 
5 
3 
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
4 
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
East evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
5 
1 car per cabin (530) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
6 
2 cars per cabin (1060) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
7 
2 car per cabin (1060) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
2000 cars from community 
3 
8 
1 car per cabin (530) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
2000 cars from community 
3 
9 
2 car per cabin (1060) 
4-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
2000 cars from community 
3 
10 
1 car per cabin (530) 
4-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
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 The travel demand for the model was determined based on knowledge about the number 
of residences in the community (and the number of campsites). The number of cabins in the cabin 
area was obtained from a map provided by a community agency contact, with 530 individual 
residences being identified. As the number of vehicles present at each cabin was unknown at this 
stage, the modelled scenarios assumed either one or two vehicles per cabin. A community agency 
contact stated that on summer weekends the cabins were usually fully occupied. Therefore, to 
represent a potential worst-case-scenario (greatest number of people) it was assumed that there 
would be 530 vehicles or 1060 vehicles evacuating from the cabin area. No recent information 
could be found about the number of cottages and commercial rental properties within the main part 
of the community, however, the number of campsites was determined to be approximately 460 
[179]. As such, after looking at Google Maps satellite images of the community, it was decided 
that in total, 1000 vehicles would be assumed to be coming from the community and campground. 
It is important to note that this number is arbitrary and an accurate account of the number of 
vehicles that would need to leave this area would improve the accuracy of the evacuation. Several 
scenarios were also tested with 2000 vehicles coming from the community to see how much of an 
impact this increase would have on the evacuation.  
 The time at which the evacuating vehicles left their origin parking lot was determined 
stochastically using the Poisson distribution.20 Each scenario was run three to five times, using 
different random seeds so as to simulate stochastic variations of vehicle arrivals in the network. 
The overall timeframe during which all the vehicles would leave their origin parking lot was 
specified for each OD matrix. No previous research relating to WUI fire evacuation timelines could 
                                                 
20 The average time gap between two vehicles results from the hourly volume and it is used the average value of a 
negative exponential distribution. VISSIM uses time gaps from this distribution (which relates to a Poisson 
Distribution) [174]. 
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be found. As such, several timeframes were tested: 1-hour; 2-hours; and 4-hours. Though arbitrary, 
these timeframes were selected because greater congestion occurs when more vehicles are on the 
network at the same time (therefore representing a potential worst-case-scenario). Also, unlike 
hurricane evacuations, WUI fires can prompt immediate evacuations with little warning (as was 
the case with many of the WUI fires discussed in Chapter 1). As the number of cabin and 
community evacuees were included in the same OD matrix, the timeframe associated with that OD 
matrix was applied to all evacuating vehicles.   
 With respect to trip distribution, an OD matrix was created for each scenario, representing 
the number of trips originating from the respective zones. A trip-based approach was used for 
simplicity, and as a result of a lack of information about trips normally taken within the 
community. This could also represent an evacuation occurring at night when most people are home 
and would need to take fewer side trips to collect family and belongings. The 10 scenarios were 
determined based on looking at the community’s location and the information that was known 
about the community population and layout. Based on the location of the community in relation to 
the forested area around it, it was assumed that there would be a higher likelihood of a fire 
impacting the site from the North/East therefore most of the scenarios had a South/West evacuation 
destination. Two scenarios were simulated using an East evacuation destination for comparison 
and to create a baseline for what such an evacuation could look like.  
 Given that the community is remote and seasonal, there is no public transportation. Only a 
chartered bus company services the area [180]. Therefore, the traffic composition (modal split) 
was determined to be 100% personal vehicles. VISSIM default properties and distributions were 
used for the following vehicle features: 
• Vehicle length and width (3.75m – 4.76m and 1.85m – 2.07 respectively) 
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• Acceleration and deceleration 
• Vehicle speeds using linear distributions for speed limits of 20km/h (20km/h – 25 km/h), 
30km/h (30km/h – 35km/h), and 50km/h (48km/h – 58km/h).  
• Car following behaviour (Weidemann 74 car following model) [174], [175] 
A dynamic, enroute traffic assignment approach was used for the simulations. Dynamic 
assignment in VISSIM is usually done by running back-to-back iterations of the same scenario, 
with drivers basing their decisions off of the experience of drivers in preceding simulations. 
However, unlike commuting to work, WUI evacuations do not occur on a regular basis where 
people can learn from their past experience. As such, each simulation was run separately. Instead 
of drivers basing their decisions on previous simulations, the initial path choice is based on the 
shortest distance and subsequent decisions are made as each vehicle approaches an intersection 
(the vehicle chooses its path dynamically while it travels). At each intersection, the vehicle 
revaluates its chosen route, updating its previous decision based on how effective a path was (the 
length of travel time on each edge) in the previous time interval within the same simulation. This 
interval was set to be 5-minutes to allow drivers to update their route choices more frequently. 
VISSIM’s stochastic path choice model (Kirchhoff) was select as was required for this type of 
simulation with the default Kirchhoff exponent of 3.5 being used (sensitivity parameter). Eq. 1 
shows the Kirchhoff distribution formula used in VISSIM where Uj is the utility of route j, P(Rj) 
is the probability of route j to be chosen, and K is the sensitivity of the model [175]: 
Eq. 1                                             𝑝(𝑅𝑗) =
𝑈𝑗
𝑘
∑ 𝑈𝑖
𝑘
𝑖
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Scenario Analysis 
Data Collection Points, Vehicle Travel Time Measurements, and Queue Counters were 
used to collect information about vehicle throughput, total and individual evacuation times, queue 
lengths and travel times. Data collection points and queue counters were placed at the entrance to 
intersections on roads of interest (focus on primary intersections and cabin area intersections) and 
directly before the network exit parking lots. Vehicle travel time measurements were taken along 
stretches of road (cabin area access road and highway access roads). Table B.1 in Appendix B 
provides more information about the specific locations of each.  
4.3.7 Results and Analysis 
 Overall comparisons between the 10 scenarios were made by looking at the total evacuation 
time (TET) – when the last vehicle left the network – and the individual evacuation time (IET) of 
vehicles in the two sections of the cabin area. The area designated as “Back Cabin Area” is the 
section closest to the lake and the “Front Cabin Area” is the area farthest from the lake.  
Simulation errors occurred when running one of the scenarios, resulting in one or more 
vehicles not exiting the network. During one simulation run of Scenario 4, the software removed 
one vehicle from the network after it spent 60 seconds waiting for a lane change, and during 
another simulation run, three vehicles were removed for the same reason. This occurred on the 
easternmost road leading out of the community.  In order to allow for comparative analysis of the 
scenarios, the scenarios that resulted in errors were run additional times with new random seeds 
until there were three error-free scenarios. The results of the other scenarios were not included in 
the analysis as the reduced number of vehicles impacted the TETs and the queue lengths. For 
Scenarios 4, two additional simulations had to be run as the second and forth simulations both 
resulted in an error. The potential for errors such as these to occur must be taken in to account 
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when using software to simulate evacuations (resulting from the limitations and programming of 
the software).  
 As noted earlier, VISSIM uses as stochastic driver behaviour model and therefore, with the 
variations in the random seed used for each simulation, there is a level of randomness in the results. 
For demonstration of concept, the analysis approach used in this study is that which will be used 
for more specific simulations that will be run once additional data about the site is obtained and 
therefore more confidence is had in the model inputs. The 95% confidence intervals were 
calculated for each simulation run with the assumption that the population will have a normal 
distribution. At this stage, this also helped to determine if additional simulations of each scenario 
should be run (this applies to the individual evacuation times and queue length analysis as well). 
Table 4.2 shows the range of expected total evacuation times based on this confidence interval. 
This table seems to indicate that the stochastic variation will not have a large impact on the overall 
evacuation time, however, this would need to be confirmed with additional simulation runs such 
as those planned for the next stage of the project. For the sake of comparing scenarios, investigating 
the software, and testing assumptions about the impact of key-input parameter variation 
(timeframe and number of vehicles), the number of simulations run as part of this baseline study 
was deemed appropriate.  Table B.2 in Appendix B shows details of each simulation run, including 
the TET of each simulation of each scenario, the aggregate average TET for each scenario, the 
random seeds used, and the overall simulation time. Figure 4.11 below shows the average total 
evacuation time for each of the simulations as well as the evacuation initiation timeframe (period 
of time during which vehicles left their origin zone).  
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Table 4.2 Expected average total evacuation times 
Scenario 
95% Confidence Expected Total Evacuation 
Time Range (hr) 
1 1:05:05 - 1:06:17 
2 1:04:56 - 1:06:19 
3 2:00:31 - 2:02:26 
4 1:47:45 - 1:53:18 
5 2:02:41 - 2:04:41 
6 2:47:36 - 2:49:21 
7 3:54:55 - 4:03:40 
8 2:57:46 - 3:03:24 
9 4:03:22 - 4:04:34 
10 4:03:08 - 4:04:07 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Total evacuation time and departure timeframes  
 The aggregate IETs for the vehicles originating from the front and back cabin areas were 
also compared for each scenario. Figure 4.12 – Figure 4.14 show the aggregate average and 
median, the aggregate minimum, and the aggregate maximum IETs for each of the two cabin areas. 
The corresponding tables can be found in Appendix B (Tables B.3 – B.6). Figure 4.15 shows the 
five-number summary for the front and back cabin areas for each scenario (minimum, first quartile, 
median, third quartile, and maximum). The 95% confidence interval was calculated for each 
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scenario and varied between a few seconds to a few minutes with the larger intervals occurring in 
scenarios with greater congestion (particularly for the front cabin area).  
 
Figure 4.12: Aggregate average and median individual evacuation times 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Aggregate minimum individual evacuation times 
115 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Aggregate maximum individual evacuation times 
 
Figure 4.15: Five number summary (minimum, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile, maximum) and average for the 
front and back cabin areas in each scenario 
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As can be seen in Figure 4.13, the relationship between the minimum IETs for the two 
sections was similar for all the scenarios. There was greater variation between the maximum IETs 
(Figure 4.14), with Scenarios 3, 6 and 7 showing a longer time for those in the front cabin area. 
This is similar to the findings shown in Figure 4.12 for the average and median IETs. Scenarios 3 
and 7 resulted in the greatest difference between the average (and median) for the front and back 
cabin areas. These scenarios also resulted in a larger difference between the average and the 
median (with the median being greater than the average for the front cabin area).  Both of these 
scenarios contained the greatest number of evacuees within their given evacuation initiation 
timeframe, indicating that the number of evacuees is one of the key determinants of individual 
evacuation times. However, as Scenario 5 and Scenario 9 which had longer initiation timeframes 
involved the same number of evacuees as Scenarios 3 and Scenario 7 respectively resulted in short 
IETs, the timeframe also plays an important role.  
Congestion occurred at primary intersections in most scenarios, largely impacting the 
individual and total evacuation times. The greatest congestion corresponded with scenarios that 
had a greater number of evacuating vehicles and/or a decreased evacuation initiation timeline. 
Scenarios 1, 2, 5, 9 and 10 had minimal congestion (as observed within the model during the 
simulation and the recorded queue lengths.) Figure 4.16 below shows the location of the measured 
queues, Figure 4.17 shows the maximum recorded queue lengths for all primary intersection within 
the network, Figure 4.18 shows the maximum queue lengths within the cabin area and Figure 4.19 
shows them for the main network intersections. The average queue lengths were also recorded; 
however, they were averaged over the entire length of the simulation and not just the time when 
the vehicles were in the network. As such, the recorded values do not reflect the queue lengths 
over the correct time and therefore they were not compared within this analysis.  
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Figure 4.16: Queue measurement locations 
As is shown in the figures below, the longest queue lengths occurred at the intersections 
where cabin area and community evacuees interacted (4-way stop, east and west highway access 
roads). The longest queues were observed during scenarios that had a greater number of evacuees 
and/or a shorter evacuation initiation timeframe (as was seen with the total and individual 
evacuation times). At the 4-way intersection, Scenarios 3 and 7 caused queues reaching all the way 
back to the back cabin area access intersection, with Scenarios 4, 6 and 8 causing queue lengths 
past the front cabin area access intersection. Scenarios 3, 7 and 8 resulted in the longest queue 
lengths at the west highway access intersection, corresponding to increased traffic coming from 
the community on that road. Given that most of the evacuation scenarios had a west/south 
destination, fewer cars used the east highway access road. The longest queues occurred at this 
intersection during Scenarios 4, 7 and 8.  
Figure 4.17: Maximum queue lengths for all primary intersections
118
119
Figure 4.18: Maximum queue lengths for intersections within the cabin area
120
Figure 4.19: Maximum queue lengths for main network intersections
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Between the back and front cabin areas, the greater queues were observed in the front cabin 
area. This is in line with the longer individual evacuation times observed for front cabin area 
evacuees. The only notable queue lengths within the back cabin area occurred during Scenario 7 
while several evacuation scenarios caused substantial queues in the front cabin area. At the entry 
points into the cabin areas, four scenarios caused queues of more than 100m for the front cabin 
area while only one caused such a queue for the back cabin area. These findings reflect the type of 
intersections connecting these cabin areas to the main access road. Those travelling from the back 
cabin area have priority on the main access road, meaning that once congestion from the 4-way 
intersections reaches the front cabin access road, evacuees from this area have to wait for all of the 
vehicles from the back cabin area to evacuate before they can exit the front cabin area (unless there 
is a large enough gap between cars or a vehicle were to stop and let a car from the front cabin area 
into the flow).   
The queue lengths varied more within scenarios than the total and individual evacuation 
times did. The 95% confidence interval varied greatly between simulations and between 
intersections within simulations. Table B.7 in Appendix B shows the maximum queue lengths and 
the confidence intervals for each scenario. The queue lengths depend greatly on when vehicles 
leave (distributed timewise during the initiation timeframe stochastically in VISSIM), where they 
leave from, and the decision the vehicles make enroute. Given the observed variability, additional 
simulation runs would be needed to improve the confidence interval to be able to confidently 
estimate queue lengths in the network. However, the current results do indicate which scenarios 
are likely to result in the greatest congestion and at which intersections this congestion will occur. 
Several direct comparisons were made between individual scenarios to identify the impact 
of the changed scenario parameters. Table 4.3 below shows the results of these comparisons. In 
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each case, the total evacuation and individual evacuation times were compared. The first two 
comparisons show the impact that the destination had on the evacuation times, with and without 
traffic from the community (Comp. 2 and Comp. 1 respectively). When just the cabin traffic was 
considered, the TETs were almost identical and the IETs for the front and back areas varied only 
slightly. When traffic from the community was considered, the TET was 11 minutes greater for 
the westward direction. The IETs for the front and back cabin areas were substantially longer for 
the westward evacuation, approximately 32 and 7 minutes longer respectively. 
 The third and forth comparisons show the impact that community traffic had on the 
evacuation times for an evacuation in each direction. Comp. 3 showed that with the presence of 
community traffic the TET almost doubled, and the IET increased by 20 minutes (fivefold) for the 
back cabin area and by 48 minutes (elevenfold) for the front cabin area. The impact of community 
traffic was less for the eastward evacuation, with the TET increasing by 44 minutes, the back cabin 
area IET increasing by 13 minutes (threefold) and the front cabin area IET increasing by 16 
minutes (fourfold).   
The fifth comparison shows the impact that doubling the evacuation initiation timeframe 
had on evacuation times. As expected, the IETs decreased substantially with a greater initiation 
timeframe as there were fewer vehicles in the network at any given time, resulting in evacuation 
times similar to those seen in Scenario 1. The difference in the TET was quite small (approximately 
2 minutes), indicating that the overall evacuation timeline would be similar if all vehicles initiated 
evacuation within one hour or within two. 
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Table 4.3: Scenario Comparisons – total and individual evacuation times 
Comparison 
No. 
Scenarios Parameters 
Average Total 
Evacuation Time 
(h:m:s) 
Average 
Individual 
Evacuation Time 
(h:m:s) 
1 S1 - S2 
Same Time 
Same Volume 
Different Direction 
S1 1:05:41 
Back 0:05:25 
Front 0:04:55 
S2 1:05:37 
Back 0:05:36 
Front 0:05:06 
2 S3 - S4 
Same Time 
Same Volume 
Different Direction 
S3 2:01:28 
Back 0:26:01 
Front 0:53:22 
S4 1:50:31 
Back 0:18:43 
Front 0:21:20 
3 S1 - S3 
Same Time 
Different Volume 
Same Direction 
S1 1:05:41 
Back 0:05:25 
Front 0:04:55 
S3 2:01:28 
Back 0:26:01 
Front 0:53:22 
4 S2 - S4 
Same Time 
Different Volume 
Same Direction 
S2 1:05:37 
Back 0:05:36 
Front 0:05:06 
S4 1:50:31 
Back 0:18:43 
Front 0:21:20 
5 S3 - S5 
Different Time (double) 
Same Volume 
Same Direction 
S3 2:01:28 
Back 0:26:01 
Front 0:53:22 
S5 2:03:41 
Back 0:04:41 
Front 0:04:05 
6 S5 - S6 
Same Time 
Different Volume (double cabin) 
Same Direction 
S5 2:03:41 
Back 0:04:41 
Front 0:04:05 
S6 2:48:28 
Back 0:18:02 
Front 0:46:46 
7 S5 - S8 
Same Time 
Different Volume (double 
community) 
Same Direction 
S5 2:03:41 
Back 0:04:41 
Front 0:04:05 
S8 3:00:35 
Back 0:16:57 
Front 0:16:20 
8 S5 - S7 
Same Time 
Different Volume (double both) 
Same Direction 
S5 2:03:41 
Back 0:04:41 
Front 0:04:05 
S7 3:59:17 
Back 0:33:13 
Front 1:35:52 
9 S3 - S7 
Different Time (double) 
Different Volume (double both) 
Same Direction 
S3 2:01:28 
Back 0:26:01 
Front 0:53:22 
S7 3:59:17 
Back 0:33:13 
Front 1:35:52 
10 S7 - S9 
Different Time (double) 
Same Volume 
Same Direction 
S7 3:59:17 
Back 0:33:13 
Front 1:35:52 
S9 4:03:58 
Back 0:04:42 
Front 0:04:08 
11 S5 - S10 
Different Time (double) 
Same Volume 
Same Direction 
S5 2:03:41 
Back 0:04:41 
Front 0:04:05 
S10 4:03:38 
Back 0:03:51 
Front 0:03:15 
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 Comparisons 6 through 8 used Scenario 5 as a base case and showed the impact that 
increasing the amount of traffic coming from the cabin area and community (separately and 
combined) had on the evacuation. When the number of vehicles leaving the cabin area was 
doubled, the TET increased by 45 minutes, the back cabin area IET increased fourfold and the 
front cabin area IET increased elevenfold (Comp. 6).  When the number of vehicles leaving the 
community was doubled, the TET increased by 57 minutes, and both the back and front cabin area 
IET increased approximately fourfold (Comp. 7). It was observed in the simulation that when just 
the community traffic was doubled, the cabin area vehicles were able to evacuate more quickly as 
compared to when just the cabin area traffic was doubled. This happened largely as a result of 
congestion occurring on the central road leading out of the community which prevented 
community evacuees from turning left and heading to the 4-way intersection (reducing the traffic 
at the 4-way intersection). This is reflected in the fact that while the TET was greater for Scenario 
7 than Scenario 6, the IETs for the cabin area were reduced (the longer TET was caused by vehicles 
evacuating from the rest of the community not the cabin area). When the number of vehicles 
leaving both the cabin area and the community was doubled, the TET increased by nearly two 
hours, the back cabin area IET increased sevenfold and the front cabin area IET increased 
approximately twenty-fourfold (Comp. 8).   
The ninth comparison shows the impact of doubling all scenario parameters (initiation 
timeframe and number of evacuating vehicles leaving the cabin area and community). In terms of 
the TET, there was a difference of approximately two hours between the two scenarios, with the 
TET for each being twice the respective evacuation initiation timeframe (two hours for Scenario 
3 and four hours for Scenario 7). For the back cabin area IETs there was a difference of 7 minutes 
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(1.3 times longer in Scenario 7) and for the front cabin area, there was a difference of 42 minutes 
(1.8 times longer in Scenario 7).  
Comparisons 10 and 11 show the impact of increasing the initiation timeframe from 2-
hours to 4-hours with a total of 3060 vehicles (Comp. 10) and with a total of 1530 vehicles (Comp. 
11). The relationship between the TET for Comp. 10 and the respective evacuation initiation 
timeframes were quite different. When the initiation timeframe was shorter the TET was double 
the timeframe, and when the initiation timeframe was longer the TET was only four minutes longer 
than the initiation timeframe. The IETs for this comparison were also quite different, with the 
shorter initiation time increasing the IET sevenfold and twenty-threefold for the back and front 
cabin areas respectively (similar to the degree of difference seen in Comp. 8). Conversely, when 
fewer cars were in the network as was the case for Comp. 11, the relative differences between the 
TETs and the absolute differences between the IETs were minimal. In both compared scenarios, 
the TET was approximately four minutes more than the initiation time, and the IETs for both the 
front and back cabin areas differed by less than one minute.  
4.3.8 Key Considerations for Evacuation Modelling 
The 10 different evacuation scenarios modelled and analyzed help to identify potential 
challenges to evacuating the case study community as well as highlighting key information needed 
and considerations that should be made to better understand what an evacuation might look like. 
As expected, the individual evacuation times and the total evacuation time increased when there 
were a greater number of vehicles in the network, either as a result of the total number of evacuees 
increasing or the timeframe in which all vehicles entered the network decreasing. The intersections 
that saw the most congestion were the 4-way stop (the first location where cabin area traffic and 
community traffic met) and the highway access points. When the network was congested, the front 
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cabin area took longer to evacuate than the back cabin area, with evacuees having longer individual 
evacuation times. Figure 4.20 showcases examples of the congestion observed within the network 
simulation.  
 
Figure 4.20: Network congestion in Scenario 7 
 In looking at these results, or those of any model, it is important to keep in mind the 
assumptions that were made and the amount and quality of information that was known about the 
community. Table 4.4 summarizes key assumptions that were made in the modelling of this case 
study and the impact that these assumptions had on the simulation outcomes. All assumptions 
ultimately had the potential to impact the congestion observed within the network (where, when, 
and to what degree) as well as the total and individual evacuation times. Having more information 
about the number of vehicles that might use the network in the community would improve the 
accuracy of how many vehicles to simulate in the model and where they should originate from 
(cabin area vs. community, within cabin area and within community). This in turn impacts where 
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congestion occurs and to what degree (as was shown in the comparison of the modelled scenarios). 
Similarly, having a better idea about how long people will take to initiate evacuation can also 
impact this. In the 10 scenarios, it was assumed that both the community and the cabin area 
evacuees all left within the same timeframe. As Chapter 2 discussed, the decision to evacuate can 
be impacted by numerous factors and it is important to understand which factors would be most 
impactful for different areas of the community. For example, if the cabins are occupied by people 
who visit every summer and are familiar with the area, while the campground and parts of the 
community are occupied by first-time visitors unfamiliar with the community, this could impact 
when people leave (and which routes they take). The survey discussed in Section 4.2 seeks to help 
fill some of the current gaps in knowledge about the case study community residents. The number 
of people in each area could also play a role in the length of the evacuation initiation period. Once 
a better understanding was had, simulations could be run using multiple, overlapping OD matrices 
with different timeframes representing different evacuees to gauge the impact that this would have 
on an evacuation.  
 Just as including community traffic had a large impact on the evacuation of the cabin area, 
traffic on the highway would also play an important role, especially given that highway traffic 
would have the right of way potentially making it difficult for vehicles from the community to 
enter the highway (and therefore causing long queues and greater congestion within the community 
and cabin area). While this was outside the scope of this simulation, further analysis of the 
community should include an understanding of the amount of traffic that could be expected on the 
highway during an evacuation scenario. This would be determined largely by the location and size 
of a wildfire. As such, in addition to having information about the number of people in the 
surrounding area, it is also important to study the vegetation, topography, and weather patterns in 
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the area to more accurately predict where a fire would be likely to occur and how it would threaten 
the community and therefore in which direction the community would need to evacuate.   
Table 4.4: Key Assumptions and Impacts on Simulation Results 
No. Assumption Impact 
1 
Number of vehicles evacuating 
from cabin area and 
community 
● Determines number of vehicles in the network 
● Potential to affect the evacuation initiation time (more people, 
more vehicles, more time to "pack up" and leave origin 
● Will affect congestion (in cabin area and where cabin/community 
traffic meet) 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
2 
Distribution of community 
traffic on roads leading out of 
the community 
● Affects the amount of congestion within the network as a whole 
and the queue lengths (amount of congestion) at specific 
intersections 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
3 No highway traffic 
● Affects queues at highway access points which in turn impacts 
the queues and congestion within the cabin area and community 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
4 
South/West evacuation more 
likely 
● Affects which intersections are more congested, (potentially 
which road community traffic would take) 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
5 
Normal traffic behaviour  
(only one turning lane onto 
highway, no lane reversal, 
right of way and priority rules 
at intersections) 
● Affects speeds, behaviour at intersections, use of oncoming lanes 
● These will impact evacuation times and the distribution of traffic 
within the network  
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
6 No Counterflow 
● Evacuating vehicles did not have to deal with traffic travelling the 
opposite direction at intersections (impacting queues and 
congestion) 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
7 
No background traffic or 
evacuees making intermediate 
trips 
● Affects the number of vehicles in the network (amount of 
congestion) 
● All traffic travelling to same destination  
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
8 
Community evacuates in the 
same timeframe as cabin area; 
community evacuees only use 
south exits out of community  
● Affects the number of vehicles in the network (amount of 
congestion) 
● Impacts the number of vehicles that would be travelling on the 
highway upstream of the modelled highway access points 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
9 
Second car distributed evenly 
throughout the cabin area (one 
or two cars per cabin) 
● Affect the routes taken by evacuees within the cabin area which 
impacts queues and congestion within the cabin areas and at the 
cabin area access intersections 
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
10 Sightlines and Curb Radii 
● Affect how vehicles behave at intersections  
● Affect total and individual evacuation times 
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Understanding typical traffic flow within the community would also aid in being better 
able to predict what an evacuation would look like. It could provide a clearer picture of how people 
move within the community (common/more popular routes, typical speeds, etc.) Additionally, 
having more information about evacuee driving behaviour (in general) would provide a clearer 
picture of what could potentially happen during an evacuation of this community. Specifically, 
understanding how people treat right-of-way at 4-way stops or priority rules at other types of 
unsignalized intersections would be beneficial as this could impact which roads in the network 
would have the greatest queues and therefore potential evacuation times. Such information would 
have to be taken from studies of past evacuations, a field of study that is underdeveloped currently. 
 With respect to the accuracy of the network, surveying could be done in areas of the 
community and cabin area where the Google Maps data was blurry or not as specific as required. 
For example, many of the intersections within the cabin area were obscured by tree cover, 
impacting the accuracy of their representation within the model. Additionally, the visibility and 
sight lines for all cabin area intersections were unknown, impacting the modelled speeds and right-
of-way. Depending on the level of detail deemed necessary for a risk assessment, more specific 
information about such network geometry may be required. In order to make such decisions, a site 
visit is important to assess the community in more detail. It is still important to remember, 
however, that even though such information would help to improve the accuracy of an evacuation 
model, there would still be uncertainty due to the many factors that can impact an evacuation.  
 It is also important to consider the impact that the features of the modelling software being 
used will have on the outcome of the model. VISSIM’s default car following and lane changing 
sub-model parameters were used as information about evacuation specific driving behaviour could 
not be found. As the focus area of the study (cabin area) had only one lane in each direction, the 
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lane changing model did not have a large impact on the overall evacuation and the speeds and 
driving behaviour was largely dictated by congestion for much of the key simulated scenarios. A 
software feature that did have a bigger impact on the simulations was how VISSIM generates the 
traffic at each of the origin parking lots. While the Poisson distribution model is one of the most 
commonly used distribution models in traffic modelling, it is not clear if such a distribution is 
representative of what would occur during an evacuation. The dynamic nature of the decision to 
evacuate and the sheer number of factors that can influence this decision (Chapter 2) make it 
difficult to use a standard response curve given that there is no real behavioural basis to justify 
their representation of evacuation departure times. Running multiple simulations to allow for 
stochastic variation within the simulations does allow for some variation in the time when evacuees 
depart, however, this does not address the fundamental issue with this distribution approach (in 
the context of evacuations). As with the assumptions discussed above, this model feature has the 
potential to impact network congestion and the total and individual evacuation times displayed in 
the simulations.   
 Another key consideration when simulating WUI evacuation is the sheer number of 
decisions made by an evacuee that can impact the outcome. In looking at the small section of the 
case study community modelled here, even with the number of assumptions/simplifications that 
were made, there are still numerous different routes that each of the 1530 – 3060 evacuating 
vehicles could take. Figure 4.21 below illustrates the number of decisions available at each of the 
primary intersections for the cabin area evacuees. This means that there are thousands of potential 
variations of what could happen just based on route choice and before accounting for community 
and highway traffic. While many of these alternatives can be eliminated based on their likelihood 
and the scenario being simulated (Ex. no intermediate trips into the community, all evacuees 
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evacuating directly to the highway). In VISSIM, evacuee decisions are made by each vehicle prior 
to reaching an intersection where the software determines the best route to the vehicle’s destination 
and assigns it to a route randomly using the Kirchhoff model for generalized costs. Depending on 
how familiar an evacuee was with the area and how well they were able to interpret the flow of 
traffic during the evacuation, the realism of this method used in the simulation will vary. As the 
network in the section of the community that was modelled has very few different options for 
evacuees leaving the cabin area, it is likely that this will not have a large impact on the overall 
evacuation. However, there are many more options for vehicles leaving the rest of the community, 
and as it was shown that community evacuees can have a large impact on the cabin area evacuees, 
variations in community vehicle travel paths could have a large effect on the overall evacuation 
(congestion and evacuation times). This would also depend on the amount of traffic coming from 
the community.  
 
Figure 4.21: Number and location of potential evacuee decisions 
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 4.4 Summary 
The first-stage analysis of this seasonal, Canadian WUI case study community lays the 
groundwork for undertaking a more comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the community 
and for undertaking similar assessments of other threatened communities. The created survey, 
which is built on an extensive literature review of WUI and hurricane evacuation research, 
provides a means by which to collect important information from community members such that 
their protective actions can be better understood and used as variables in the assessment. The data 
collected from this survey will also help to fill a current gap in Canadian WUI research.  
The evacuation scenarios modelled using VISSIM highlighted key scenarios and factors 
that contribute to longer evacuation times for the cabin area as well as provide insight into the type 
of information needed to model such evacuations. The more traffic in the network, whether from 
more evacuees or a shortened departure initiation timeframe, the more congestion and longer 
evacuation times were observed. The model showed the importance of considering the impact that 
the surrounding area will have on the focus area, the potential impact of assumptions related to 
traffic distribution and behaviour, and the role that the modelling software itself plays. This is 
important if an existing software is being used to model an evacuation or if one is being developed.  
The results and discussion in this chapter, in combination with the bigger picture findings 
from earlier chapters, aids in the development of a framework for assessing WUI vulnerability. 
Such a framework will be critical for the successful and safe commercialization of WUI 
vulnerability assessments which are becoming of interest to many communities and engineering 
companies alike. This will be discussed further in the next chapter summarizing the work 
conducted and the work that needs to be done moving forward. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
Canadian science, technology and engineering are struggling to keep pace with the 
increasingly complex challenges posed by wildland fire, specifically in the WUI [8].  With 
Canadian wildfires and fire seasons continuing to grow and intensify, the need to improve the 
safety of the WUI is becoming increasingly important. Understanding how people behave in 
response to WUI fire threats and to the communication systems and emergency procedures set up 
to help them is critical if companies, agencies, researchers and governments want to be able to 
keep pace with and respond to the growing safety challenges in the WUI. In response to this, this 
thesis provides a framework for understanding how HBiF can impact the way people respond an 
react to WUI fires.  It provides a foundation on which to build a comprehensive WUI community 
vulnerability assessment, as will be done in the next phase of this project.  
Using a multifaceted approach, this thesis broke down the complexities of HBiF and their 
impact on key WUI evacuation processes into an accessible form that can more easily be 
understood and incorporated into fire safety engineering and emergency management. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 provided a detailed summary of the factors identified by wildfire 
and hurricane research to have an effect on protective action decision-making during such events. 
By organizing the factors according to the Protective Action Decision Model, a better 
understanding of how each stage of the decision-making process is impacted by a variety of factors, 
as well as which stages are more developed in this respect was obtained. Chapter 3 provided a 
more nuanced understanding of human behaviour in response to a specific factor, emergency alerts 
and information through an exploratory analysis of Canada’s Alert Ready system. Chapter 4 built 
on the findings from Chapters 2 and 3 and laid the groundwork for a WUI vulnerability assessment 
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of a Canadian case study community. A survey was developed to help fill a gap in Canadian WUI 
research and to understand the anticipated actions and the factors influencing protective action 
decision-making in seasonal Canadian WUI communities. In addition to identifying key 
congestion locations and congestion-inducing factors in the case study community, the evacuation 
scenarios modelled in VISSIM also created a baseline for future development of WUI evacuation 
models. The key findings from each research component in this thesis are detailed in the following 
sections. 
5.1.1 Protective Action Decision-Making  
There are many factors that can impact protective action decision-making including 
sociodemographic factors, social and environmental cues, preparation and experience, familial 
responsibilities, location, and credible threat and risk assessment. Within wildfire and hurricane 
literature, more factors have been identified to impact the protective action decision itself than 
have been for the pre-decision, risk assessment and credible threat stages of the PADM. Other 
research gaps identified include more nuanced information about gender and previous experience; 
interactions between factors (additive, subtractive, multiplicative); mediating factors; factors 
impacting specific pre-evacuation actions, route and destination choices; the time implications of 
the identified factors; data from additional countries; and the influence of changing WUI 
demographics and landscapes.  
Depending on the circumstances and other factors at play, a single factor can have different 
impacts on protective action decision-making. For many factors such as previous experience and 
environmental cues, their impact ultimately depends on how they are internalized by an individual 
and whether they are seen to contribute to the level of personal danger perceived. The degree of 
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trust that an individual has in a source will impact how they respond to the information it is 
providing about a threat.   
5.1.2 Emergency Alerts and Communication  
Though not a fire incident, the information-seeking behaviours and responses showcased in 
the analysis of Alert Ready’s first official mobile alert provide insight into some of the challenges 
and considerations that need to be kept in mind when using mass notification systems. It 
highlighted the role that message relevance (geographical, urgency, new information, etc.) plays 
in people’s perception of the necessity and usefulness of an alert. It showcased the challenge of 
providing timely, accurate and informative information while not annoying or desensitizing people 
with multiple alerts. It is therefore important that guidelines be in place to guide the development 
of emergency messages sent using the Alert Ready wireless system. While Canada does have 
general guidelines about the length of such messages, guidance on the actual content and structure 
of a message should also be provided. As Canada’s wireless alerting system is quite new, looking 
to countries with more developed systems such as the United States provides a good first step.  
The potential of wireless alerting systems such as Alert Ready and WEAs to be used for WUI 
fire and evacuation notification rests largely in their ability to reach very large and/or very specific 
groups of people in a short timeframe. In order for them to be a viable tool in WUI fire 
emergencies, the telecommunication systems that they rely on must be accessible and reliable. As 
many parts of the Canadian WUI do not currently have such infrastructure, having a multifaceted 
approach to emergency communication that is sensitive to the technological limitations of different 
areas is key. By continuing to develop wireless systems and including them as components in a 
holistic and diversified emergency communication system, the chances of reaching those most in 
need of information during a WUI fire increases.   
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5.1.3 First-Stage Canadian Case Study 
The 10 evacuation scenarios modelled highlighted key scenarios and factors that are likely to 
contribute to longer evacuation times for the cabin area. The more traffic in the network, whether 
from more evacuees or a shortened departure initiation timeframe, the more congestion and longer 
evacuation times were observed. The greatest congestion is likely to occur at intersections where 
community and cabin area traffic interact, with the community traffic having a large impact on the 
total and individual evacuation times. This highlighted the importance of considering traffic from 
neighbouring areas even when the aim of a simulation is to analyze a particular area. When the 
network was congested, individual evacuation times were substantially longer for the front cabin 
area than the back cabin area as a result of the intersection right of way. 
Assumptions relating to traffic distribution, network layout and driver behaviour can have a 
sizable impact on the outcome of a simulation. The limitations, sub-models and assumptions 
embedded in the simulation software also impact the model results and therefore they need to be 
considered when choosing (or designing) a software and their implications need to be understood 
when analyzing model outputs. Additionally, the larger and more intricate a network is, the more 
route choice decisions can be made by the simulated drivers. While uncertainty can be reduced by 
running a greater number of simulations and by making assumptions based on the specific 
evacuation scenario or knowledge about the actual community being modelled, it is important to 
recognize the complexity of modelling evacuation scenarios.   
5.2 The Role of Research Findings in a Larger Canadian WUI Framework  
The framework created herein for the use of human behaviour in WUI fires can help to fill 
in gaps within the current Blueprint for Wildland Fire Science in Canada [8]. Though the blueprint 
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creates a business case for increasing WUI fire science funding, it could be strengthened by the 
incorporation of human behaviour, which impacts each of the six identified knowledge gaps and 
research themes to some degree.21  
 The first-stage conceptual model provides structure to the protective action decision-
making process and the factors that impact each stage of this process. The model can help to guide 
researchers looking to collect such data (what factors are likely to have an effect, stages lacking 
data, etc.) globally and within Canada specifically. It acts as a first step towards creating a 
quantifiable model of human behaviour in WUI fires which is necessary for the creation of a 
comprehensive WUI evacuation model. Such a tool could be used by urban and emergency 
planners to assess the impact of new construction as well as make informed modifications to 
existing communities deemed to be at risk. First responder training could be updated to address 
the implications of such a conceptual model, enabling their interventions to be sensitive to expected 
resident responses. An understanding of resident response will allow authorities to better prepare 
guidance and allocate resources to meet the current population’s expectations, vulnerabilities, and 
capabilities. Additionally, regulations regarding WUI safety can be updated to account for 
expected resident responses. Similarly, the analyzed responses to the Alert Ready system’s official 
use over the past year can be used to help prompt more in-depth research in this area and to promote 
the development of more comprehensive guidance for the structure and content of messages sent 
out via the system.  
The first-stage analysis of a seasonal Canadian WUI case study community has laid the 
groundwork for undertaking a more comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the community 
                                                 
21 Themes: Understanding Fire in a Changing World, Recognizing Indigenous Knowledge, Building Resilient 
Communities and Infrastructure, Managing Ecosystems, Delivering Innovative Fire Management Solutions, and 
Reducing the Impacts of Wildland Fire on Canadians [8]. 
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and for undertaking similar assessments of other threatened communities. Having a survey based 
on the findings of an extensive literature review provides a means by which to collect important 
information about Canadians’ protective actions and decisions. It can be modified and distributed 
in multiple communities or act as a starting point for the development of new surveys which can 
be used to collect additional data and help fill a current gap in the country’s wildfire research. The 
evacuation model created, and the scenarios simulated, help provide a baseline for more advanced 
evacuation models and provide insight into potential evacuation challenges within a specific case 
study community. It highlights some of the challenges of trying to represent human behaviour 
within traffic (and evacuation) models, as well as the impact that different factors can have on 
simulation results and the considerations that should be made as a result. This in turn can aid in 
the development of more comprehensive models as well as caution against using simulation tools 
without fully understanding their abilities and limitations. 
5.3 Future Research and Recommendations 
The framework for using human behaviour in fire to improve wildland urban interface 
evacuations presented in this thesis is a starting point from which further advancements can be 
made. It is the first step in filling a current gap in the Canadian WUI fire science, engineering and 
safety arena and contributes to expanding existing frameworks for WUI safety. The first-stage 
conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 can be further developed, quantified, calibrated and 
validated with additional data on protective action response from WUI fire events. This is 
necessary for the eventual creation of a computational simulation of WUI fire evacuations. The 
model can also be expanded to include information from new studies as they are made available 
(including Canadian studies) and possibly research from other disaster types or research written in 
languages other than English. With respect to emergency notification systems in Canada, further 
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research looking at alarm and warning fatigue in natural disaster type situations, and WUI fires 
specifically, will aid in understanding if and how it presents itself and what factors combine to 
result in this response. In a Canadian specific context, cross-referencing the location of WUI 
communities with access to reliable cellular service could provide a better understanding of the 
potential impact of using Alert Ready wireless alerts for WUI fire notification. This in turn could 
be a factor considered in a comprehensive vulnerability index or assessment of Canadian WUI 
communities. 
The next stage of the case study vulnerability assessment will involve piloting the survey and 
making modifications based on the feedback received. The survey distribution method will need 
to be decided based on the resources available, the occupancy of the cabin area, and the time 
constraints resulting from the seasonal nature of the community. This decision should therefore be 
made after the community dynamics are better understood, such as after a site visit and/or 
conversation with informed community partners. The data collected using this survey will not only 
help in the vulnerability assessment of this specific community, but it will also shed light on the 
protective actions and decisions of a type of Canadian community not previously studied. 
With respect to evacuation modelling, additional scenarios and simulations could be run once 
more information about the community is known (from site visits, conversations with community 
partners, survey results, etc.). These could then be compared to the baseline created in this thesis 
to better understand the impact of additional information. If it was found in discussion with 
community partners that the addition of secondary egress routes for the cabin areas was still 
planned, simulations could be run which incorporate such routes (either to evaluate the impact of 
pre-determined route locations or evaluating the best location for such routes). A preliminary 
analysis of two alternative egress route locations can be found in Appendix C. This thesis has also 
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highlighted the capabilities as well as the limitations of existing traffic software to represent human 
behaviour in fire. In order to accurately be able to represent evacuation decision-making and 
actions it is likely that a sub-model focused solely on this would be required.   
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Appendix A: Case Study Community Survey 
A.1 Cabin Information and Visits 
 
1. Do you own or rent this cabin? 
Sole Homeowner (or with partner) □ 
Shared Homeowner (extended family, friends, timeshare, etc.) □ 
Renter (permanent tenant, holiday rental, etc.) □ 
 
2. Number of years visiting this cabin? 
0 – 5 years □ 
6 – 10 years □ 
11 – 15 years □ 
16 – 20 years □ 
More than 20 years □ 
 
3. How often do you visit this cabin? 
0 – 2 times a year □ 
3 – 4 times a year □ 
5 – 6 times a year □ 
7 – 10 times a year □ 
More than 10 times a year □ 
 
4. What is the average length of single stay at the cabin? 
1 – 2 days □ 
3 – 4 days □ 
5 – 7 days □ 
Between 1 week and 1 month □ 
Greater than 1 month □ 
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5. Do you visit or stay at your cabin during the following months?  
 
Yes No 
Winter (December – February) □ □ 
Spring (March – May) □ □ 
Summer (June – August) □ □ 
Fall (September – November) □ □ 
 
6. During the last three years, have spent time at your cabin during the following holidays? 
 
Yes No 
Easter Long Weekend □ □ 
Victoria Day Long Weekend □ □ 
Canada Day Long Weekend □ □ 
Labour Day Long Weekend □ □ 
Thanksgiving Long Weekend □ □ 
 
7. Are pets ever at your cabin when people are there? 
Yes, 100% of the time □ 
Yes, more than 70% of the time □ 
Yes, 30% - 70% of the time □ 
Yes, less than 30% of the time □ 
Never □ 
 
8. Does your cabin have a back-up generator? 
Yes □  No □  Unsure □ 
 
9. Do you have access to the following devices when you are at your cabin? 
 
Yes No 
Computer (laptop or desktop) □ □ 
Tablet (iPad, Samsung Galaxy, etc.)   □ □ 
Mobile Phone  □ □ 
Radio □ □ 
Television  □ □ 
Landline Phone □ □ 
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10. Do you have reliable access to these services at your cabin? 
 
More than 
90% of the 
time 
50 – 75% 
of the time 
25 – 50% 
of the 
time 
0 – 25% of 
the time 
Do not 
have 
access 
Electricity   □ □ □ □ □ 
Internet  □ □ □ □ □ 
Television □ □ □ □ □ 
Radio □ □ □ □ □ 
Cellular Service □ □ □ □ □ 
Cellular Data  □ □ □ □ □ 
Water □ □ □ □ □ 
 
11.  How is your cabin heated? 
Furnace (forced air) □ 
Boiler (radiant heat) □ 
Gas-Fired Space Heater □ 
Electric Space Heater □ 
Wood-Burning or Pellet Stove □ 
Gas Fireplace  □ 
Wood Fireplace □ 
Unsure what type □ 
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For Questions 12 – 14, answer based on the number of people who would be at your cabin on a 
normal visit (typical visit). For Questions 15 – 17, answer based on the greatest number of people 
who would be at your cabin (busy visit).  
12. During a typical visit to your cabin: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 More than 6 
(please specify) 
Average number of people at 
cabin? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of pets at cabin? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ ________ 
Average number of vehicles 
present at cabin? (cars, trucks) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of vehicles 
parked elsewhere in community? 
(cars, trucks) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of motorcycles?  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ ________ 
Average number of all-terrain 
vehicles?  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of watercrafts? 
(motorized boats, seadoos, etc.) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
 
13. During a typical visit to your cabin, how many people in each of the following age groups 
would be at the cabin?  
Age Group 10 and 
younger 
11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 80 and 
older 
Number of People ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
14. During a typical visit, who is present at the cabin? 
 
Yes No 
Immediate family members □ □ 
Extended family members □ □ 
Friends and/or acquaintances  □ □ 
Other (please specify) 
_________________________________ 
□ □ 
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15. During a busy week/weekend visit: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 More than 6 
(please specify) 
Average number of people at 
cabin? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of pets at cabin? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ ________ 
Average number of vehicles 
present at cabin? (cars, trucks) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of vehicles 
parked elsewhere in community? 
(cars, trucks) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of motorcycles?  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ ________ 
Average number of all-terrain 
vehicles?  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
Average number of watercrafts? 
(motorized boats, seadoos, etc.) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
________ 
 
16. During a busy visit to your cabin, how many people in each of the following age groups 
would be at the cabin?  
Age Group 10 and 
younger 
11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 80 and 
older 
Number of People ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 
 
17. During a typical visit, who is present at the cabin? 
 
Yes No 
Immediate family members □ □ 
Extended family members □ □ 
Friends and/or acquaintances  □ □ 
Other (please specify) _______________________________ □ □ 
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A.2 Previous Experience  
 
18. Have you heard of the Alert Ready notification system? 
Yes, I have heard about it and know what it is □ 
It sounds familiar, but I don’t know what it is □ 
No, I have never heard about it □ 
 
19. Have you heard of the FireSmart Canada Program? 
Yes, I have heard about it and know what it is □ 
It sounds familiar, but I don’t know what it is □ 
No, I have never heard about it □ 
 
20. Have you or someone you know ever experienced any of the following (at primary 
residence, secondary residence, or a previous residence?) 
 
Yes, I have  Yes, someone I 
know has 
Received an Alert Ready mobile test alert (not an emergency) □ □ 
Received an Alert Ready mobile alert for an emergency (Amber 
Alert, flood warning, tornado warning, etc.) 
□ □ 
Been on evacuation notice/stand-by due to wildfire □ □ 
Been under a voluntary evacuation order due to wildfire □ □ 
Been under a mandatory evacuation order due to wildfire □ □ 
Lost personal property due to a wildfire □ □ 
Been injured by a wildfire □ □ 
Lost someone due to a wildfire □ □ 
 
21. If you have received a wildfire evacuation order before:  
 
Yes No Non-Applicable 
Did you evacuate under a voluntary evacuation order? □ □ □ 
Did you evacuate under a mandatory evacuation order? □ □ □ 
If you have evacuated due to a wildfire in the past, were you 
happy with your decision (after the fact)? 
□ □ □ 
If you chose not to evacuate during a wildfire in the past, were 
you happy with your decision (after the fact)? 
□ □ □ 
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A.3 Warnings and Information Sources 
 
22. Rank the following sources of information in the order that you would use them to seek 
information about a wildfire if you were at your cabin (1 for first, 10 for last, NA if you 
would not use) 
Rank Source 
___ Friends/family members at the cabin with you 
___ Other family/friends 
___ Cabin neighbours 
___ Radio 
___ TV or internet news source (video, print) 
___ Social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) 
___ Government website (Provincial government, Parks Canada, etc.) 
___ Alert Ready mobile, radio or TV notification 
___ Go outside (look for smoke, flames) 
___ Police/Fire department 
 
23. Is your answer to Question 22 influenced by not having access to certain services at your 
cabin? (computer, internet, cellular signal, etc.) 
Yes □ 
 
No □ 
 
24. Would you expect to receive an official warning about a wildfire threatening your 
community? (Official Alert Ready notification via TV, Radio, or text; information from 
police or fire department, etc.) 
Yes □ 
 
No □ 
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25. Which of these sources would you classify as a trusted source for information about a 
wildfire? 
 
Very 
trustworthy 
Trustworthy Neutral Untrustworthy Very 
untrustworthy 
Friends/family members 
at the cabin with you 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Neighbours □ □ □ □ □ 
Other family/friends (not 
present) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Radio □ □ □ □ □ 
TV or internet news 
source (video, print) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, etc.) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Government website 
(Provincial Government, 
Parks Canada, etc.) 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
Alert Ready mobile, 
radio or TV notification 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
Your own observation of 
smoke, flames or embers 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
Police/Fire department □ □ □ □ □ 
 
26. In general, how concerned are you that a wildfire could affect you one day? 
Very, it is something that I think about often □ 
Somewhat, I think about it occasionally  □ 
Not really, it has crossed my mind once or twice □ 
Not at all, it is not something I worry about □ 
 
27. How likely do you think that it is that a wildfire could impact your cabin community? 
Very unlikely □ 
Unlikely □ 
Likely □ 
Very likely  □ 
Haven’t thought about it □ 
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28. How would you classify the degree to which you have thought about wildfire planning? 
Have not thought about what I would do if a wildfire occurred □ 
Feel I should think about what to do, but haven’t □ 
Have thought about it but still deciding what I would do □ 
Have thought about it and decided that I didn’t need to do anything □ 
Have decided what to do and are in the process of developing a plan □ 
Have made a fire plan about what to do if a wildfire occurs   □ 
Other (please specify) _______________________________________ □ 
 
29. Do you think that wildfires are an issue: 
 
Yes Somewhat Neutral Not Really No 
Globally? □ □ □ □ □ 
In the United States? □ □ □ □ □ 
In Canada? □ □ □ □ □ 
In my province? □ □ □ □ □ 
In my community? □ □ □ □ □ 
 
30. Have you heard of these Canadian wildfires? 
 
Yes No 
Slave Lake Fire, Alberta, 2011 □ □ 
Fort McMurray, Alberta 2016 □ □ 
2017 British Columbia Wildfires □ □ 
2018 British Columbia Wildfires □ □ 
2018 Manitoba Wildfires □ □ 
 
31. Have you heard of these international wildfires? 
 
Yes No 
Portugal 2017 □ □ 
Greece 2018 □ □ 
California 2017 (Thomas Fire, Tubbs, etc.) □ □ 
California 2018 (Camp Fire, Woolsey Fire, etc.) □ □ 
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A.4 Expected Actions 
 
32. What do you anticipate your response to a wildfire would be if you were at your cabin: 
Stay and try to protect my property throughout the fire □ 
Do as much as possible to protect my property but leave if threated by 
the fire 
□ 
Wait to see what the fire is like before deciding whether to stay and 
defend or leave 
□ 
Wait for police, fire or emergency services to tell me what to do  □ 
Leave as soon as I know there is a fire threatening my region □ 
Leave as soon as I know there is a fire threatening my community □ 
Would not be at my cabin because I intend to not be there at times of 
high fire danger 
□ 
Other (please specify) _______________________________________ □ 
 
33. Do you anticipate that you would respond differently if a wildfire threatened your primary 
residence? 
Yes, I would be more likely to try to defend my house □ 
Yes, I would be more likely to wait and see □ 
Yes, I would be more likely to evacuate □ 
No, I would respond the same way □ 
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34. If you anticipate evacuating from your cabin in response to a wildfire threat, what would 
prompt you to evacuate? 
 
I would 
leave 
immediately  
I would 
begin 
preparing 
to leave 
and then 
do so 
I would 
begin 
preparing 
and then 
wait 
I would 
seek more 
information 
before 
taking any 
action  
It would 
have no 
effect 
A day of high fire danger □ □ □ □ □ 
Being told by relatives, friends or 
neighbours to leave  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Seeing video footage and pictures 
of the fire on social media  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Hearing about the fire on the 
news (TV, radio, internet) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Receiving a voluntary evacuation 
order 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Receiving a mandatory 
evacuation order 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Observing neighbours leaving  □ □ □ □ □ 
Being told by the police, 
firefighter or emergency services 
to leave  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Seeing or smelling smoke □ □ □ □ □ 
Seeing flames □ □ □ □ □ 
 
35. How many vehicles do you anticipate you would use to evacuate? 
1 □ 
2 □ 
3 □ 
More than 4 □ 
 
For Questions 36 and 37, answer based on the amount of time (minutes or hours) that you think 
you would spend on the listed actions in preparation for an evacuation from your cabin. For 
Question 36, answer based on the amount of time you would spend if you were thinking that you 
might evacuate (final decision not yet made), and answer Question 37 based the amount of time 
you would spend if you were going to evacuate (decision made). 
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36. If preparing to potentially evacuate: How much time do you anticipate you would spend on 
the following pre-evacuation tasks? If you would not do the task or it does not apply to you, 
then write “0” as the estimated time. 
Action Estimated Time 
Gather household members (people at cabin who you would evacuate with) ______ 
Gathering belongings to take with you ______ 
Loading belongings into vehicle/s ______ 
Secure cabin (turn off utilities, close windows, lock door, etc.) ______ 
Other (please specify) _____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
______ 
 
37. If preparing to evacuate immediately: How much time do you anticipate you would spend 
on the following pre-evacuation tasks? If you would not do the task or it does not apply to 
you, then write “0” as the estimated time. 
Action Estimated Time 
Gather household members (people at cabin who you would evacuate with) ______ 
Gathering belongings to take with you ______ 
Loading belongings into vehicle/s ______ 
Secure cabin (turn off utilities, close windows, lock door, etc.) ______ 
Other (please specify) _____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
______ 
 
38. If you plan to stay and defend during a wildfire threat, how confident do you feel that you’d 
be able to: 
 
Very 
confident 
Confident Neutral 
Not very 
confident 
Not 
confident 
at all 
Do what is required to protect yourself 
and others? 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Do what is required to protect your 
cabin?  
□ □ □ □ □ 
Get help from other people? 
(Neighbours, friends, etc.) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
Get help from fire/emergency services? □ □ □ □ □ 
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A.5 Household Information  
 
39. What best describes your gender? 
Female □ 
Male □ 
Prefer to self-describe: □ 
Prefer not to respond □ 
 
40. What is your age? 
18 – 29 years old □ 
30 – 39 years old □ 
40 – 49 years old □ 
50 – 59 years old □ 
60 – 69 years old □ 
70 – 79 years old □ 
80 years and older □ 
 
41. Do you identify as an Indigenous person (First Nations (North American Indian), Métis or 
Inuk (Inuit))? 
No, not an Indigenous person □ 
Yes, First Nations (North American Indian) □ 
Yes, Métis □ 
Yes, Inuk (Inuit) □ 
 
42. What language do you speak most often at home? 
English □ 
French □ 
Other (please specify) _______________________________________ □ 
 
43. Do you speak any other languages on a regular basis? 
No □ 
Yes, English □ 
Yes, French □ 
Other (please specify) _______________________________________ □ 
 
168 
 
44. Do feel confident conducting a conversation in French and/or English? 
English only □ 
French only □ 
Both French and English □ 
Neither English or French □ 
 
45. Do feel confident reading in French and/or English? 
English only □ 
French only □ 
Both French and English □ 
Neither English or French □ 
 
46. Are there people in your household (people at the cabin with you) who would require 
assistance during an evacuation? 
 
Yes No 
Yes, infants or children □ □ 
Yes, elderly person/s □ □ 
Yes, person/s with a disability  □ □ 
Yes, ill person/s □ □ 
Yes, other (please specify) ______________________________ □ □ 
 
47. Do you or does anyone in your household use a physical mobility aid?  
No □ 
Yes, a motorized scooter □ 
Yes, a wheelchair  □ 
Yes, a walker □ 
Yes, a cane □ 
Yes, service animal □ 
Yes, other (please specify) 
____________________________________ 
□ 
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48. Do you work in any of the following industries? 
Fire fighting  □ 
Police service □ 
Forestry or forest management  □ 
National or provincial parks □ 
Paper and pulp industry □ 
Emergency management □ 
None of the above □ 
 
49. Is the anything else that you would like us to know about your wildfire preparation, previous 
experience or expected actions?  
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Appendix B: Traffic Modelling Data 
 
Table B.1: Location of Data Collection Points, Vehicle Travel Time Measurements and Queue Counters 
Type No.  Placement Location 
Data 
Collection 
Points 
1 
At 
Intersection 
Back Cabin Area 
2 Front Cabin Area 
3 Cabin Area Access Road 
4 Highway Access West Road 
5 West/Southbound Highway Right Lane 
6 West/Southbound Highway Left Lane 
7 Eastbound Highway Left Lane 
8 Eastbond Highway Right Lane 
9 Highway Access East Right Lane 
10 Highway Access East Left Lane 
Vehicle 
Travel Time 
Measurements 
1 
Between 
Intersections 
Back Cabin Area - Front Cabin Area 
2 Front Cabin Area - 4Way Stop 
3 4Way Stop - Highway Access West 
4 3Way Intersection - Highway Access East 
Queue 
Counter 
1 
At 
Intersection 
Back Cabin Area 
2 Front Cabin Area 
3 4WaySub 
4 HighwayLeft 
5 HighwayRight 
7 Sub29_30 
8 Sub36_37 
9 Sub27_28 
10 Sub25_26 
11 Sub34_35 
12 Sub32_33 
13 Sub23_24 
14 Sub31 
15 Sub21_22 
16 Sub9_10 
17 Sub19_20 
18 Sub17_18 
19 Sub7_8 
20 Sub5_6 
21 Sub15_16 
22 Sub13_14 
23 Sub3_4 
24 Sub11_12 
25 Sub1_2 
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Table B.2: Scenario simulation information and total evacuation times 
Scenario 
Simulation 
Duration 
(s) 
Simulation 
No. 
Random 
Seed 
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (min) 
Average 
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (min) 
Average 
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (hr) 
Standard 
Deviation 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
(min) 
1 4200 
1 10 65.50 
65.69 1:05:41 0.6814 0.5972 
2 20 64.85 
3 30 66.35 
4 40 66.42 
5 50 65.31 
2 4200 
1 10 65.23 
65.62 1:05:37 0.7941 0.6960 
2 20 64.79 
3 30 66.53 
4 40 66.42 
5 50 65.14 
3 7700 
1 10 121.31 
121.47 2:01:28 0.8458 0.9571 2 20 120.72 
3 30 122.39 
4 7200 
1 10 113.34 
110.52 1:50:31 2.4528 2.7756 3 30 108.85 
5 50 109.38 
5 7700 
1 10 124.70 
123.68 2:03:41 0.8855 1.0020 2 20 123.12 
3 30 123.22 
6 11000 
1 10 168.72 
168.47 2:48:28 0.7740 0.8759 2 20 167.60 
3 30 169.09 
7 15000 
1 10 235.33 
239.29 3:59:17 3.8648 4.3734 2 20 243.05 
3 30 239.48 
8 15000 
1 10 181.47 
180.58 3:00:35 2.4902 2.8180 2 20 182.50 
3 30 177.77 
9 15000 
1 10 244.54 
243.97 4:03:58 0.5296 0.5993 2 20 243.50 
3 30 243.88 
10 15000 
1 10 243.41 
243.63 4:03:38 0.4327 0.4897 2 20 244.13 
3 30 243.35 
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Table B.3: Aggregate average individual evacuation times 
Scenario 
No. 
Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
1 0:05:25 0:04:55 
2 0:05:36 0:05:06 
3 0:26:01 0:53:22 
4 0:18:43 0:21:20 
5 0:04:41 0:04:05 
6 0:18:02 0:46:46 
7 0:33:13 1:35:52 
8 0:16:57 0:16:20 
9 0:04:42 0:04:08 
10 0:03:51 0:03:15 
 
 
Table B.4: Aggregate minimum individual evacuation times 
Scenario 
No. 
Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
1 0:03:16 0:02:44 
2 0:03:44 0:03:01 
3 0:03:29 0:02:55 
4 0:03:44 0:03:17 
5 0:03:16 0:02:45 
6 0:03:56 0:02:55 
7 0:04:01 0:02:57 
8 0:03:58 0:03:03 
9 0:03:11 0:02:38 
10 0:03:06 0:02:34 
 
 
Table B.5: Aggregate median individual evacuation times 
Scenario 
No. 
Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
1 0:05:29 0:05:02 
2 0:05:34 0:05:07 
3 0:28:26 1:03:29 
4 0:15:53 0:16:58 
5 0:04:33 0:03:56 
6 0:19:35 0:39:48 
7 0:32:21 1:57:26 
8 0:15:35 0:15:19 
9 0:04:31 0:03:57 
10 0:03:50 0:03:11 
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Table B.6: Aggregate maximum individual evacuation times 
Scenario 
No. 
Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
1 0:07:52 0:07:37 
2 0:07:45 0:07:58 
3 0:34:37 1:30:48 
4 1:33:20 1:32:50 
5 0:07:09 0:06:23 
6 0:23:17 2:00:57 
7 0:59:57 3:21:48 
8 0:27:47 0:30:47 
9 0:07:37 0:07:05 
10 0:06:12 0:04:13 
 
 
Table B.7: Maximum Queue Length and 95% Confidence Interval 
  S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
No 
Intersection 
Name  
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
1 Sub1_2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Sub3_4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.13 4.18 0.00 0.00 
3 Sub5_6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.95 3.82 1.95 3.82 2.31 4.52 
4 Sub7_8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.10 4.11 0.00 0.00 
5 Sub9_10 1.47 2.88 0.00 0.00 2.54 4.99 7.19 7.90 0.00 0.00 
6 Sub11_12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 Sub13_14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Sub15_16 2.01 3.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 Sub17_18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 Sub19_20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 Sub21_22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 29.96 12.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 Sub23_24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 52.68 28.39 6.62 12.98 0.00 0.00 
13 Sub25_26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 139.03 27.79 80.14 10.46 0.00 0.00 
14 Sub27_28 1.11 2.17 0.00 0.00 20.14 22.47 14.44 16.23 0.00 0.00 
15 Sub29_30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 141.32 17.61 11.18 11.17 0.00 0.00 
16 Sub31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.52 12.69 5.07 9.94 0.00 0.00 
17 Sub32_33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 96.10 19.37 39.00 39.30 0.00 0.00 
18 Sub34_35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 88.55 9.89 13.50 4.13 0.00 0.00 
19 Sub36_37 1.97 3.87 1.96 3.85 123.26 49.04 69.20 15.92 0.00 0.00 
20 BackSub 36.63 5.40 36.27 5.42 37.28 3.65 45.24 23.47 21.72 4.35 
21 FrontSub 53.90 10.11 54.70 16.33 258.29 0.45 245.76 12.18 18.07 1.00 
22 4WaySub 250.73 17.13 227.03 13.47 763.49 6.63 509.23 17.91 30.41 0.34 
23 HighwayLeft 13.07 0.11 12.14 0.33 800.91 0.01 419.64 11.59 168.00 40.72 
25 HighwayRight 0.00 0.00 11.54 0.41 259.35 35.60 432.62 0.02 65.09 17.84 
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Table B.7: Maximum Queue Length and 95% Confidence Interval (continued) 
  S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
No 
Intersection 
Name  
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
(m) 
1 Sub1_2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Sub3_4 1.80 3.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 Sub5_6 4.34 4.26 17.29 10.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 Sub7_8 0.00 0.00 11.54 12.70 0.00 0.00 1.83 3.58 0.00 0.00 
5 Sub9_10 0.00 0.00 79.12 59.03 1.80 3.53 1.65 3.23 2.47 4.84 
6 Sub11_12 0.00 0.00 5.07 9.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 Sub13_14 0.00 0.00 22.18 22.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Sub15_16 0.00 0.00 15.26 20.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 Sub17_18 0.00 0.00 3.48 6.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 Sub19_20 3.34 6.55 18.86 7.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 Sub21_22 49.77 20.29 72.46 19.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 Sub23_24 140.13 21.16 141.43 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 Sub25_26 214.10 33.24 216.04 47.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 Sub27_28 38.22 18.83 112.65 5.79 1.69 3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 Sub29_30 64.62 38.37 160.31 16.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 Sub31 80.83 29.37 95.60 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 Sub32_33 160.14 51.14 185.05 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 Sub34_35 112.92 15.33 111.44 14.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
19 Sub36_37 201.86 26.61 217.90 24.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 BackSub 63.46 15.40 223.81 76.14 28.89 15.10 22.80 3.14 17.19 3.83 
21 FrontSub 258.67 0.09 258.68 0.31 36.15 22.63 29.83 4.42 12.57 0.49 
22 4WaySub 589.67 32.70 823.61 0.00 470.97 37.53 43.18 6.15 22.11 5.29 
23 HighwayLeft 388.19 9.09 986.13 0.00 986.12 0.01 215.83 49.23 44.45 2.30 
25 HighwayRight 105.99 52.30 432.50 0.14 432.61 0.03 51.34 6.23 29.48 4.41 
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Appendix C: Modelling Additional Cabin Area Egress Routes 
To begin the process assessing the impact of network design modifications, two alternative 
cabin area egress routes were modelled for the case study community. The same assumptions and 
modelling approach as those detailed in Chapter 4 were used. Figures C.1 and C.2 show the 
location of the two additional roads. The first road (extra back cabin area road) connects the back 
cabin area to a parking lot access road. This road currently exists within the community however 
it is not in use. As noted in the community plan, there is the potential to turn this road into an 
emergency egress route for use in the case of an evacuation. The second road (extra cabin area 
highway access road) connects the main cabin area road directly to the highway. As this road does 
not exist, its location is arbitrary, however the southern most part of the road was made to follow 
an existing walking path.  
 
 
Figure C.1: Location of Extra Back Cabin Area Road 
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Figure C.2: Location of Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 
 
 
 Scenarios 3 and 7 were modelled for each of the modified networks as these were identified 
as the worst-case scenarios in the previous analysis (Table C.1). As with this analysis, the total and 
individual evacuation times were compared along with the queue lengths. Each scenario was run 
three error-free times.22 Table C.2 identifies the expected total evacuation times and Figure C.3 
depicts the average total evacuation time for each scenario in relation to the corresponding 
departure initiation timeframe (see Table C.3 for the total evacuation times and 95% confidence 
intervals for each simulation run). Figures C.4 – C.7 illustrate the average, median, minimum and 
maximum individual evacuation times for the front and back cabin areas in each scenario, as well 
as the 5-number summary (see Tables C.4 – C.7 for the corresponding data). Figures C.8 – C.10 
show the measured queue lengths within the network and Table C.8 depicts the corresponding data 
and 95% confidence intervals. 
                                                 
22 The extra cabin area highway access road for the Scenario 3 was run a total of 4 times as one run resulted in an 
error due to a vehicle being removed from the network after waiting 60 seconds for a lane change.   
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The most notable findings are as follows: 
• The addition of the extra back cabin area road had no impact on the total evacuation time 
whereas the addition of the extra cabin area highway access road decreased the total 
evacuation time by nearly 45 minutes for Scenario 3 and nearly 1.5 hours for Scenario 7.  
• The extra back cabin area road increased the maximum individual evacuation time for the 
back cabin area, but otherwise had a minimal impact. The extra cabin area highway access 
road substantially reduced the individual evacuation times for both the front and back cabin 
areas in Scenario 3 and Scenario 7 (less than 25 minutes in both cases). 
• The extra cabin area highway access road substantially reduced the queue length at the 4-
way intersection. The queue length was reduced from 760m (base case) to 130m for 
Scenario 3, and from 820m (base case) to 400m for Scenario 7. 
 
Though preliminary, this analysis showcased that the location of additional egress routes is critical 
in their effectiveness and should therefore be considered carefully. 
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Table C.1: Modelled evacuation scenario descriptions and number of error-free simulations run 
Scenario No. Description 
Number of 
Simulations Run 
3 - Base Case  
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
3 - Extra Back 
Cabin Area Road 
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3 
3 - Extra Cabin 
Area Highway 
Access Road 
1 car per cabin (530) 
1-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
1000 cars from community 
3* 
7 - Base Case  
2 car per cabin (1060) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
2000 cars from community 
3 
7 - Extra Back 
Cabin Area Road 
2 car per cabin (1060) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
2000 cars from community 
3 
7 - Extra Cabin 
Area Highway 
Access Road 
2 car per cabin (1060) 
2-hour departure window 
South-West evacuation 
2000 cars from community 
3 
 
 
 
Table C.2: Expected average total evacuation times 
Scenario 95% Confidence Expected Total Evacuation Time Range (hr) 
3 - BC 2:00:31 - 2:02:26 
3 - EBCAR 2:00:41 - 2:02:03 
3 - ECAHAR 1:18:13 - 1:25:52 
7 - BC 3:54:55 - 4:03:40 
7 - EBCAR 3:58:32 - 4:02:45 
7 - ECAHAR 2:40:38 - 2:44:29 
 
 
179 
 
 
Figure C.3: Total evacuation time and departure timeframes 
 
 
Table C.3: Scenario simulation information and total evacuation times 
Scenario 
Simulation 
Duration 
(s) 
Simulation 
No. 
Random 
Seed 
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (min) 
Average 
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (min) 
Average 
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (hr) 
Standard 
Deviation 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
(min) 
3 
Base Case 
7700 
1 10 121.3125 
121.473 2:01:28 0.84575 0.957056 2 20 120.719 
3 30 122.3875 
3 
Extra Back 
Cabin Area 
Road 
7700 
1 10 121.5543 
121.3614 2:01:22 0.602776 0.682105 2 20 120.6858 
3 30 121.8442 
3 
Extra Cabin 
Area Highway 
Access Road 
7700 
2 20 84.10583 
82.04317 1:22:03 3.382066 3.827168 3 30 83.88367 
4 40 78.14 
7 
Base Case 
15000 
1 10 235.3257 
239.2856 3:59:17 3.864802 4.373435 2 20 243.0477 
3 30 239.4835 
7 
Extra Back 
Cabin Area 
Road 
15000 
1 10 240.3033 
240.6421 4:00:39 1.86094 2.105852 2 20 242.6492 
3 30 238.9738 
7 
Extra Cabin 
Area Highway 
Access Road 
15000 
1 10 160.7667 
162.5557 2:42:33 1.700468 1.92426 2 20 164.151 
3 30 162.7495 
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Figure C.4: Aggregate average and median individual evacuation times 
 
Table C.4: Aggregate average individual evacuation times 
Scenario No. Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
3 – Base Case 0:26:01 0:53:22 
3 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 0:31:16 0:46:24 
3 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:08:26 0:07:27 
7 – Base Case 0:33:13 1:35:52 
7 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 0:44:09 1:32:12 
7 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:10:34 0:10:06 
 
 
Table C.5: Aggregate median individual evacuation times 
Scenario No. Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
3 – Base Case 0:28:26 1:03:29 
3 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 0:28:58 0:56:43 
3 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:08:55 0:08:30 
7 – Base Case 0:32:21 1:57:26 
7 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 0:39:11 1:52:42 
7 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:10:16 0:09:43 
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Figure C.5: Aggregate minimum individual evacuation times 
 
 
Table C.6: Aggregate minimum individual evacuation times 
Scenario No. Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
3 – Base Case 0:03:29 0:02:55 
3 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 0:03:04 0:02:55 
3 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:02:56 0:02:20 
7 – Base Case 0:04:01 0:02:57 
7 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 0:03:36 0:02:57 
7 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:03:00 0:02:21 
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Figure C.6: Aggregate maximum individual evacuation times 
 
 
Table C.7 Aggregate maximum individual evacuation times 
Scenario No. Back Cabin Area Front Cabin Area 
3 – Base Case 0:34:37 1:30:48 
3 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 1:54:12 1:28:16 
3 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:17:34 0:17:41 
7 – Base Case 0:59:57 3:21:48 
7 – Extra Back Cabin Area Road 3:46:43 3:13:33 
7 – Extra Cabin Area Highway Access Road 0:22:27 0:21:54 
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Figure C.7: Five number summary (minimum, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile, maximum) and average for the front 
and back cabin areas in each scenario 
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Table C.8: Maximum Queue Length and 95% Confidence Interval 
  
S3 – Base Case 
S3 – Extra Back 
Cabin Area 
Road 
S3 – Extra 
Cabin Area 
Highway Access 
Road 
S7 – Base Case 
S7 – Extra Back 
Cabin Area 
Road 
S7 – Extra 
Cabin Area 
Highway Access 
Road 
No Location  
Max 
Queue 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Inter. 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Inter. 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Inter. 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Inter. 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Inter. 
(m) 
Max 
Queue 
Length 
(m) 
95% 
Conf. 
Inter. 
(m) 
1 Sub1_2 0.00 0.00 1.60 3.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.46 2.86 0.00 0.00 
2 Sub3_4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.34 10.47 0.00 0.00 
3 Sub5_6 1.95 3.82 2.01 3.94 0.00 0.00 17.29 10.07 10.10 4.87 3.87 3.87 
4 Sub7_8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.98 7.80 11.54 12.70 20.95 6.62 1.58 3.10 
5 Sub9_10 2.54 4.99 6.70 0.16 0.00 0.00 79.12 59.03 110.62 34.62 1.80 3.53 
6 Sub11_12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.07 9.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 Sub13_14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.18 22.14 3.29 6.44 0.00 0.00 
8 Sub15_16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.57 3.08 15.26 20.70 40.18 24.54 0.00 0.00 
9 Sub17_18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.48 6.83 9.40 10.23 0.00 0.00 
10 Sub19_20 0.00 0.00 3.10 6.08 0.00 0.00 18.86 7.54 23.16 7.94 3.66 7.17 
11 Sub21_22 29.96 12.74 4.68 4.63 0.00 0.00 72.46 19.60 81.18 47.56 0.00 0.00 
12 Sub23_24 52.68 28.39 25.11 20.01 0.00 0.00 141.43 7.00 166.96 46.68 0.00 0.00 
13 Sub25_26 139.03 27.79 174.02 38.58 0.00 0.00 216.04 47.95 151.27 8.00 0.00 0.00 
14 Sub27_28 20.14 22.47 13.02 15.08 0.00 0.00 112.65 5.79 105.04 26.26 0.00 0.00 
15 Sub29_30 141.32 17.61 135.25 27.83 0.00 0.00 160.31 16.77 161.85 7.39 1.54 3.02 
16 Sub31 38.52 12.69 13.01 16.79 0.00 0.00 95.60 0.28 62.12 2.76 0.00 0.00 
17 Sub32_33 96.10 19.37 86.77 2.19 0.00 0.00 185.05 0.24 191.83 13.44 0.00 0.00 
18 Sub34_35 88.55 9.89 64.90 28.13 2.64 5.17 111.44 14.26 114.78 4.54 0.00 0.00 
19 Sub36_37 123.26 49.04 110.95 14.59 0.00 0.00 217.90 24.73 183.51 35.82 6.15 6.03 
20 
Back Cabin 
Area Access 
37.28 3.65 47.88 25.04 44.57 4.62 223.81 76.14 199.27 26.32 60.03 23.99 
21 
Front Cabin 
Area Access 
258.29 0.45 252.03 12.50 48.72 9.54 258.68 0.31 258.53 0.34 49.54 11.89 
22 4WaySub 763.49 6.63 732.85 35.77 135.51 68.69 823.61 0.00 823.61 0.00 395.81 75.06 
23 
Highway 
Access Left 
800.91 0.01 838.75 74.16 757.63 52.49 986.13 0.00 986.12 0.01 986.11 0.02 
25 
Highway 
Access Right 
259.35 35.60 239.90 28.40 220.27 25.54 432.50 0.14 432.56 0.11 420.04 24.52 
26 
Extra Back 
Cabin Area 
Road 
0 0 142.7 18.2 0 0 0 0 239.3 69.153 0 0 
27 
Extra 
Highway 
Access 
0 0 0 0 376.2 46.138 0 0 0 0 568.7 179.66 
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Appendix D: A Provisional Conceptual Model of Human Behaviour in 
Response to Wildland Urban Interface Fires 
D.1 Abstract 
With more frequent and destructive wildfires occurring in the growing wildland urban 
interface (WUI), the ability to ensure the safe evacuation of potentially large groups of people is 
of increasing importance. This is a challenging task made only more difficult by the fact that there 
is often little warning and that evacuations often need to take place in a short period of time. The 
creation of credible and effective evacuation models is needed within the fire safety engineering 
community to help address this challenge. Although potentially difficult to represent, a critical 
component in developing such models is the consideration of what people will do in response to a 
WUI fire. In this literature review, research relating to WUI fire evacuations was collected to 
identify the factors that influence protective action decision-making and response during these 
events, specifically whether someone chooses to evacuate or not. To supplement the findings, 
related hurricane evacuation literature was also reviewed for such factors. The factors that were 
identified relate to sociodemographic factors, social and environmental cues, preparation and 
experience, familial responsibilities, location, and credible threat and risk assessment. These 
factors were organized according to the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) to create a 
conceptual model of protective action decision-making. This is the first step in being able to 
incorporate such factors and their corresponding impact on public response into comprehensive 
WUI evacuation models. 
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D.2 Introduction and Purpose 
The danger posed by wildfires and the damage they can cause are issues of growing global 
concern. Environmental changes such as warmer temperatures, increased drought and earlier 
snowmelt are contributing to an increased wildfire threat and a longer fire season [1]–[3]. The 
increasing likelihood of more extreme weather as a result of climate change is also playing a role 
in the growth of wildfire potential [2]. In some countries, previous fire management strategies with 
a focus on complete fire suppression have led to a build-up of fuels which contribute to the 
increased risk of wildfire [1], [4]. As the number of large wildfires continues to increase in many 
parts of the world as a result of these factors, the degree of destruction these fires can cause is 
intensified by changes in land use and socioeconomics [5]. 
A growing proportion of these wildfires threaten communities living nearby or within the 
wildlands, known as the wildland urban interface or the ‘‘WUI’’. WUI communities exist ‘‘where 
humans and their development meet or intermix with wildland fuel’’ [6] and as such, the WUI is 
a complex area comprised of diverse groups of people and geographical areas. It includes both 
intermix and interface communities, with varying densities, levels of remoteness, and interaction 
with the wildland [7]. Intermix communities include areas where wildland vegetation and housing 
intermingle, and interface communities are those that are in close vicinity to areas of large, dense 
wildland vegetation [8]. Given their proximity to the wildland, WUI communities are generally 
the most vulnerable to wildfires and the subsequent property damage and physical, social, 
environmental, and psychological impacts as a result [8]. In addition, other vulnerabilities such as 
fewer and more dangerous egress routes and a lack of easily accessible firefighting resources 
contribute to the additional challenges faced by WUI communities [9]. 
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The 2016 Fort McMurray Fire in Canada [10] and the 2016 Haifa Fire in Israel [11] each 
resulted in the evacuation of tens of thousands of people. The California Wildfires of 2017 and 
2018 resulted in numerous fatalities and the evacuation of tens and hundreds of thousands of people 
respectively [12], [13]. These fires, in addition to the deadly 2017 Portugal Wildfires [14] and the 
2018 Greece Wildfires [15], bring attention to the fundamental need to protect people before and 
during response to WUI fire23 events. While it is the policy in many countries for people to evacuate 
areas at risk during WUI fires [16]–[18], many times the public evacuates only minutes before the 
fire reaches their communities, if they are able to evacuate at all [19]. Additionally, a large 
percentage of WUI fire deaths have occurred during evacuation itself [20], as was the case during 
the 2017 Portugal Wildfires. It is therefore of growing importance to have comprehensive tools to 
aid in the planning and execution of safe and effective WUI fire evacuations. 
Modelling tools are available to simulate components of evacuations; however, some gaps 
in capabilities exist. Current modelling tools are either statistical or empirical in nature and/or 
feature only one aspect of the incident; e.g. the fire development, the emergency response, the 
evacuation response, etc. [21]. As such, these models are incapable of explicitly representing the 
temporal nature and the highly coupled nature of an incident. Having a type of time-based, 
inclusive simulation approach would better enable the vulnerability of communities to be assessed. 
This would not only be beneficial for WUI evacuations, but for other types of community 
evacuations as well. 
Additionally, current evacuation simulation tools focus primarily on people or traffic 
movement, and in turn, neglect to simulate evacuation decision-making and behaviour that would 
                                                 
23 WUI fire refer to wildfires/bushfires/forest fires that infringe upon the wildland urban interface. 
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prompt or prohibit evacuation movement to take place. Instead, a model often represents the 
probability of a particular response rather than representing the decision-making process through 
which an individual passes before selecting a response. In order to create such comprehensive 
evacuation tools, it is necessary to understand what factors affect evacuations and what information 
is necessary for evacuation models to be useful and effective. This understanding of evacuee 
decision-making comes from exploring existing research on public response to WUI fires and other 
disasters. 
The majority of current and past research on the factors that affect WUI fire protective 
action decision-making—sociodemographic factors, social and environmental cues, preparation 
and experience, risk assessment, etc.—available to the authors in English originates from the 
United States and Australia. Behavioural research on WUI fires is relatively new compared to 
research studying other disaster types, and therefore a smaller amount of data has been collected. 
Fortunately, despite the differences among disaster types, there are a number of similarities which 
enable our understanding of WUI fire evacuations to be enhanced through an understanding of 
public response to other disaster types. For example, with respect to evacuations, there are similar 
challenges among longer-duration (or slow-onset) disasters regarding notification, timing, ingress 
and egress decisions and actions [22]. There is a substantial body of research that looks at such 
challenges and the factors that affect them with respect to disasters in general [23]–[27]. 
Additionally, the overall process that one goes through to make decisions and respond to natural 
or technological disasters is ultimately the same [28]. As such, looking at research relating to other 
disasters can further our understanding of how people will act and behave during WUI fires. 
While looking in detail at research from all disaster types (floods, earthquakes, man-made 
disasters, etc.) would provide the most comprehensive understanding of evacuation factors, it was 
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within the scope of this study to compare two disaster types. Relevant U.S. and Australian WUI 
fire research was identified and reviewed along with hurricane research from the United States to 
determine potential environmental and social factors that affect protective action decision-making 
and response. Hurricane evacuations were chosen so as to maximize the amount of information 
available for comparison given the wealth of United States’ hurricane literature (available in 
English). Focusing on American studies also meant that additional cultural and political influences 
would not need to be considered within this review. Although there are differences between 
wildfires and hurricanes, there are many similarities that makes their focus in this review a 
reasonable exercise, e.g.: 
• the movement of wildfires and the track of hurricanes are dependent on many factors, 
making prediction difficult 
• both hazards provide similar timeframes for notification—including public alerts and 
warnings, in that they begin in one location and have the potential (over time) to negatively 
impact communities in its path 
• both hazards have the capacity to displace large groups of people 
• both hurricanes and wildfires have the potential to change course or direction without 
warning, therefore potentially decreasing the time available to make protective action 
decisions 
The purpose of this literature review is to identify the factors that have an impact on 
household protective action decision-making in the context of WUI fires. This is done by looking 
both at U.S. and Australian wildfire research,24 as well as U.S. hurricane literature. The factors 
                                                 
24 Wildfire research include that which referred to bushfires and forest fires. 
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identified by this review are organized according to the Protective Action Decision Model 
(PADM) to better understand what factors affect the different stages of the decision-making 
process [28]. From these factors, and their organization in the PADM, the authors have developed 
a conceptual model of protective action decision-making for WUI fires. It is the intent that the 
collection and analysis of this information, and the development of the conceptual model, will help 
to inform the development of broad and all-inclusive WUI fire evacuation models. 
D.3 Background 
D.3.1 Evacuation Modelling 
In any WUI evacuation model, certain key components need to be addressed in order to 
simulate WUI fire scenarios to an acceptable degree of detail. In reference to the evacuation model, 
vehicle evacuation, including both private vehicles and public transportation, is the primary 
transport mode for affected populations during WUI fire incidents. This reliance on vehicles is 
often due to the scale of these incidents, the distances that need to be covered, the trend in 
household units to evacuate together, and the fact that the transport of goods/provisions (in addition 
to the residents) are often required during evacuations. Therefore, WUI evacuation models should 
be capable of simulating the movement, route choice, and route destination of vehicles of varying 
capacities, which is covered in depth by the field of traffic modelling (see [21] for more details). 
It is important to understand that traffic performance (and modelling) is not independent 
of the actions of individuals (referred to here as pedestrians). Pedestrian decision-making and 
preparation will determine the time at which household units decide to initiate their evacuation as 
well as the time that they move from their starting location (e.g., home, business, hospital, school, 
etc.) and eventually enter the traffic system. This aspect of individual/household decision-making 
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in WUI fire events is less developed, and in turn, not well represented in current large-scale WUI 
(or disaster-based) evacuation models. What is required are largescale evacuation models that 
account for individual/household protective action decision-making before vehicular evacuation 
begins. Protective action decision-making is defined here as the process by which people make 
decisions based on the cues/information available (i.e., threat conditions) to protect themselves, 
others, and/or their property in the event of a WUI fire. Furthermore, current evacuation and traffic 
models such as those reviewed by Ronchi et al. [21] would be significantly improved if they were 
better able to account for behavioural choices of individuals/households based not only on threat 
conditions, but the interactions between individuals as well. A number of studies have previously 
explored the benefits of including such components into existing models [27], [29]–[33]. 
The first step in accounting for individual/household decision-making during WUI fires is 
made in this paper. From a review of WUI fire and hurricane literature, the authors have developed 
a conceptual model of decision-making for WUI fires. The PADM is used as the foundation for 
the development of this model, and is discussed in the following section. 
D.3.2 Behavioural Modelling 
Over the last 50 years, numerous empirical studies have sought to systematically chart the 
social processes involved in human response to emergency incidents [34]–[36]. Of these, the 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) is selected here as it provides a framework to 
understand how people protect themselves and one another in response to cues from a disaster 
event [28], [37]. This model was deemed most appropriate for the task of categorizing the factors 
affecting the different stages of the decision-making process in an attempt to create a behavioural 
conceptual model for WUI fire evacuations. 
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The PADM asserts that the process of protective action decision-making begins when 
people are first presented with any kind of environmental cue, including physical and social cues 
and information. The introduction of these cues initiates a series of stages through which an 
individual passes prior to performing protective actions; e.g., initiating evacuation or deciding to 
stay and protect one’s home. These stages are split into pre-decisional processes, which determine 
whether a decision-making process commences (PRE-DECISION in Figure D.1), and into the key 
components of the decision-making process itself (CREDIBLE THREAT, RISK ASSESSMENT 
and PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION in Figure D.1). 
 
Figure D.1: Protective Action Decision Model Framework (adapted from [28]). 
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Initially, the individual needs to receive a cue, pay attention to it, and comprehend the 
meaning associated with the cue (e.g., hearing an alerting signal, seeing flames, or smelling 
smoke). These represent the three pre-decisional stages of the PADM (PRE-DECISION 1–3 in 
Figure D.1), the stages that determine whether external information is processed such that it can 
inform the decision-making process [28]. Given that this information is processed, it then needs to 
be assessed to determine whether the information provided is credible (CREDIBLE THREAT in 
Figure D.1). At this stage, the individual decides if there is actually something occurring that may 
require action. 
If the individual considers there to be a threat, they next determine whether the threat is 
relevant to him/her (RISK ASSESSMENT in Figure D.1), known as personalizing the threat (or 
risk). Research has shown that a person’s perception of personal risk, or ‘‘the individual’s 
expectation of personal exposure to death, injury, or property damage’’ is highly correlated with 
taking protective action [28], [35], [38], [39]. The individual tries to gain insight on the potential 
outcomes of the disaster and what those potential outcomes mean to his or her safety. If the cues 
are deemed to relate to them, the individual then determines whether it is relevant and pressing. 
This then requires the individual to determine the nature of the response required at that point in 
time. 
At this stage (PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION in Figure D.1), the individual engages 
in a decision-making process to identify a set of possible protective actions from which to choose. 
When it comes to taking protective actions in response to a WUI fire threat, there are ultimately 
two choices, to stay or to leave. Within the option of staying, households may choose to actively 
defend their home and property, or passively shelter in place (SIP), i.e., in their home, another 
location on their property or in their community. After establishing at least one protective action 
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option, an individual engages in protective action assessment of these options and their current 
action. 
If at any stage the individual is uncertain about the situation, the individual engages in 
additional information-seeking actions or they simply wait until additional information is provided 
to them. If seeking information, they may search for other sources of information (e.g., websites, 
media, etc.) and/or reach out to other people to discuss the situation and what to do (also known as 
the milling process) [40], [41]. The greater the ambiguity involved in the situation, the more likely 
that individuals will search for additional information that can guide their actions [42], [43]. 
Information seeking is especially likely to occur when individuals think that time is available to 
gain additional insight. The individual continues in this action until sufficient information is 
available or time runs out (the threat reaches them) [28]. During an incident, information received 
can be incomplete, ambiguous, or contradictory, causing uncertainty in understanding the nature 
of the event and the actions necessary [44], [45]. In these cases, progress in the stages of the PADM 
can be significantly delayed and/or promote inefficient or unsafe protective action behaviour. 
D.4 Methodology 
This paper is based on a review of literature related to evacuation decision-making during 
WUI fires and hurricanes. It includes literature from various databases including Web of Science, 
Google Scholar, the NIST Research Library, and the Carleton University Library. The literature 
was obtained from peer-reviewed journal articles, conference proceedings, book chapters, 
government agency and university reports. A set of key search terms was identified, and additional 
terms were added as the research progressed. These terms include: Wildfire, Bushfire, Forest Fire, 
Wildland Urban Interface, WUI, Hurricane, Evacuation Behaviour/Decisions/Actions/ 
Alternatives, Decision Making, Evacuation Modelling, Shelter-In-Place, Protective Actions, 
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Affecting/ Influencing, and Risk Perception. The review includes primarily post-2000 literature as 
the majority of related research for WUI fires and hurricanes was conducted during this time, 
however, a small number of commonly referenced hurricane research papers from the 1990s were 
also included. The selected studies were reviewed to identify the factors deemed influential in the 
protective action decision-making process. The literature includes both qualitative and quantitative 
studies, as well as related literature reviews and compendiums. 
WUI fire literature from both the United States and Australia has been included, while the 
hurricane literature was limited to the United States. It is important to note that Australia and the 
United States have historically had very different approaches to wildfire policy. Australia’s policy 
of ‘‘prepare, stay and defend or leave early’’ and later ‘‘Prepare. Act. Survive,’’ allows for the 
practice of staying and defending one’s home. Conversely, in the United States, evacuating all 
people threatened by wildfires has been the long-accepted practice. Given these differences 
between Australian and U.S. wildfire policies, it is acknowledged that the findings given in the 
respective literature would have been influenced by the varying perspectives about wildfire safety 
and the role of evacuations. It is also understood that additional factors, both technical and non-
technical, may exist that have an impact on the protective action decision-making process. This is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The methodologies employed in the reviewed material differed, as some studies collected 
purely qualitative data, quantitative data, or a combination of both. Within these studies, some 
conducted correlation analysis, while others also utilized regression analysis. Varying sampling 
techniques and strategies were used, including surveys, questionnaires, interviews and focus 
groups. The size and nature of the samples also varied, with some sample groups having a greater 
awareness and interest in the risk posed to them by the hazard in question. Some studies collected 
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post-disaster data, whereas others looked at intended actions. The definition of terms such as 
evacuation, as well as other aspects of the process, may have been different and in turn, measured 
differently between the studies. In addition, each paper discussed its own limitations within the 
context of the individual study. Commonly mentioned limitations included the accurate 
representation of a target population, survey response rate, hindsight bias, and issues related to the 
reliability of behavioural intention studies. 
The factors included in this paper are those that were found by the authors of the reviewed 
literature to be significant based on each study’s own criteria. In the case of quantitative studies, 
these include factors that were deemed statistically significant. For the qualitative studies, these 
factors included those that were deemed notable by the researchers, based on the analysis methods 
employed. The identified factors for WUI fires and hurricanes are presented in Sects. 4 and 5 
respectively. Each section is broken up into the stages of the PADM discussed in Sect. 2.2. In 
addition to these, individual/household delay and actions processes relevant to the proposed 
conceptual model were also identified and incorporated in each section. The presented factors are 
discussed in greater detail in Sect. 6, along with conceptual model considerations and 
recommendations for future work. The paper is concluded in Sect. 7. 
D.5 Factors Influencing Protective Action Decision-Making During WUI Fires 
This section details the factors identified in the literature relating to protective action 
decision-making during WUI fire events. A summary of the identified factors can be seen in Sect. 
6.1, Table D.1. Section 4.1 focuses solely on the factors affecting threat identification and risk 
assessment, since minimal to no data was found relating to the pre-decisional phases of the PADM 
(i.e., perception, attention, and comprehension). Next, Sect. 4.2 addresses factors affecting the 
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decision to evacuate (or not). Finally, Sect. 4.3 details additional factors relevant to delay, delay 
time and the specific types of actions undertaken. 
D.5.1 Credible Threat and Risk Assessment 
WUI fire literature was identified that discussed factors that affect the following PADM 
processes: identification of a credible threat and risk assessment. A few studies identified 
sociodemographic and cue-related factors, but the majority of factors were related to location, 
preparation and experience. 
One WUI fire study identified sociodemographic factors and their impact on threat and risk 
identification. Mozumder et al. [46] found that having a higher income or level of education was 
related to an increased level of concern that one’s home may be threatened by a wildfire. Additional 
studies explored the role of environmental and social cues in decision-making. In several studies, 
a fire cue was often noted to be a trigger that indicated a credible threat and high level of risk 
inciting evacuation. This trigger could be the sight of others leaving [47]; sensory cues such as 
visible smoke, embers or flames; or information from trusted sources about the location and 
intensity of the fire [47], [48]. 
Studies also identified residence, location, knowledge and experience with WUI fires as 
influential to threat identification and risk assessment. First, the length of time a household lived 
in the area; i.e., residence time, was found to relate to the level of perceived wildfire risk. Newer 
residents were more likely to be concerned that their home was endangered, whereas long-term 
residents were more likely to feel that their property was safe [46], [49]. However, if a household 
had experienced previous property damage due to a wildfire, they were more likely to be concerned 
that their home would be endangered again [46]. Similarly, a household’s knowledge of previous 
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fires in their community and area led to greater concern that wildfire may endanger their own 
home, impacting their assessment of risk and leading to a higher likelihood of evacuation [46], 
[50]. In a review looking at post-Black Saturday Fires research, it was noted that one’s location 
had an impact on risk perception, as many people living in suburban locations had not considered 
themselves at risk to wildfire [51]. 
D.5.2 Protective Action Decision 
The vast majority of WUI fire literature focused on identifying the factors that influence 
the protective action decision itself; i.e., the decision to stay or go. These factors were grouped 
into categories relating to sociodemographic factors, environmental and social cues, experience 
and preparation, familial and societal responsibilities, place/location, and credible threat and risk 
assessment. 
Sociodemographic Factors  
One of the most commonly cited demographic factors affecting the likelihood of 
evacuation was gender. Numerous pre-and post-disaster studies indicated that women were more 
likely than men to decide to evacuate, and that men were more likely than women to stay in place 
[46], [51]–[57]. On a similar note, Proudley [58] found that the roles people play within a family 
had a large role in how people respond and behave during a WUI fire event. With respect to reasons 
for wanting to stay, Benight et al. [49] found that women were significantly more likely than men 
to report that their ‘‘love for the forest’’ made it difficult to leave. Among those who chose to stay, 
women were more likely to report that they thought it was too dangerous to leave or that their 
attempt to leave had been unsuccessful [54]. The study found that protecting property was more 
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often cited by men as their reason for staying, however, this was also a major reason for women 
as well. 
Additional sociodemographic factors that influenced evacuation decisions include political 
leaning, age, income and occupation. Mozumder et al. [46] found that in the United States, 
Democrats were more likely than Republicans to evacuate under both voluntary and mandatory 
evacuation orders. The average age of those who chose to stay and defend during the 2009 Black 
Saturday Fires was slightly higher than those who evacuated (51.5 years vs. 48.4 years), suggesting 
that age could be a potential factor [57]. One study found that people with a higher income were 
more likely to evacuate, and those employed by the wood products and insurance industries were 
more likely to stay and defend (implied by the authors as being potentially a result of having greater 
knowledge or skills related to wildfire management or damage) [56]. 
Environmental and Social Cues  
The nature and number of cues received about a wildfire threat have been found to 
influence the protective action decision made. Rates of evacuation have been found to be higher 
when people receive multiple warnings from more than one source [50], and receiving advice to 
leave from friends, family, neighbours and emergency services was also found to influence 
evacuation (more so for women than men) [54]. However, Strawderman et al. [50] found that these 
sources had less impact than a more formal warning from authorities. McLennan et al. [57] found 
that a greater percentage of those who chose to evacuate had received information about the fire 
from neighbours or emergency personnel in a face-to-face setting. Similarly, receiving a voluntary 
or mandatory evacuation order was found to increase the likelihood of evacuating, with the latter 
having a greater effect [46]; however, this may not always be the case [59]. 
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Preparation and Experience  
Preparation for WUI fires and experience with these events can also influence protective 
action decisions. Commitment to a previously developed plan to stay and defend, coupled with a 
belief that preparations taken were sufficient to meet the perceived level of risk, was a principal 
factor in staying and defending [47], [48], [57], [60]. Similarly, a lack of preparedness and planning 
to stay has been found as influential on evacuation decisions, showing that levels of wildfire 
preparedness and knowledge were higher among those who chose to stay and defend versus those 
who evacuated [57]. Taking this further, having a plan to evacuate made people less likely to 
consider staying and defending and more likely to evacuate [56], [61]. Additionally, studies found 
that those who intended to stay and defend had greater confidence in their perceived physical 
readiness and ability to successfully defend their homes than did those who intended to evacuate 
[57], [62], [63]. 
In reference to previous experience, Whittaker and Handmer [51] found that previous false 
alarms—i.e., evacuations or evacuation orders later deemed unnecessary—led people to be less 
likely to evacuate in the future, while Benight et al. [49] found that such experience did not have 
a negative impact on future evacuation intentions. Other studies found that those who had 
evacuated in previous WUI fire events were more likely than those without such experience to 
evacuate in the future [50]. This variation in the influence of previous evacuations was also noted 
by Cohn et al. [52], who found that for some, previous experience motivated immediate 
evacuation; for others, it resulted in evacuation after a longer period of time, and for others still, it 
made them less inclined to evacuate at all as they deemed it unnecessary. 
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Familial and Societal Responsibilities  
Various studies show that there are a number of factors related to familial and social roles 
and responsibilities that influence protective action decisions. It was found that having children in 
a household not only influenced evacuation behaviour, but it also prompted a quicker response—
either immediately upon threat awareness or under a voluntary evacuation order [57], [63]. 
Conversely, those with pets or livestock were more likely to wait and see or stay and defend than 
those without [46], [57], [63]. The impact that having livestock had on decisions to stay was found 
to be stronger than the impact of pets [46]. As noted by Tibbits and Whittaker [60], focus groups 
revealed that for many farmers and people whose livelihoods depend on their livestock, there was 
a feeling that they had no choice but to stay and defend, for economic reasons as well as for the 
welfare of their animals. 
For those who choose to stay and defend, connections to their community and emotional 
attachment to their property were found to be motivating factors [48], [57], [61]. Studies found 
that concerns about personal and family safety were motivating factors for people intending to 
evacuate [61], [63], whereas a desire to protect property with the acceptance of some personal risk 
was found to motivate those intending to stay and defend [52]. Another reason Cohn et al. [52] 
identified for staying was the concern about an inability to return for an extended period of time. 
According to Tibbits and Whittaker [60], people’s confidence in their own ability to defend their 
property was influenced by active emergency and firefighting officials in the area, as well as by 
having more than one able-bodied person in the home to help defend; however, other studies found 
no such evidence [57]. Paveglio et al. [56] found that the belief that residents who live near forests 
should accept the likelihood of some level of potential property damage was found more commonly 
among those who choose to stay and defend [56]. Similarly, McLennan et al. [48] found that some 
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of those who chose to stay and defend during the Black Saturday Fires of 2009 were more likely 
to believe that they were to some extent responsible for protecting their own property, as opposed 
to relying entirely on emergency personnel. 
Place/Location  
The decision to evacuate has been shown to be influenced by the location and 
length/frequency of residence. Some residents of rural areas have been found to decide to stay in 
place as they deem it impractical given the time and distance required to reach a safe area [56], 
[60]; however, other studies found no effect of property location on protective action decision-
making [57]. In a more general sense, the belief that evacuation was no longer safe was found by 
McLennan et al. [47] to be a factor contributing to the decision to stay and defend in some cases. 
Conversely, Strawderman et al. [50] found that those living in a rural area or on a farm were more 
likely to evacuate than those living in subdivisions or urban areas. Paveglio et al. [56] noted that 
full-time residents were less likely to evacuate than part-time residents. 
Credible Threat and Risk Assessment  
The assessment of risk was identified by various studies as being an important factor in the 
decision to evacuate [46], [50], [61], though not universally across all studies [56], [62]. For those 
who intended to evacuate, ‘‘risk’’ could be defined as a concern that one’s life and home would 
be endangered [46], [61]; for those who intended to wait and see or stay and defend, ‘‘risk’’ 
corresponded to danger associated with leaving unnecessarily and having to drive through 
hazardous conditions [61], [64]. McLennan et al. [61] noted that while those intending to leave 
were more likely to report higher levels of concern about wildfire danger, they were no more likely 
than those intending to stay to believe that they were at greater risk than others. 
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D.5.3 Delay and Actions 
A number of factors have been identified which affect the time it takes to make a decision. 
It has been indicated by Paveglio et al. [56] that in the United States, those planning on employing 
shelter in place are likely to ‘wait and see’ how bad the fire gets, and potentially evacuate if 
conditions degrade. McNeill et al. [66] found that the biggest cause for decision delay is a lack of 
distinct attractiveness of one decision option over another. That is, both the option of evacuating 
or staying and defending are similarly appealing. They found this to have more of an impact on 
decision delay than a lack of perceived risk, sociodemographic or responsibility avoidance. 
Additionally, Rhodes [64] notes that ‘waiting and then leaving when threatened’ is seen by some 
to be an acceptable strategy that allows for the increased chances of protecting property and life 
safety. Individuals who ‘wait and see’ do not necessarily see their actions as being risky [65]. In 
their review of literature from the United States, Canada and Australia, McLennan et al. [67] found 
that many people are likely to delay leaving (because they want to protect their property or avoid 
the costs of evacuating—financial burden, dangers during evacuation) and therefore it should not 
be assumed that all those threatened by a WUI fire will evacuate immediately upon receiving an 
evacuation order or warning. 
There are also a number of factors that influence the actions people take once they have 
decided to evacuate. Often times people prepare, including collecting their belongings and packing 
vehicles, before evacuating. This is seen even among those who originally chose to stay and 
defend, but considered evacuation as a last-minute possibility [60]. Having to manage belongs has 
been found to slow down an evacuee’s response time [49]. Also, families tend to leave together as 
a group, sometimes with neighbours and extended family as well (the authors did not specify what 
was meant by extended family) [52]. Evacuees will often search for others and inquire about what 
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they have heard about the event before packing up and leaving [52]. These actions have the 
potential to increase the time it takes to evacuate. 
D.6 Factors Influencing Protective Action Decision-Making During Hurricanes 
This section details factors influencing protective action decision-making during 
hurricanes as found in the related literature. Table D.1 in Sect. 6.1 provides a summary of these 
factors in comparison to those identified in the WUI fire literature. As with the WUI fire data 
discussed in Sect. 4, there was no discussion of factors affecting the pre-decisional phases of the 
PADM, and because of this, only those factors that influence threat identification and risk 
assessment are discussed (Sect. 5.1). Additionally, Sect. 5.2 discusses factors that influence the 
decision to take action, i.e., stay or go (Sect. 5.2). Finally, factors relating to delay, delay time, and 
specific types of actions taken are discussed in Sect. 5.3. 
D.6.1 Credible Threat and Risk Assessment 
Literature was found that identified factors that influence threat identification and risk 
assessment. These factors include sociodemographic factors, as well as those relating to 
environmental and social cues, place/location, and experience. 
First, sociodemographic factors were identified as influential to threat identification and 
risk assessment. In their analysis of gender roles in hurricane evacuations, Bateman and Edwards 
[68] found that women were more likely than men to perceive higher levels of risk. Even more 
complicated is that studies have found perception of risk to be a mediating variable between gender 
and evacuation behaviour—in that while men were less likely to perceive risk, men who did 
perceive risk were more likely than women (with comparable levels of risk) to evacuate. 
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Environmental and social cues have been identified by several studies as playing a role in 
the identification of a credible threat and assessment of risk. Storm intensity and severity were 
found to be of primary concern and were seen as key indicators of personal risk [69], [70]. 
Additionally, the perceived potential for flooding was found to influence perception of risk more 
than forecasts for high winds [70]. Huang et al. [72] found that in addition to environmental cues, 
social cues also had an impact on risk assessment. Official warnings were determined to have a 
positive effect on both the identification of a credible threat and risk assessment. 
Studies also identified location and experience in hurricanes as influential to threat 
identification and risk assessment. The location of those threatened by a hurricane can influence 
how the threat is perceived. Surprisingly, it was found that those farther from the coast perceive 
more severe storm characteristics, potentially as a result of the types of environmental cues faced 
by residents in different locations [72]. For example, Stein et al. [71] found that there was a 
heightened perception of risk due to wind rather than flooding or storm surge for residents outside 
of the evacuation zone. Additionally, having previous hurricane experience has been shown to 
increase perception of credible threat and risk [72]. However, experience with unnecessary 
evacuation was found to have an impact on lowered risk levels, leading to the belief that previous 
positive outcomes indicated perceived positive outcomes in the future. 
D.6.2 Protective Action Decision 
As was found when looking at the WUI fire literature, the majority of the factors discussed 
in the hurricane literature were found to influence the actual protective action decision. These 
included sociodemographic factors, and those relating to environmental and social cues, 
experience and preparation, familial and societal responsibilities, place/location, and credible 
threat and risk assessment. 
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Sociodemographic Factors  
It was noted by a number of researchers that females were more likely than males to 
evacuate [73]–[76]. However, other studies found that when other factors, such as roles and 
responsibilities within the family and location within the risk areas were taken into account, the 
effect of gender on evacuation decision was insignificant [68], [72]. In general, the likelihood of 
evacuating has been found to be higher among younger individuals [68], [74], with the exception 
of those who classified themselves as retirees who have been found to be more likely to evacuate 
[68], [77] (even more so with women than with men [68]). It should be noted that other studies 
found no significant association between age and evacuation [77], [78]. Conflicting results have 
been found for other socio-demographic factors such as income, education, marital status, and race. 
Some studies have found these factors to have a significant influence on evacuation [70], [73], 
[78]– [81], while other studies have found that these factors do not play a significant role [68], 
[77], [82]. 
Environmental and Social Cues  
Receiving information about a hurricane threat or an evacuation notice from a trusted 
source, particularly from family, peers or authorities, tended to lead to a higher likelihood of 
evacuation [74], [80]. Other sources of information such as national television stations, were also 
identified as influential and, depending on the situation, could have a greater impact on evacuation 
decisions than other information sources [82]. One of the most influential social cues on the 
decision to evacuate was receiving an official evacuation order or warning [72], [74], [77]. Both 
voluntary and mandatory evacuation orders have been found to increase the likelihood of 
evacuation, with the latter having a greater effect [70], [79], [80], [83], [84]. 
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It has been found that one’s location inside or outside of an evacuation zone can impact the 
outcome of such evacuation orders. For example, those located outside of the evacuation zone were 
less likely to evacuate, unless they received information about the evacuation order from the media, 
which then prompted them to evacuate unnecessarily [71]. The effect of the news media was found 
to have a minimal impact on those inside evacuation zones. Conversely, Lazo et al. [75] noted that 
perceived evacuation zone did not have a significant impact on evacuation behaviour. 
The type of information disseminated about the storm was also found to play an important 
role in the decision to evacuate. Dow and Cutter [83] noted that the probability and location of 
hurricane landfall were important factors affecting evacuation decisions. Information on wind 
speeds [84], storm strength [76], [79], [82] and storm severity [77], [83] were also identified as 
influential to the decision to evacuate. However, location, such as coastal proximity, and the fact 
that public officials tend to disseminate stronger messages during stronger storms, can mediate the 
influence of such storm indicators [74], [77]. The mediation effect caused by other factors was also 
noted when it came to the effect of observing others. Observing neighbours and peers leaving, or 
the absence of neighbours who have already left, has been shown to increase the likelihood of 
evacuating [68], [74], particularly in the case of residents in non-evacuation zones [71]. However, 
other research found that neighbourhood evacuation was strongly related to high-risk areas and 
with actions taken by officials, therefore making it difficult to identify the independent strength of 
this factor [77]. 
Preparation and Experience  
Previous experience with hurricanes and hurricane evacuations is a potentially influential 
factor in hurricane evacuation decisions [73]. Numerous studies have found such experience to 
lead to increased likelihood of evacuation [69], [75], [78], [81], [82]. Petrolia and Bhattacharjee 
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[84] found that past storm experience had a significant impact on future evacuation intention; 
however, the nature of the experience determined whether the person was inclined to stay or go. 
For example, past experience has been found to negatively impact evacuation in instances where 
past evacuations were viewed as unnecessary [72], [80]. It should be noted that other studies have 
found the impact of past experience to be insignificant [74], though others point out that it can 
contribute to awareness of the hazard and potentially produce a greater appreciation for the danger 
it may pose [77]. Murray-Tuite et al. [78] noted a level of consistency between previous evacuation 
actions, with 70% of study respondents making the same protective action decisions for both 
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Ivan. 
People who had created a household evacuation plan were more likely to evacuate [68], 
[75] and those who had spent more money on household storm preparation and planning were less 
likely to evacuate [82]. An increased knowledge about hurricanes was not found to impact 
evacuation decisions [77]. 
Familial and Societal Responsibilities  
The strength and viability of one’s social network has been found to have an impact on 
evacuation decisions, with those who have stronger social support being more likely and able to 
evacuate [81], [85]. Riad et al. [81] noted that it was a weaker social network, and not poverty, that 
was the greatest obstacle to evacuation for those with fewer resources. 
The desire to keep one’s family safe was identified as being one of the strongest influences 
on evacuation intention [75]. In line with this, research has found family size and the presence of 
children to impact the decision to evacuate. However, this impact varies. Studies have found that 
having children in the household can positively impact evacuation [74], [76], [80], [82], negatively 
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impact evacuation [78], or have no effect at all [68], [77]. Similarly, the impact of family size is 
unclear [68], [78], [82]. 
Work responsibilities (requiring people to stay) and the potential loss of income due to 
evacuating have been found to significantly impact the decision to stay [80], [83]. Additionally, 
wanting to protect property from the storm and/or from looters [77], [79] and having pets or 
livestock decreased the likelihood of evacuation [70], [79], [82]. Concerns regarding perceived 
evacuation impediments, including traffic congestion, reduced the likelihood of evacuation [72], 
[83]. In line with this, people tended to consider a wide variety of indirect costs associated with 
evacuation such as travel costs, care for pets, and potential difficulties with re-entering the 
evacuation zone [83]. 
Place/Location  
The vulnerability of one’s home to hurricanes has been shown to impact the likelihood of 
evacuation, though the strength of this factor varies depending on the study. In the case of 
hurricanes, vulnerability is most often classified as living in a mobile home, and for those who do, 
studies show that they are more likely to evacuate [68], [76]–[78], [82], [84]. Conversely, some 
research indicated an insignificant correlation between evacuation and mobile home residence 
[74]. 
Other research on place and location has found that living in multi-family dwellings can 
increase the likelihood of evacuation [78]; however, not all studies agree [79]. Homeownership, 
compared with renting, is also identified as an influential factor for non-evacuation in some studies 
[76], [80], [82], with longer-term residents being less likely to evacuate than shorter-term residents 
[81]. However, not all studies found significant results [77]. The belief that one’s home was a safe 
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place was identified by Dow and Cutter [83] as being the first consideration in deciding to stay, 
followed by traffic, work responsibilities and the likelihood that landfall would be nearby. In line 
with this, living near the coast or bodies of inland water, or in flood areas has been shown to lead 
to increased levels of evacuation [68], [72], [74], [77], [82]. However, context matters here, of 
course. The factors of the population within the coastal communities, e.g., income and other 
demographics, should also be taken into account [78]. 
Credible Threat and Risk Perception  
As the PADM model shows, risk perception is a critical factor that influences protective 
action decisions. Those who feel safe in their home are more likely to stay, and those who feel 
unsafe were more likely to leave [69], [77], [81]. Individuals who were concerned about costly 
damages favoured evacuation [77], [79], as did those who perceived personal vulnerability to wind 
and storm surge [75]. 
D.6.3 Delay and Actions 
Some research found that those living farther from the coast were more likely to wait before 
making their decision to evacuate compared to those closer to the coast [84]; however, they were 
more likely to take less time to prepare—i.e., spending less time protecting their property, packing 
and securing their home [74], [86]. Not having an evacuation destination identified ahead of time 
(pre-storm) was identified as contributing to added confusion and subsequent delay as a result of 
not knowing what protective action decision to make [84]. Additionally, large households tended 
to evacuate later and took more vehicles, whereas older adults tended to evacuate earlier [86]. 
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D.7 Discussion 
D.7.1 Similarities and Differences Between WUI Fire and Hurricane Factors 
For this paper, the factors mentioned in Sects. 4 and 5 above, for WUI fire and hurricane 
events respectively, are structured according to the PADM framework. This allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding of how a given factor will affect the evacuee decision-making 
process and how this effect might propagate through this process, potentially affecting the time it 
takes to respond and the outcome of the response. As will be shown in the discussion below, it was 
often found that a particular factor influenced more than one stage of this process. A summary of 
the identified factors is presented in Table D.1. Factors that were identified solely in qualitative 
studies are denoted with an asterisk (*), all other factors were found in quantitative studies or in 
both qualitative and quantitative studies. For detailed information about the methodologies used in 
each study, readers are directed to the sources noted in the table beside the respective factors. 
For both hurricanes and WUI fires, very little research was found that identified the factors 
affecting the pre-decisional phases (i.e., receipt of, attention paid to, and comprehension of cues 
and information). The only study identified discussed how hot weather may have prevented 
awareness of the Black Saturday Fires as the heat prompted some people to stay indoors [53]. 
Identifying additional factors that affect the pre-decisional phases will enable WUI evacuation 
models to more effectively and comprehensively represent potential obstacles to resident fire threat 
awareness. 
With respect to the threat identification and risk assessment stages of the PADM, similar 
factors were identified in the hurricane and WUI fire case studies. Within the sociodemographic 
factor category, income, education and gender were identified as having potential impacts on the 
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assessment of threat and risk in both the WUI fire and hurricane literature. Similarly, within the 
environmental and social cue category, triggers were important factors identified for both hazards. 
For instance, for WUI fires, environmental cues consisted of seeing or feeling the heat from flames 
and embers, and seeing or smelling smoke; and for hurricanes, environmental and social cues 
consisted of storm intensity and severity, as well as the risk of flooding due to heavy rain or storm 
surge. Both data sets found that social cues, such as observing others leaving, receiving information 
from trusted sources, or receiving an evacuation order increased the credibility of a threat and the 
perception of risk. Place and location as well as preparation and experience were also factor 
categories found to play a role in threat and risk assessment in both hazards. However, in both 
cases, it is important to note that previous experience alone was not sufficient to influence 
behaviour. This factor is more nuanced in that the type of experience (e.g., positive or negative), 
is what actually influenced threat identification and/or risk assessment. 
The vast majority of the factors identified in this literature review played a role in the 
protective action decision-making stage of the PADM. With respect to sociodemographic factors, 
gender was found to be the most commonly discussed factor for both WUI fires and hurricanes. In 
both cases, it was predominantly the case that women were identified as being more likely than 
men to evacuate. These findings must be put into context; however, when other factors associated 
with gender roles were taken into account (e.g., roles and responsibilities within the home), the 
impact of gender became insignificant. Moving forward, it would be beneficial to delve further 
into the role of gender in evacuation decision-making and response. Additional sociodemographic 
factors such as age and income were mentioned in both WUI fire and hurricane research, but they 
were identified less often and/or their influence was often contradicted by findings from other 
studies. 
216 
 
Table D.1: Hurricane and WUI Fire PADM Factors 
PADM stage Wildfire Hurricane 
Pre-decision Weather [53]* Not Applicable 
Credible threat and 
risk assessment 
Income/Education [46] 
Trusted sources [47], [48]* 
Coastal proximity [71], [72] 
Environmental cues [69]–[71] 
Length of time lived in area [46], [49] Gender [68] 
Location [51] * Previous hurricane experience, 
Observe others [47]* unnecessary evacuations [72] 
Previous experience with wildfires, 
knowledge of other fires [46], [50] 
Sensory-environmental [47], [48]* 
Social cues [72] 
Trusted sources [72] 
Protective action 
decision 
Sociodemographic Factors 
[46], [49], [51]–[58] 
Sociodemographic Factors 
[68], [70], [72]–[82] 
Age Education 
Gender Gender 
Income Income 
Occupation Marital status 
Political leaning Race 
Retired 
Environmental/social cues 
[46], [50], [54], [57], [59] 
Environmental/social cues 
[68], [70]–[72], [74]–[77], [79], [80], [82]–
[84] 
Evacuation order Environmental cues 
Multiple sources Evacuation order 
Telling other people Observing neighbours 
Trusted source Trusted source 
Wait and see  
Preparation/experience 
[47], [48], [50]–[52], [56], [57], [60]–
[63] 
Preparation/experience 
[68], [69], [72]–[75], [77], [78], [80]–[82], 
[84] 
Belief in capacity/survivability Plan 
Commitment to plan Previous experience (hurricane 
Preparation and knowledge and/or evacuations) 
Previous evacuation/fire experience  
Familial and societal responsibilities 
[46], [48], [52], [56], [57], [60], [61], 
[63] 
Familial and societal responsibilities 
[68], [70], [72], [74]–[83], [85] 
Attachment to home/community/ 
desire to protect property 
Keep family safe (children, family size) 
Pets/livestock 
Children Protect property (from storm and looters) 
Pets/livestock Social network 
Work responsibilities 
*Indicate factors identified solely in qualitative studies 
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Table D.1: Hurricane and WUI Fire PADM Factors (continued) 
PADM stage Wildfire Hurricane 
Protective action 
decision 
(continued) 
Place/location 
[50], [56], [57], [60] 
Place/location 
[68], [72], [74], [76]–[84] 
Distance to neighbours 
Full time vs. part time residents 
Dwelling type (mobile home, multi-
family) 
Rural vs. suburban Coastal/water proximity 
 Home as a safe place 
Home ownership and length of 
residence 
Risk assessment/credible threat 
[46], [50], [56], [61], [62], [64] 
Risk assessment/credible threat 
[69], [75], [77], [79], [81] 
Assessment of effectiveness 
Concern 
Risk/danger (staying or leaving) 
Risk of flooding, high cost damages 
Delay and actions Families stay together [52] * Age [86] 
Gathering physical possessions [49], 
[60] 
Evacuation destination [84]          
Household size [86] 
Indecision [66] Location [74], [84], [86] 
Wait and see [56], [64], [65], [67]  
*Indicate factors identified solely in qualitative studies 
In a general sense, environmental and social factors that influenced evacuation decision-
making were similar in both the WUI fire and hurricane literature; i.e., observing others; receiving 
warnings from multiple sources, especially from trusted sources; and receiving evacuation orders 
(especially those mandatory in nature) tended to result in a decision to evacuate. Another category, 
i.e., place and location, was identified in both data sets as influential to evacuation decision-
making. Influential factors identified were locations (i.e., rural versus suburban), residency, 
neighbour proximity, home vulnerability (i.e., home type), home ownership, length of residence, 
and proximity to the hazard (i.e., the coast in reference to the hurricane studies and proximity to 
the fire front in a WUI fire). It is important to note; however, that the findings were not consistent 
across the studies, making it ever more important for additional research to be performed on 
evacuation behaviour in response to hazards. 
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Researchers identified that preparation and previous experience influenced protective 
action decision-making for both WUI fires and hurricanes. Similar to its impact on threat 
identification and risk assessment, the effect of previous experience is more complicated, requiring 
understanding of the type or nature of the experience (i.e., positive or negative) and its impact on 
future behaviour (i.e., evacuating or staying). Familial and societal responsibilities also affected 
decision-making in both WUI fires and hurricanes. Having children, a need to protect the family, 
family size, and owning pets and livestock were found to influence evacuation behaviour. The 
influence of pets and livestock on staying (or sheltering in place) might be further influenced by 
restrictive shelter policies on accepting pets and/or boarding facilities requirements of proof of 
vaccination (which evacuees are unlikely to have with them). Additionally, having a connection to 
one’s community, wanting to protect property, and believing that one could successfully do so 
were also factors that were discussed along with the impact of one’s social network and work 
responsibilities. Similarly, factors highlighting the important role of threat credibility and risk 
perception in evacuation decision-making was found in both data sets. The risk to life versus 
property, as well as the likelihood of evacuation being the safest option (versus being potentially 
dangerous), were examples of risk assessment impacts on WUI fire evacuation. The hurricane data 
showed that the risk of varying types of storm-related impacts such as flooding, storm surge and 
wind influenced people’s likelihood of evacuating. 
Lastly, factors influencing delay, delay time, and specific types of actions included 
confidence in one’s capability to defend one’s home in the face of a WUI fire, coastal proximity, 
age, family size and having (or lacking) a destination choice. Post-decision actions were identified 
by a few WUI fire papers and these included collecting belongings, checking on and waiting for 
family/friends, and deciding on the evacuation destination and travel routes to get there. 
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The factors identified in Table D.1 aid in the development of a conceptual model of 
protective action decision-making in WUI fires. Factors have been linked with various stages of 
the PADM to create the framework for a model that can conceptually explain eventual decisions 
to evacuate or stay in place (either to defend the home or to shelter in place). The factors identified 
from the hurricane studies fill in gaps left behind by the WUI fire studies to develop a more 
comprehensive model. The framework, or conceptual model presented in Table D.1, can be further 
developed, quantified, calibrated and validated with additional data on protective action response 
from a WUI fire event to eventually create a computer simulation model of WUI fire evacuation. 
D.7.2 Conceptual Model Considerations 
The conceptual model presented here has several limitations. First, individual study 
conditions can vary by hazard conditions, populations, and community environment, which in turn, 
can affect the factors identified as influential to evacuation decision-making and response. Also, 
the WUI fire studies reviewed focused on U.S. and Australian populations, which can differ greatly 
by evacuation policy, preparedness and experience. Within both Australia’s former wildfire 
evacuation policy (Prepare, Stay and Defend) and its current one (Prepare. Act. Survive.), there is 
a greater acceptance of staying and defending, while in the U.S., community officials almost 
exclusively disseminate mandatory (and sometimes voluntary) evacuation orders to threatened 
communities.25 Delays (or ‘‘wait and see’’ behaviours) still occur in U.S. fire evacuations; 
however, issues of data applicability lie in the final decision to stay or go. Policies in one country 
may affect evacuee perception of viable evacuation alternatives and/or their experience or 
                                                 
25 Despite the practiced policy of evacuation in the United States, a number of studies suggest a growing number of 
people do not want or intend to evacuate automatically in the event of a wildfire and a small number of communities 
have looked into implementing a version of evacuation alternatives, primarily shelter in place [46], [59], [88], [89]. 
With that said, such cases are rare and such methods are still typically seen as a last resort if evacuation is not a 
possibility. 
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knowledge with such evacuation alternatives (which then influences the eventual decision). Little 
data is available on evacuation decision-making and behaviour during WUI fires in countries other 
than the United States and Australia. Studies of WUI fires in other countries would strengthen and 
broaden the scope of the conceptual model developed here. 
D.7.3 Future Model Development and Research Needs 
As mentioned earlier, Table D.1 provides the framework or conceptual model of protective 
action decision-making in WUI fire (and hurricane) events. Factors are identified as influential to 
each step of the PADM (noting that there is little research that identifies influential factors of the 
pre-decisional phases). The next step in conceptual model development is to identify the ways in 
which the factors that influence the same decision-making phase interact with one another in a 
more integrated manner. In reality, many of these factors are highly coupled and this may affect 
the outcome in complex ways (i.e. additive, counteractive and multiplicative). Reconciling these 
interactions is not a trivial task (and one that requires additional empirical support), but it is 
necessary for the continued development of this type of conceptual model. For instance, Dash and 
Gladwin [73] identified risk perception as having a greater impact on hurricane evacuation than 
negative past experience such as traffic delays. Similarly, it was found that risk perception could 
have a bigger impact than evacuation warnings if people believed their homes were safe as they 
were less likely to interpret such warnings or orders as being directly applicable to them and their 
situation [77]. This was also shown to apply in the reverse where environmental cues led people 
to evacuate even when they were not under an evacuation order [71]. For these reasons, 
understanding factor interactions at each decision-making phase of the PADM will be vital when 
translating these concepts into a quantitative model. 
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This work has focused on establishing a qualitative framework identifying the social and 
environmental factors to be considered within a WUI evacuation model. For implementation 
within a computational platform, this framework would need to be quantified. Work is currently 
underway to create a quantitative modelling framework (based on the framework adopted and 
developed here) to simulate householder risk perception given a WUI fire event and to predict 
householder protective actions [87]. Such predictions could be embedded within a simulation tool 
to make time-based estimations of the consequences of the decisions made by residents in 
conjunction with the resources available, the fire incident conditions and the existing physical 
infrastructure. An understanding of such consequences would be of great benefit in planning and 
design, in emergency response, and in post-incident investigations when attempting to assess the 
effectiveness of the emergency plans enacted. Provided here is a list of research gaps that need to 
be addressed to facilitate the development and validation of the conceptual model described above 
and the subsequent implementation within a simulation tool: 
1. The factors that influence the three pre-decisional phases, including perception, attention, 
and comprehension. 
2. The relationship between previous experience and PADM processes (e.g., threat 
identification, risk perception, and the protective action decision), and mediating factors. 
3. A more current representation of the relationship between gender and PADM processes 
(e.g., threat identification, risk perception, and the protective action decision), and 
mediating factors. 
4. The factors that influence specific actions taken before evacuation movement begins, as 
well as the time to complete these actions. 
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5. The factors that influence evacuation decisions, such as route choice and choice of final 
evacuation destination. 
6. An understanding of the interaction of factors and their resulting outcomes. 
7. Data from studies on WUI fires from populations in countries outside of the U.S. and 
Australia. 
8. The influence of changing demographics of people living in the WUI on evacuation 
decision-making and response (e.g. new WUI residents and long-term aging WUI 
residents). 
9. The influence of a changing WUI landscape (e.g. environmental conditions) on evacuation 
decision-making and response, especially where communities are now vulnerable to WUI 
fires for the first time. 
D.8 Conclusion 
The increasing prevalence of large and destructive wildfires is an issue of growing concern. 
With more people living in the wildland urban interface, being able to evacuate potentially large 
groups of people with little warning and in a short period of time will continue to become a more 
pressing and challenging task. One of the ways to address this more credibly and effectively is 
through the development of comprehensive WUI fire evacuation models. 
A key component that must be considered in these models is protective action decision-
making and behaviour in the WUI; i.e. what people do in response to the fire. Choosing to evacuate 
or taking another protective action is a complex process influenced by a number of diverse factors 
including sociodemographic factors, social and environmental cues, preparation and experience, 
familial responsibilities, location, and credible threat and risk assessment. Although challenging, 
it is important to represent these factors within WUI fire evacuation models, as they influence 
223 
 
if/when people choose to evacuate and where they will go. At this stage, identifying the factors 
that influence evacuee decision-making during WUI fire events and characterizing the nature of 
this impact is a key step—a step that has been addressed in this article. The authors collected and 
categorized the factors identified as influencing evacuee decision-making and response to WUI 
fires and hurricanes according to the PADM framework. The conceptual model developed 
represents a qualitative description of the evacuation decision, delay and actions taken before 
vehicular movement begins. This represents an important foundation on which to build. 
Overall, the development of a comprehensive and credible conceptual model of resident 
response to WUI fire incidents has a number of important benefits. It will allow us to develop 
simulation tools that better account for resident response and to quantify the impact of this 
response. Such tools could be used by urban and emergency planners to assess the impact of new 
construction and mitigate against such impacts. Similarly, first responder training may be updated 
to address the implications of such a conceptual model, enabling their interventions to be sensitive 
to expected resident responses. An understanding of resident response will allow authorities to 
better prepare guidance and allocate resources to meet current population’s expectations, 
vulnerabilities, and capabilities. Additionally, regulations regarding WUI safety can be updated to 
account for expected resident response. 
Broadening the scope of this conceptual model to include research from WUI fires and 
hurricanes was necessary given the limited information available; it also generated ideas for future 
research into the factors influencing the decision to evacuate or not in WUI fires. This approach 
provided the opportunity to see how factors might vary given different incident scenarios, 
strengthened the findings that some factors were particularly influential, and identified gaps in our 
current understanding that should be explored in future research.  
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Appendix E: Approach to Using Human Behaviour in Fire to Inform WUI 
Community Evacuations 
E.1 Introduction 
The increasing number of fires impacting the wildland urban interface (WUI) and the 
growth of WUI communities in recent years has highlighted the importance of being able to safely 
evacuate at-risk communities [1]. Incidents such as the 2016 Fort McMurray fire and the 2017 
British Columbia fires forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of people. The recent California 
wildfires resulted in the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people and numerous fatalities. 
WUI fire evacuations are challenging as they often need to take place in a short period of time 
with little advanced warning. Recent international fires have shown that these challenges can result 
in last-minute evacuations and substantial loss of life [2]. WUI evacuations are complex, requiring 
the collaboration of numerous agencies and adaptability to the nature of the fire and the 
environment, as well as the characteristics and number of people who need to evacuate [3]. Given 
this complexity, it is necessary for all the influential elements to be understood, and for people 
from various disciplines (engineering, policy, social science, fire services, etc.) to work together 
to tackle the challenges posed by such evacuations.  
One important component that can be overlooked when striving to improve WUI fire 
evacuations is the role and impact that human behaviour can have on the success of an evacuation. 
Human behaviour in fire (HBiF) is a multidisciplinary field of study that looks at human response 
to fire events [4], [5]. Though historically undervalued, the acceptance of HBiF as one of the key 
pillars of fire safety engineering has grown in recent years [6]. While typically associated with 
fires in the built environment (office buildings, apartments, houses, etc.), the study of HBiF is 
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closely related to the field of disaster research, where researchers have sought to understand the 
ways people respond to natural and technological disasters such as tornados, volcanos, hurricanes, 
floods and more recently, wildfires. The way that people respond to these events will impact their 
evacuation decisions. With a more thorough understanding of the decision-making process and the 
factors that impact how people behave and act, researchers and practitioners can design systems, 
messages, procedures and communities that are better able to support safer and effective WUI 
evacuations. 
The study of human response and decision-making during wildfires has grown over the 
past few decades, primarily in the United States and Australia [7]. Despite this growing 
momentum, there are few Canadian studies looking at the impact of human behaviour on WUI fire 
evacuations. Given the importance of understanding human responses to wildfires, this study seeks 
to build on existing research in the field, create a survey for WUI communities informed by this 
research, and gather information about the factors impacting people’s decision to evacuate in a 
Canadian WUI context. This survey will be tailored to look at a specific type of WUI community 
found in Canada: seasonal communities.  
E.2 Study Approach 
This project is in progress and consists of three primary stages. Stage One was completed 
last year and is currently subject to peer review, Stage Two is the underway presented herein as 
the focus of this paper and presentation, and Stage Three will take place over the coming years 
involving field studies. Each stage is summarized below for context. Stage Two is the basis of this 
current study. 
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E.2.1 Stage One: Understanding HBiF during WUI Fires 
Stage One consisted of conducting a review of existing literature looking at evacuation 
decision-making. This review included wildfire and hurricane literature so as to gain insight from 
understanding and comparing decision-making findings from both disaster types. Using the factors 
identified in the research, a first-stage conceptual model for evacuation decision-making during 
wildfires was created using the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) as a framework [8]. 
This conceptual model improves our understanding of the factors that have the greatest impact on 
the different stages of the decision-making process: pre-decision, credible threat and risk 
assessment, and protective action decision. This literature review and the conceptual model is 
currently in final peer review and is expected to be published in 2019.  
E.2.2 Stage Two: Survey Creation and Data Collection Preparation 
Stage Two of the project consists of the creation of a survey to collect further information 
about the factors influencing protective action decision-making during wildfires. This survey is 
created based on the conceptual model developed in Stage One, the factors found to have an impact 
on evacuation decision-making, and the gaps in knowledge identified during the literature review. 
For example, it was found that most of the factors in the studied research focused on the third stage 
of the PADM, the protective action decision itself. Therefore, in addition to seeking information 
about the decision to evacuate or not, the survey seeks to gain more information about the factors 
that influence the pre-decision phase and the credible threat and risk assessment phase of the 
PADM. Furthermore, the study seeks to gain information about the amount of time people 
anticipate spending on pre-evacuation tasks. The survey is specifically tailored to collect data 
about the indented evacuation actions of residents in seasonal communities without a recent history 
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of wildfire threat (Stage Three), however, it could be modified for use in other types of 
communities (non-seasonal, indigenous etc.).  
E.2.3 Stage Three: Canadian Case Study 
The third stage of the project will involve the piloting of the survey followed by its broader 
distribution within a seasonal Canadian case study community and the subsequent analysis of the 
collected data. Given the variable Canadian climate, seasonal communities are generally 
comprised of cabins and cottages where people spend time during the warmer summer months, 
which corresponds to the Canadian fire season. These communities, often located in the WUI, are 
popular with local and foreign tourists alike and can see large population fluctuations over the 
course of the year. As the Canadian fire season is changing and more of these communities become 
vulnerable to a wildfire threat [9], there is a growing interest in better understanding the intended 
evacuation actions of residents and the factors influencing these decisions. 
E.3 Survey Creation 
E.3.1 Methodology 
The goal of the survey is to gain insight into the anticipated actions of residents in seasonal 
Canadian WUI communities. Questions were created using best principles from The Tailored 
Design Method [10] and inspiration was drawn from the 2016 Canadian Census [11] and the 2009 
Bushfire CRC Survey [12]. The survey herein is divided into five main sections seeking to gain 
different types of information. These include: Cabin Information and Visits; Previous Experience; 
Warnings and Information Sources; Intended Actions; and Household Information. 
A quantitative survey method was chosen to allow for statistical analysis to be performed 
on the collected data. A combination of closed-ended questions with unordered and order response 
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were used in addition to a few partially closed-ended questions allowing respondents to specify an 
alternative answer. Space is provided at the end of the survey to allow participants to provide 
additional information that they feel is important, such as expected evacuation responses, 
additional previous experience or evacuation constraints.  
The survey is designed with the understanding that the first case study community to be 
studied has not been impacted by a wildfire in recent history. Given the history of wildfire response 
and policy in Canada, more questions focus on information about evacuation intentions and 
experience than staying and defending. This decision was also influenced by findings from 
previous studies that have shown that people are less likely to stay and defend if the property 
threatened is not their primary residence.  
E.3.2 Filling in Knowledge Gaps 
It was noted in Stage One of the project that there were a limited number of factors 
identified in previous research that were shown to affect the first stage of the PADM, the pre-
decisional stage. This stage has three main components: being exposed to a cue; paying attention 
to a cue; and comprehending a cue. Figures D.1 and D.2 show two questions in the survey that 
seek to gain more information about factors that could potentially affect this stage.  
Figure E.1 shows a question seeking to understand if respondents have reliable access to 
services that could impact their ability to receive or be exposed to a cue. Given the remoteness of 
many seasonal WUI communities in Canada, it is important to understand if people would be able 
to receive a message or cue delivered via a means requiring one of the services listed. For example, 
Alert Ready, Canada’s national alerting system, can distribute messages about a threat or 
emergency such as a wildfire or WUI evacuation via radio, television, or LTE-connected devices 
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[13]. If a person does not have reliable access to the listed services, they could be unable to receive 
an Alert Ready alert. It could also impact their ability to search the internet or receive news 
updates. It is important to note that a wildfire can further impact these services. This question acts 
as a means of establishing a baseline for service accessibility in the surveyed communities.  
 
Figure E.1: Survey question asking about access to services that could impact being able to receive an alert about a 
wildfire threat or evacuation notice 
Another factor that has the potential to impact the pre-decisional phase of the PADM is 
language comprehension. In Canada, there are two official languages, French and English. It is 
therefore required by law that all official emergency messages be distributed in both languages. 
Canada is also a very multicultural country, and seasonal WUI communities are also popular with 
international tourists. Therefore, Figure E.2 shows one of the language questions asked by the 
survey with the aim of gaining information about the ability of respondents to understand a 
message delivered in one of the official languages. 
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Figure E.2: Survey question asking if respondents feel comfortable conducting a conversation in French and/or 
English, Canada’s two official languages 
E.3.3 Time to Complete Pre-Movement Tasks 
In addition to asking about intended evacuation actions and responses, the survey seeks to 
understand how long people think that they will spend on certain pre-evacuation tasks. Figure E.3 
is an example of one question seeking to do this, specifically in the context of the respondent 
having decided to evacuate immediately (other timeframes/levels of urgency are also explored). 
The categories of pre-evacuation tasks were created after looking at similar questions asked in 
previous disaster research studies. In the case of nuclear power plant incidents, the categories used 
included: warning receipt, preparation to leave work; return from work; and prepare to leave home 
[14]. In hurricane literature, studies have asked residents in hurricane-prone areas about their 
intended evacuation actions, asking about the amount of time they anticipate spending on 
preparing to leave work, travel from work to home, gathering household members, pack travel 
items, protect property from storm damage (ex. install storm shutters), and secure their homes 
before evacuating  [15], [16]. Such information is important when trying to understand potential 
trip generation time (TGT) which affects how long it will take people to evacuate an area. It is, 
however, important to understand the limitations of this question. The amount of time people 
expect to take is not necessarily the same as the amount of time they will actually take to complete 
pre-evacuation tasks during an evacuation. Given the current lack of time estimates (expected and 
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recollected) from “identical” or similar communities, this information should be seen as 
exploratory and not used quantifiably. 
 
Figure E.3: Survey question asking about how much time people anticipate that they would spend on pre-evacuation 
actions if they were planning to evacuate immediately 
E.4 Next Steps 
The authors plan a small pilot study distribution of the survey for user assessment, followed 
by the distribution of the survey in the case study community in 2019.  This will be followed by 
the subsequent analysis of the collected data and development of a risk-based framework which 
will be influenced upon the results. Non-seasonal community evaluation and adaptation of the 
survey will follow in 2020.  
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Appendix F: Emergency Egress for the Elderly in Care Home Fire Situations 
F.1 Abstract 
Practitioners are continuing to develop egress modelling software for the design of the built 
environment. These models require data about human behaviour and factors for calibration, 
validation, and verification. This study aims to address the specific data and knowledge gap: 
emergency egress of the elderly. Such data is difficult to collect given privacy and consent 
concerns, with strong relationships generally being required between residences and researchers. 
Through the observation of nine fire drills at six Canadian long term care and retirement homes, 
specific evacuation actions and behaviour were observed for 37 staff members and information 
about the evacuation of 56 residents was collected. These drills demonstrated that emergency 
egress in long term care and retirement homes is highly staff dependent with 72% of residents 
recorded requiring full assistance at all stages of movement in evacuation, and that the type of 
announced/unannounced drill and level of resident care will affect the type of data collected. 
Specific attention is given to understanding the considerations that must be made when using fire 
drills as data sources, and the impact that these can have on using such data for modelling. 
F.2 Introduction  
A demographic factor that has potential to have significant impact on the time required for 
emergency egress is that the global population is aging [1]. In Canada, the 2016 census showed 
that seniors outnumbered children for the first time in the country’s history [2]. By 2036, seniors 
are projected to comprise 23%-25% of Canada’s population [3]. This change will affect the 
requirements of the built environment. Aging and elderly populations require more time and 
assistance to evacuate in emergencies due to the increased prevalence of physical and mental 
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disabilities [4], [5]. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) identified the collection of 
data relating to demographics, specifically vulnerable populations, as the priority theme in its 2018 
Research Roadmap [6]. This demonstrates that there is a need for understanding of the behaviour, 
actions and dependencies of vulnerable populations, such as the elderly, in fire events.   
In places such as long term care (LTC) and retirement homes, which specifically cater to 
this demographic, the role played by care staff can have a substantial impact on the nature of the 
evacuation process [7]. This can be seen in a number of prominent and deadly fires in LTC and 
retirement-type homes. Devastating fires (ex. Rosepark Care Home in Scotland in 2004 and in the 
L'Isle-Verte Senior’s Residence in Canada in 2014) have resulted in significant loss of life [8], [9]. 
There have been over eight fires in Canadian residences dedicated to the care of the elderly within 
the last nine years alone with life loss (Table F.1). 
Table F.1 Recent fires in Canadian long term care, retirement and seniors homes [10] – [19] 
Date Place Location Fatalities 
Mar-18 R J Brooks Living Centre Bancroft, Ontario 1 
Sep-17 Extendicare Port Hope Long Term Care Centre Port Hope, Ontario 0 
Jul-17 Oasis Residence Terrebonne, Quebec 1 
Nov-16 Domaine des Trembles Gatineau, Quebec 0 
Mar-16 Villa Carital Vancouver, British Columbia 0 
Dec-15 Medicine Tree Manor High River, Alberta 0 
Jun-14 Extendicare Starwood  Ottawa, Ontario 0 
Jan-14 L'Isle-Verte Seniors Residence L'Isle-Verte, Quebec 32 
Aug-12 Retirement Home Edmonton, Alberta 1 
May-12 Place Mont-Roc home Hawkesbury, Ontario 2 
Apr-12 Long Term Care Home Langley, British Columbia 1 
Apr-11 Rainbow Suites Retirement Home Timmins, Ontario 1 
Apr-10 St. Joseph's Residence Winnipeg, Manitoba  0 
Jan-09 Muskoka Heights Retirement Home Orillia, Ontario 4 
 
In order to be representative of real-life emergency situations that can inform building 
design, egress models must represent various elements of human behaviour and take into account 
244 
 
the wide range of factors that can influence how and when people will evacuate in diverse 
situations and environments. These models require calibration, validation and verification. They 
rely upon access to data covering a range of populations and environments. Data of this nature can 
come from a variety of settings, can include a wide spectrum of demographics, and can represent 
varying levels of credibility for using and developing egress models and subsequent design.  
Herein, quantitative and qualitative behavioural data was collected through the observation of nine 
fire drills at six different LTC and retirement homes in Ontario, Canada. Data relates to the actions 
and behaviours of the residents and most specifically the dependencies on staff and caretaker 
members. This study discusses the limitations to be taken into account when using fire drills as a 
data collection method. The study is Canadian focused but certain conclusions and material will 
extend and have use broadly.  
This manuscript is the first in a series by the authors which is intended to be followed by a 
modelling verification and validation study which is beyond this current manuscript’s scope. 
F.3 Theory 
F.3.1 Legal Fire Drill Requirements  
In this study, the observed retirement homes had three levels of care. These levels range 
from independent, assisted and memory care. In independent care, there is little to no supervisory 
staff needed for residents. Assisted care offers staff assistance with day-to-day activities. Memory 
care assistance offers extended care for residents with neuro-diverse requirements such as early 
stage dementia or derivatives. These residents often have difficulty with recognition and can easily 
be confused. For their safety, these residents receiving memory care assistance are located on a 
secured floor, with staff assistance available. LTC home residents tend to require physical or 
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cognitive assistance and have restricted mobility. Enhanced monitoring and care is provided with 
24-hour nursing.  
The two types of care homes are both required to have fire safety training and procedures 
per the National Fire and Building Code of Canada (NBC and NFC herein) in addition to the 
provincial codes [20], [21]. The procedure of a fire drill is the responsibility of the building 
management [22]. The procedure should address the potential building fire hazards with respect 
to the residing occupants, note building safety features, indicate the target number for non-staff 
occupant participation during the drill and the number of trained staff involved. Procedure should 
follow the fire department regulations and confirm that the emergency systems comply with the 
NBC [22]. The NFC also addresses that the frequency of the fire drills depends on the occupancy 
type. For elderly care homes, the staff are required to participate in a fire drill once a month and 
the staff participation must be recorded. In LTC homes, three fire drills are required every month, 
one on every shift (morning, afternoon, night) [21], [23]. Both LTC and retirement homes are 
required to have one fire drill per year observed by a city fire marshal. This drill must represent 
the worst-case timing scenario - the least number of staff that would be present in the home - the 
night shift. It also requires that all residents in the fire drill wing be evacuated to a place of relative 
safety e.g. to an adjacent fire compartment, and not necessarily to outside the building. The code 
allows staff members to stand in and act in the place of residents [21], [23]. 
F.3.2 The Role and Purpose of Fire Drills 
A drill can be defined as “an exercise involving a credible simulated emergency that 
requires personnel to perform emergency response operations for the purpose of evaluating the 
effectiveness of the training and education programs and the competence of personnel in 
performing required response duties and functions” [24]. Drills are often used to evaluate the 
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performance of individuals in a simulated emergency environment so as to gauge how they could 
perform during a realistic emergency. Drills can also be seen as training and educational activities 
to teach people how they should act in an emergency situation [22]. In both cases, drills provide 
the opportunity to address performance, be it an individual act, role or procedure, or the 
interactions between different groups, individuals, environments, and emergency scenarios. Drills 
can also provide opportunities to gather valuable information about evacuee behaviour and 
procedural design [25]. Given that conducting “experiments” in the traditional sense of the word 
is generally not possible for ethical and safety concerns – particularly with vulnerable populations 
– drills, along with other models, can provide a limited opportunity to better understand aging 
populations’ behaviour in fire. Egress drills are commonly used tools. However, their benefit, 
effectiveness and limitations are not widely understood as discussed in depth elsewhere [22]. This 
is a critical consideration when using drills as a means of data collection for research. It is 
important to understand that drills are a simulation, a model of an emergency situation. Practicality, 
safety, cost and ethics can limit their value [22].  Researcher influence can also impact the realism 
of a drill and the quality of the data collected and should therefore be managed carefully to 
minimize its impact [26]. For the modeller using this data it is critical to know the limitation and 
applicability of the data to keep it within context and understand its impact on the practitioner’s 
uncertainty. 
F.3.3 Egress Data and Evacuation Modelling  
Over the past few decades, evacuation modelling software has been developed for 
applications in crowd dynamics, pedestrian movement and evacuation processes [27]. These 
models are used by various fields and disciplines, and as such they play an important role in 
understanding and representing human movement and evacuation behaviour. There exist many 
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different egress models, ranging from hydraulic calculations to adaptive agent-based approaches 
[28]. These models vary in the way that they configure buildings, populations, and procedures 
[29]. Practitioners have reviewed and summarized the features and capabilities of current egress 
modelling software [30], [31]. 
Models rely on an understanding of the situation being simulated and appropriate data 
input. This data is not only used for creating egress model simulations, it is also necessary for the 
verification and validation of the tools themselves [32]. Data can come from a variety of sources 
including simulated emergency evacuations such as fire drills. Much of the data collected available 
in publicly accessible literature has been compiled and can be found in the fifth edition SFPE 
Handbook [33]. An understanding of human behaviour in fire and the dependencies between 
groups and their care takers are important when using and interpreting the data available. 
Additionally, data collection context, techniques and processes can have a large impact on the 
nature of the data collected and therefore need to be considered when looking to use the data in a 
computer model specifically when dependent behaviour is sought to be understood. 
F.4 Methodology  
Data relating to fire drills and procedures was collected in collaboration with three LTC 
homes and three retirement homes. The characterization of the buildings used for the nine drills is 
summarized in Table F.2 and E.3. The drills are numbered in the order that they were observed. 
Early research focused on LTC homes (Drills 1-4, 6) while the more recent studies focused on 
retirement homes (Drills 5, 7-9). The first four drills were monthly drills in which resident 
participation was not mandatory while the latter five drills were legally required annual fire 
marshal-observed drills. 
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Table F.2 Summary of participating long term care and retirement home locations where data was collected 
  Drill 1a  Drill 2  Drill 3a  Drill 4  Drill 5b  Drill 6a  Drill 7b  Drill 8  Drill 9  
Number 
of Storeys  
3  3  7  2  5  3  5  5  6  
Number of 
Residents  
161  193  180  192  127  190  125  N/A c N/A c 
Long 
Term Care 
Home  
X  X  X  X  -  X  -  -  -  
Retirement 
Home  
-  -  -  -  X  -  X  X  X  
              a Drills 1, 3 and 6 were observed in different wings at the same location at the same level of care but at different dates so occupancy differs.  
              b Drills 5 and 7 was observed at the same location at different levels of care location at the same level of care but at different dates so occupancy differs. 
              c Exact occupancy not available but > 100. 
 
Table F.3 Summary of fire drill conditions 
  Drill 1  Drill 2  Drill 3  Drill 4   Drill 5  Drill 6  Drill 7  Drill 8  Drill 9  
Type of Drill 
Observed  
Monthly  Monthly  Monthly  Monthly  Annual  Annual  Annual  Annual  Annual  
Working 
Shift  
Day  Evening  Evening  Evening  Night  Night  Night   Night  Night   
Number of 
Staff  
15 7  9  7  3  8a 3b  3  3  
Number of 
Staff Stand-
Ins  
0  0  0  0  3  11c 1  0  4 
Number of 
residents 
participating  
3  1 2  2  10 14 22 14 6 
Number of 
residents that 
did not 
evacuate 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Number of 
residents 
recorded 
3 0 2 2 10 5 18 10 6 
Autonomous 
residents 
recorded e 
3 0 0 0 1e 0 11 1 0 
Drill Timing 
to “all clear” 
(mm:ss) 
6:00 5:00 4:52 3:23 13:33 9:08 14:28 15:05 7:38 
a 8 staff participated in the drill, data was collected for 3 of them 
b 3 staff participated in the drill, data was collected for 2 of them 
c 11 staff stand-ins participated in the drill, data was collected about 7 of them 
d Resident evacuated on their own, but were returned to their room and then evacuated by staff 
e Autonomous is defined as residents who left their rom on their own ability and moved to the safe zone on their own ability, with or without prompting, with or 
without walkers, wheel chairs etc. 
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F.4.1 Building Connections and Conducting Interviews 
The first stage of the research involved building a relationship of trust with LTC and 
retirement homes. Four rounds of written requests were sent out to managerial staff at various 
homes describing the project and inquiring about their willingness to be interviewed about the 
home's fire safety practices, policies and evacuation procedures. It was made clear that the authors 
would answer questions or discuss any concerns that the home representatives had prior to 
agreeing to an interview. Table F.4 details the response rate for each round of interview requests. 
Interviews were conducted and transcribed in person with managerial staff. The pre-determined 
questions focused on general building information, fire detection systems, active and passive 
systems, fire strategies and staff procedures, resident level of care as well as general demographics 
and resident population characteristics. 
Table F.4 Response rate for each round of interview requests 
Round of 
Interview 
Email 
Requests  
Request 
Timeframe 
Type of 
Home  
Number 
of Homes 
Contacted 
Number of 
Homes 
that 
Responded 
Number of 
Homes 
that 
Agreed to 
Participate 
Number of 
Homes 
Where 
Interviews 
Were 
Conducted  
Number of 
Homes 
Where 
Drills Were 
Observed  
1 Sept. 2014 
Long 
Term Care 
8 4 3 2 1 
2 Sept. 2015 
Long 
Term Care 
7 4 4 4 3 
3 Jan. 2016 Retirement  7 2 1 1 1 
4 May 2017 Retirement  15 6 4 3 3 
 
F.4.2 Fire Drill Observation and Data Collection 
Following the interviews, the participating homes were asked if they would be willing to 
allow members of the research team to observe one of the homes' required fire drills as part of this 
research study; six different homes agreed. The authors were invited to observed drills that were 
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pre-arranged by the different homes based on monthly or yearly fire drill requirements. 
Information such as floorplans, staff fire safety procedures and anticipated number of participants 
were acquired in advance of each drill and were used to prepare a guide which was given to each 
observer. Drill conditions can be seen in Table F.3. 
The method of observing each fire drill followed a similar process so as to maintain 
compatibility and allow for comparisons to be made. Each drill was observed in person from within 
the designated fire wing (outside the room compartments). An in-person observer method for data 
collection was necessary given that informed consent of residents living with dementia could not 
practically be obtained for using cameras for data collection. Additionally, filming nursing staff 
during the fire drills was forbidden as third-party evaluation by film was prohibited by their unions. 
Research ethics were also more easily obtained in this method of data collection. It is 
acknowledged by the authors that this method of observation does not allow for all events that may 
occur during a drill to be recorded and analyzed. While the authors acknowledge this can and does 
result in a loss of important data, the willingness of the homes to allow the drills to be observed in 
the first place was in part due to the fact that cameras were not being used. 
At each home, the authors met with the drill coordinator for a pre-drill discussion on the 
details of the drill. If the drill was a worst-case scenario annual drill, the drill coordinator would 
also hold a pre-drill discussion with the staff members participating to review procedures, assign 
roles, and answer questions. The drill observations took place within the building wing where the 
evacuation was taking place. Three to four researchers (led by at least one of the authors, but also 
including those on their research team) attended each fire drill and were positioned along the 
corridors of the fire drill area to limit interference with staff procedures. The number of researchers 
in attendance at each drill was determined based on maximizing the amount and quality of data 
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collected, and by minimizing the impact of the observers on the drill (based largely on the 
geometry of the floorplan).  
The information collected evolved as the project progressed to collect more specific 
information. For the first four drills which took place at LTC homes, each observer was responsible 
for recording general observations of participating staff and residents along with the corresponding 
times. For Drills 5 – 9, the timestamps of specific actions, including when staff members entered 
the wing and when residents or staff entered a room, left a room, and entered the safe zone, were 
the focus of the observation. Behaviours exhibited and actions undertaken by both staff and 
residents were also noted, along with the times that they were observed. For these later drills, the 
observation task distribution between the researchers depended on several factors including the 
geometry of the building wing being evacuated, the level of care being provided (and 
corresponding level of resident dependency), and the number of participating staff and residents. 
For Drills 5, 6 and 9, each researcher recorded the actions of one staff member. This was 
deemed the most effective method given that the residents in Drill 5 and 6 had a high dependency 
on staff (memory care floor or long term care home) and would therefore not evacuate on their 
own, and for Drill 9 there were only a few residents living on the evacuation floor. It should be 
noted that in contrast to Drills 5 and 9 where the number of observers equalled the number of 
participating staff members (3:3), there were more staff participating in Drill 6 than there were 
observers (8:3). It was determined that in order to collect data to the degree of specificity required 
while not unduly interfering with the drill by having too many observers present, it was necessary 
to focus closely on a select number of staff. Therefore, each researcher observed one staff member. 
This meant that the same amount of data was collected as in the other drills, but the proportion of 
data collected to potential data was smaller.  
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For Drills 7 and 8, researchers focused on recording actions observed in specific sections 
of the wing. This was deemed the most effective method as the drills took place on floors where 
residents were more independent and autonomous and therefore were expected to evacuate without 
extensive staff assistance. This method allowed the researchers to observe and record the actions 
of both the staff and the residents (both autonomous and non, herein we define autonomous as 
residents who left their room on their own ability and moved to the safe zone on their own ability, 
with or without prompting, with or without walkers, wheel chairs etc).  Given the floorplan 
geometry, this method also allowed the researchers to remain in one place throughout the drill, 
limiting their impact on the drill. Following each drill, the researchers observed the post-drill 
discussion held by the drill coordinator with the participating staff (and the fire marshals if 
present). After leaving the homes, the researchers then met to discuss the drill and to consolidate 
the raw data each person had collected. 
F.5 Results 
F.5.1 Interview Data 
Though each home had different architectural designs and features, the buildings were 
typically organized in the same way. In the LTC homes, this meant that each floor was 
compartmentalized into wings or units, which were straight hallways that generally branched off 
a central core. The elevators were centrally located, and fire rated stairwells were located at the 
end of each unit. The wings were separated by fire rated doors, creating compartmentalized units. 
This enabled horizontal evacuation to take place during emergency situations. In the retirement 
homes, this compartmentalization was only seen if the home had a floor or wing designated for 
the care of residents with dementia. Most floors of the retirement homes consisted of rooms 
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branching off a main hallway. Horizontal evacuations were still the first stage of an evacuation in 
the retirement homes, however residents could be evacuated to the stairwells.   
In the LTC homes, the average age of residents was 75 to 88 years. Based on their 
knowledge about the residents, it was estimated by the interviewed staff members that between 
88-100% of residents would require some form of assistance to evacuate horizontally given the 
number of residents with cognitive and/or physical disabilities. While the need for assistance was 
less than in the retirement homes, in one building for example, over 90% of the residents would 
still require assistance to go down the stairs. Staffing levels were consistent among both the LTC 
and retirement homes - that the least number of staff were present during the night shifts.  
The interviews provided information on the fire evacuation procedures and practices at 
each home. Each home had a fire plan that was updated annually and reviewed by the fire 
department. The official procedures varied from home to home, however they were similar in 
nature and are published in publicly available policy literature. REACT was the most popular fire 
response procedure (Remove those in danger, Ensure door is closed, Activate alarm, Call 911, Try 
to extinguish the fire), with one home using the RACE method (Rescue, Alarm, Contain the fire, 
Extinguish) and another using the SCATEE method (Save, Contain, Alarm, Telephone, Evacuate, 
Extinguish). A few home representatives did not cite a specific reaction acronym, however the 
approach they described closely resembled the REACT method.  
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Figure F.1: Visualization of the “critical triangle” that determine what are weighted to be evacuated first. 
In addition to the initial fire safety training they received as part of their orientation upon 
being hired, employees were required to participate in annual training and fire drills. During the 
monthly fire drills, the residents were not required to participate as it was viewed more as a way 
for the staff to practice the steps that they would need to go through in an actual fire evacuation. 
In both the LTC and retirement homes, this involved locating and evacuating the fire room (and 
any connecting rooms) followed by the rooms on either side and the one directly across the hall 
from the fire room: these occupants are considered most at risk during the initial stages of a fire. 
This was referred to as the critical triangle (Figure F.1). The rooms were then to be progressively 
evacuated, starting with those in closest proximity to the fire room. All doors were to be closed 
after each room was evacuated. Each home had a way of designating which rooms had already 
been evacuated. Some homes used Evacuchecks which were tabs attached to the doorframe of 
each room that could be flipped once the room had been checked, other homes hung a tag on the 
door handle (Figure F.2a and F.2b).  
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Figure F.2: (a) Evacucheck before evacuation (b) after evacuation 
In the LTC homes, where some residents were bedridden, several different methods of 
physically assisting residents during real evacuations were described. One home could use 
mechanical lifts to move bedridden residents into a wheelchair, another home moved the beds 
themselves into the hallway and into the safe zone. The two other interviewed LTC homes used 
what was known as the blanket method, where bedridden residents were wrapped in their sheets, 
guided to the floor and then pulled into the safe zone. As the participating retirement homes did 
not have any bedridden residents given the level of care they provided, such methods were not 
necessary. Additionally, it was also expressed by the LTC home interviewees that while the staff 
were searching for the fire, they were supposed to close any open resident room doors as well as 
clear the hallway of all obstacles (wheelchairs, nursing carts, etc.). In the LTC homes, the staff 
were also expected to make a "Code Red" announcement over the intercom at the start of the drill 
to inform all staff in the building that a fire had been detected. In contrast, staff at the retirement 
homes were notified of the fire emergency via handheld radios instead of over the intercom system. 
During both LTC and retirement home fire drills, one staff member was expected to simulate 
calling emergency services and one staff member was required to remain on a floor or wing that 
provided physical and/or cognitive assistance. 
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F.5.2 Drill Observations  
Sections 4.2.1 – 4.2.9 provide summaries of the nine observed drills, where only critical 
information is provided. The significant times recorded for each observed action and behaviour 
are written in mm:ss format. The drill floorplans (Figures E.3 – E.11) may show more residents 
and staff stand-ins than are noted in the description as the location of all participating residents 
and staff stand-ins were disclosed prior to some drills. Rooms labelled “Room #” represent resident 
rooms that were or would normally be occupied by a resident (including rooms from which 
residents were not evacuated during the drill). Rooms labelled “Vacant Room #” indicate rooms 
where residents were not living at the time. Research observer locations are shown in each drill 
figure. Tables E.1 through E.3 summarize parameters for each drill. 
F.5.2.1 Drill 1 (Long Term Care Home – Day time working shift)  
Fifteen staff members participated in the drill. Three residents participated and evacuated 
without any assistance from staff. The other residents in the wing either remained in their rooms 
or had left just before the drill started.  
 
Figure F.3: Drill 1 Floorplan 
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The floorplan of the wing where the drill took place can be seen in Figure F.3. The drill 
started with the activation of the fire alarm and an announcement over the intercom indicating 
"Code Red". After 30 seconds, the staff at the nursing centre began discussing if they should call 
emergency services. They were told by another staff member not to as it was "just a drill". At 0:50, 
one resident evacuated the wing through the main exit instead of the one adjacent to their room. 
The fire room was located after 1:20 and staff begin to clear the hallway. At 2:20, a staff member 
was assigned to simulate calling emergency services. Once the hallway was cleared, the staff began 
checking resident rooms, closing doors and marking the rooms as clear. Two residents from the 
same room evacuated the wing at 3:39. Ten seconds later, one of those residents returned to their 
room. Staff announced that the evacuation was complete at 4:15 and “all clear” was announced at 
6:00. The post-drill debriefing followed. During the debriefing, staff members discussed their 
confusion about what they should do during an evacuation (when to call emergency services, 
which exits to use, what to do at night when they are short-staffed). The drill coordinator then 
reviewed the steps according to the home's fire safety plan with the staff.  
F.5.2.2 Drill 2 (Long Term Care Home – Evening time working shift) 
The second fire drill took place on the evening staffing shift. It was expected that three to 
four residents would participate, though none did. According to the home's fire safety plan, the 
residents who were bedridden would be kept in their beds and then moved out of the wing. 
However, this was not something that was intended to be simulated during fire drills.  
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Figure F.4: Drill 2 Floorplan 
The floorplan of the evacuated wing can be seen in Figure F.4. The fire alarm indicated the 
start of the drill, after which "Code Red" was announced over the intercom. The first staff member 
entered the wing at 0:19 and entered the designated fire room at 0:32. During the 24 seconds that 
the first staff member was in the fire room, two additional staff entered the wing. Upon leaving 
the fire room (not closing the door to the room all the way), the first staff member moved back 
down the hallway. Ten seconds later, a second staff member checked the fire room, leaving 10 
seconds later and closing the door. At 2:00, a green checkmark was placed on the fire room door 
and the door of the room next to it, and a fourth staff member entered the wing. Three additional 
staff members entered the wing at 2:12, with one asking if the fire room had been checked. At 
3:00, one staff member said that all the residents were in bed and another staff member finished 
checking a room and stood outside the room with the door open (a resident was inside the room). 
At 3:11, the drill coordinator announced the end of the drill and the staff began to move into the 
hallway outside of the wing. The post-drill debriefing began soon afterwards, and "all clear" was 
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announced over the intercom at 5:00. A key point that the staff discussed during the post-drill 
debriefing was that there needed to be a better way for staff within the fire wing to communicate 
with those outside the wing as there was no way to know how many staff should be sent to assist 
with the evacuation. 
F.5.2.3 Drill 3 (Long Term Care Home- Evening time working shift) 
The floorplan of the wing where the third drill took place can be seen in Figure F.5. The 
drill coordinator activated the fire alarm in the room that was to act as the fire room. The 
coordinator remained in the room until located by one of the participating staff members, as their 
presence indicated that it was the fire room.  
 
Figure F.5: Drill 3 Floorplan 
When the alarm sounded, one staff member was already in the wing. "Code Red" along 
with the fire wing location was announced over the intercom at 0:20. A second staff member 
entered the wing 10 seconds later. Seven more staff entered near 1:00. At 1:10, a staff member 
began moving a resident toward the main safe zone (1:31) and a resident at the far end of the hall 
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was moved back into their room to allow staff to conduct the complete egress procedure for all 
rooms. At 1:27, the fire room was identified by one of the staff members. At 2:00, the staff started 
clearing the hallway in the fire wing, and soon after the door to the fire room was closed. During 
the drill, two non-participating residents in the safe zone tried to enter the fire wing and were 
stopped by staff members outside the wing. Two staff members re-entered the fire room at 2:30, 
leaving soon after and closing the door as another staff member asked if they checked to see if 
anyone was in the room. Soon after, a custodial staff member (not part of the drill), moved a 
cleaning cart from the hallway and into the safety zone, leaving it directly on the other side of the 
fire doors. The hallway was clear at 3:00, and 15 seconds later, a staff member opened the fire 
room door again. At 4:00, the Evacucheck was flipped on the fire room door, after which staff 
members began flipping Evacuchecks on other resident room doors. The drill ended with “all 
clear” announced at 4:52, 20 seconds after the drill coordinator ended the drill. The drill was 
followed by a staff debriefing. A participating staff member discussed her confusion on how to 
use the Evacuchecks.   
F.5.2.4 Drill 4 (Long Term Care Home – Evening time working shift) 
It was the home’s policy that mechanical lifts be used for bedridden residents as the home 
had a no-lift policy for the employees. During the fourth drill, the staff were expected to simulate 
using the lifts (taking one to the resident room but leaving it outside the door). The drill coordinator 
mentioned that the home had adopted a new procedure approximately one and a half years ago, 
and that the staff were still adapting to it. Specifically, the staff were now expected to check and 
evacuate all rooms in the wing as opposed to just the critical triangle. The drill coordinator also 
mentioned that fire drills were being used as both a training and evaluation tool. The floorplan of 
the wing where the drill took place can be seen in Figure F.6.  
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Figure F.6: Drill 4 Floorplan 
The fire alarm signaled the start of the drill and 15 seconds later a resident in a wheelchair 
was moved from the hallway to the safe zone. A second resident was also evacuated from the 
hallway to the safe zone at 1:00 after two staff members spent 15 seconds debating where to take 
the resident. The door next to the fire room was closed at 1:41, followed by the door to the room 
across from the fire room. At 1:50, a third staff member entered the wing, and 12 seconds later a 
towel was placed at the base of the fire room door. During the following minute, four additional 
staff members entered the wing, standing around and waiting for something to do. At 3:12, a staff 
member left the wing to say that everything was done. At 3:23 "Code Red All Clear" was 
announced.  During the drill it was noted that key elements of the home’s fire emergency 
procedures were not executed. Examples included not simulating lift use and neglecting to close 
the doors and evacuate all resident rooms. In the post drill debriefing, the staff expressed that the 
drill generally went well. The drill coordinator briefly discussed a few things that were missed, 
and the staff asked a few questions.  
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F.5.2.5 Drill 5 (Retirement Home – Night time working shift) 
In addition to the three staff, ten residents participated in the fifth drill along with three 
additional staff members standing in place of residents. The floorplan of the wing where the drill 
took place can be seen in Figure F.7. All participating residents were evacuated to the section of 
the hallway separated by the fire doors; the stairwell at the other end of the hall was not used. 
There were initial difficulties with the staff’s hand-held notification system, so the fire 
room was not located nor entered until 2:02. During that time, a resident left their room 
independently and made their way towards the safe zone before being prompted by one of the 
observing staff members to go back to their room. Two staff members initially entered the fire 
room, but one left 30 seconds later to begin evacuating the room beside it. At 3:45, the first resident 
in the fire room was assisted into the hallway but tried to get back into the room. The second 
resident in the fire room entered the hallway at 4:06 and both residents then travelled with a staff 
member to the safe zone. Two staff members continued to evacuate the rooms, starting with those 
in closer proximity to the fire room. The third staff member entered the wing at 5:44 (they had 
been on the main floor meeting the fire marshal as would happen during a real fire). Once all of 
the rooms had been checked and the residents had been evacuated, the rooms were then rechecked 
and tagged to show that the rooms were clear. During this second check, a resident was found 
hiding in their room, 10 minutes after the drill started. This resident was then evacuated, and the 
remaining rooms were double checked and tagged. The drill lasted a total of 13 minutes and 33 
seconds.  
 
263 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure F.7: (a) Drill 5 Evacuation Timeline (b) Floorplan 
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F.5.2.6 Drill 6 (Long Term Care Home – Night time working shift) 
The sixth drill was observed in the same long term care home as the first and third drill, 
and was an annually required worst-case scenario drill. Each of the three observers were 
responsible for watching one staff member. As with the previous worst-case scenario drill, all the 
staff were aware that a drill would be taking place. During the pre-drill discussion with the drill 
coordinator and participating staff, the details of the evacuation were explained, roles were 
assigned, and staff questions were answered. Eight staff were assigned to evacuate the wing and 
11 staff were designated to act as resident stand-ins. The residents chosen to be replaced by staff 
members were pre-determined based on their requiring a personal lift to get out of bed or their 
history of uncooperative behaviour. During the pre-drill discussion, the participating staff 
members were given the opportunity to practice the blanket evacuation method that was to be used 
to evacuate the staff stand-ins replacing bedridden residents. During this time, the research team 
selected three of the participating staff to focus on during the drill.  
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Figure F.8: Drill 6 (a) Evacuation Timeline (b) Floor plan. 
The floorplan of the drill location can be seen in Figure F.8. The fire alarm was set off by 
the drill coordinator from within the designated fire room. The first staff members to respond 
started checking the rooms to locate the fire. Once the fire room was identified at 0:34, the 
evacuation started with that room and the one connected to it via a shared washroom, and then 
proceeded to the critical triangle. One staff member was the designated site manager and this 
person was in charge of directing all of the other staff. This person did not help with the physical 
checking of the rooms or the evacuation of residents, with the exception of assisting ambulatory 
residents who only needed guidance. After the evacuation of the critical triangle, the other rooms 
were also evacuated. From the start of the alarm to the drill being deemed complete by the 
organizer and the observing fire marshal, the drill lasted 9:08. In addition to the 11 staff members, 
14 residents were evacuated from the wing. During the post-drill debriefing, one of the main points 
discussed was how physically strenuous the blanket method evacuation was, especially after it had 
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been done several times. The staff expressed concern over the feasibility of the night staff being 
able to evacuate certain residents in this manner. 
F.5.2.7 Drill 7 (Retirement Home – Night time working shift) 
In contrast to the fifth drill which was observed on a memory care floor at the same home, 
this drill took place on an independent care floor without fire separation doors. This meant that all 
residents on the floor were meant to be evacuated to the stair-wells. Twenty-two residents and 
three on-duty staff members participated in the drill, although one staff member was required to 
stay on the memory care floor and did not participate in the evacuation. Four additional staff 
members were located in the safe zones for resident safety and supervision. The longer hallway 
was divided into two sections shown on the floorplan in Figure F.9. Residents on one half of the 
wing were evacuated to Stairwell 1 and residents from the other side were evacuated to Stairwell 
2. The residents and staff were informed in advance of the date and time the fire drill would occur.  
The alarm was sounded for 5 minutes at the start of the drill, then was silenced as to not 
disturb the rest of the building and occupants. The fire alarm was first sent to the responding 
nurses’ communication phones, which they responded to before the audible alarm was heard by 
the fire marshal or observers. The evacuation followed the critical triangle method. The resident 
in the fire room required staff assistance and was observed to have exited the room at 0:32, pushed 
in a wheelchair by the staff member, and then entered the safe zone at 0:49. Two ambulatory 
residents evacuated on their own once the audible alarm began. Most other residents evacuated 
when instructed by the staff member, but some were confused about the procedure. Those residents 
exited their room and sat on their walkers, awaiting staff assistance to the safe zone. One room 
housed a married couple in which the spouse would not leave without the other resident who 
insisted they finish showering before evacuating. The second staff member, who had attended the 
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fire command centre, entered the fire drill wing at 4:05. Occupied and vacant rooms underwent 
two checks before an “All Clear” marker was placed on the door handle, indicating the room was 
empty. There was one wheelchair-bound resident who independently initiated evacuation once the 
alarm sounded but was not observed to have entered the safe zone and was later seen re-entering 
the floor via elevators. The drill ended at 14:28. A key finding was that although this drill occurred 
on an independent care floor, a majority of residents still required verbal cues from staff to initiate 
evacuation and some even thought it was the staff’s responsibility to guide each resident to the 
safe zone. This highlighted the important leadership role of staff in these establishments even if 
the residents were perceived as independent.  
 
(a)  
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(b)   
Figure F.9: Drill 7 (a) Evacuation Timeline (b) Floorplan 
 
F.5.2.8 Drill 8 (Retirement Home – Night time working shift) 
The eighth observed drill was held on an assisted living floor that was not secured; it had 
two wings separated by a fire door to create compartmentation shown in Figure F.10. As this was 
an annual worst-case scenario drill, the staff of the building were notified of the fire drill details in 
advance while the residents were notified of the date but not the time that the drill would occur. 
Three on-duty night staff and 14 of an expected seventeen residents participated, four of whom 
abstained from evacuating (two refused to evacuate, two were told by staff that they did not have 
to evacuate). Four observing administrative staff, two maintenance staff and two fire marshals 
were also in attendance on the fire floor in addition to the three research observers and the two 
drill coordinators. The floor was separated into two fire safety zones by a fire door to which the 
residents were evacuated past into the safe zone following the critical triangle method.  
On arrival, staff members were overheard discussing the proper procedures for the drill. 
This was a silent drill therefore the fire marshal indicated the start of the drill. One staff member 
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was required to go to the fire control centre to discover where the fire was located while the other 
two entered the fire wing and awaited the fire location. Once the location was known, the first staff 
member evacuated the fire room while the second staff member began notifying the resident in the 
adjacent room of the evacuation. The residents occupying the fire room were confused and exited 
the room at 2:25 and then entered the safe zone at 3:57. A resident who did not require assistance 
other than a verbal cue then evacuated to the safe zone. The third staff member re-entered the wing 
almost 8 minutes after the drill started. For both occupied and vacant rooms, one check was 
conducted before the room was declared empty of residents and a marker was hung on the door. 
One staff member was repeatedly reminded to properly close the door after exiting the room with 
a resident or after the check. The second staff member encountered two non-participating residents 
and instructed a third resident that participation was not necessary. This staff member then 
proceeded to jog with said resident’s walker to the safe zone in an attempt to emulate the 
evacuation actions. At 11:30, visitors entered the fire drill zone via elevators and stood in the lobby 
area. The fire marshal did not require staff to evacuate a wheelchair-dependent resident to the safe 
zone if it caused undue stress to the resident. The last resident who entered the safe zone did so at 
13:55 and the drill was deemed complete soon after.  In the post-drill discussion, the fire marshals 
emphasized that the building was sprinklered and had compartmentation therefore firefighting 
actions by staff were not required.  
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(b) 
Figure F.10: Drill 8 (a) Evacuation Timeline (b) Floorplan 
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F.5.2.9 Drill 9 (Retirement Home – Night time working shift) 
Having just recently opened, this home had been receiving occupants two months before 
the fire drill was observed and had approximately 50% occupant capacity at the time of 
observation. This was the first annual fire marshal-attended drill the retirement home underwent 
with resident participation. This included three on-duty staff, four staff stand-ins and six residents 
on a secure memory care floor which required a pass code to exit into the stairwells, one of which 
was used as the safe zone. The floor had 33 rooms; only ten were occupied, as shown in Figure 
F.11. Some residents were notified in advance of the drill and were moved to alternate floors. Staff 
stand-ins were put in their place with the respective mobility assistance devices.  
This was a silent drill where no audible alarms were used, but the staff went through the 
motions of going to the fire command centre (located at the Nurse’s Office on the same floor) and 
using the mobile communication phones to relay the location of the fire. The fire room had a staff 
stand-in using a walker and was evacuated by staff at 0:21, entering the safe zone at 1:43. The 
second staff member began evacuating residents 59 seconds after the drill began. The third staff 
member realized they were supposed start the drill on a different level and went into the elevator 
lobby, then “re-entered” the fire wing at 1:19. The staff followed the critical triangle evacuation 
procedure similar to Drills 5 and 8. A couple of residents were in the communal lounge area at the 
time of the drill and exited the lounge at 5:32, entering the safe zone at 6:52 and 7:03. All residents 
required staff guidance from their initial locations to the safe zone. All the rooms were checked 
twice before an Evacucheck marker was flipped up, indicating that the room was cleared. The last 
resident was evacuated from their room and exited the wing at 7:32. The drill ended soon after, at 
7:38. Observers noted issues with the room doors not fully closing and the lack of fire separation 
doors on all floors of the building. In the post-drill discussion, the fire marshal suggested that the 
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residents in the fire wing should be evacuated but residents from the rest of the building could stay 
in place due to the building’s compartmentation design. This highlighted the reliance on 
compartmentation from the building design for the fire safety plan.  
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Figure F.11: Drill 9 (a) Evacuation Timeline (b) Floorplan 
 
F.6 Discussion 
F.6.1 Observed Trends in Behaviour and Actions 
Through the observation of the nine fire drills discussed above, several similarities and 
differences in resident and staff actions and behaviours were identified. A high level of staff 
dependence was observed. Table F.5 provides the types of staff actions and behaviours observed 
as well as their frequency and probability of occurrence. For consistency, only the actions of the 
staff members who were the primary focus of the observers are included. Drill 1 was excluded as 
the recorded actions were not associated with specific staff members and therefore could not be 
tallied. Table F.5 shows there are several actions that were observed in multiple drills and by 
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numerous staff members. The observed actions were influenced by the type of drill being observed 
and in part due to the requirements of relevant legislation. For example, the number of staff 
members who evacuated residents was quite low in the first four drills (all monthly drills), 
especially compared to the percentage of overall staff participating in the drill. This is likely a 
reflection of the fact that during these drills the staff are not required to evacuate residents. While 
they are supposed to evacuate residents who are willing and able to participate, it was seen that 
this was not often done, be it for reasons of not disturbing the residents or because the staff were 
unaware that they were supposed to. As the staff during the worst-case scenario drills knew the 
location of the fire room prior to the drill, they were not observed spending time looking for the 
fire while the staff in the monthly drills generally did. It is also important to note that while Table 
F.5 groups the observed actions into categories and appears to follow a linear progression from 
drill start to drill end, there is evidence of observed actions occurring multiple times at various 
times during the drills. For example, staff seeking information from each other occurred at various 
times throughout the drills.  
Less data was collected for residents as they did not egress independently for most 
instances and focus was instead on staff interactions. Some observations included residents seeking 
information by coming to stand at their doors prior to being evacuated, residents waiting for other 
residents before evacuating (e.g., couple), finishing tasks (e.g., showering), bringing belongings 
with them (e.g., tea), and hiding. The action of hiding requires more careful study to allow design 
to account for this in the future. It was also observed that many residents, even those in retirement 
homes where nursing care is not provided, required assistance to evacuate (40 of the 56 who were 
recorded). In some cases, this meant that the staff had to guide and walk with them to the safe 
zone. In other cases, this meant verbally prompting residents who were waiting at their bedroom 
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doors. In both cases, the staff had a large impact on the evacuation of residents as the worst total 
egress times seemed to be most affected by low staff and high proportions of residents as per Table 
F.3. 
Table F.5: Frequency and probability of observed staff actions and behaviour 
Action or Behaviour 
Overall Frequency 
From All Nine Drills 
# of Staff Observed (# of 
Drills Observed In)   
Probability 
Based on 
Total 
Number of 
Actions (%) 
Probability 
Based on Total 
Number of 
Staff Observed 
(%) 
Pre-Drill Actions    
 
 
     Normal (unaware of drill about to occur) 23 (3) 9.7% 62.2% 
     Staged (aware of drill about to occur) 14 (5) 5.9% 37.8% 
Perception of Initial Stimulus (Drill Start)   
 
 
     Ambiguous - Observe behaviour of others  0 (0) 0.0% 0.0% 
     Unambiguous - Alarm, intercom message, staff radio devices  37 (8) 15.7% 100.0% 
Seek and Disseminate Information, Investigate     
 
 
     Already in fire wing when drill starts 10 (6) 4.2% 27.0% 
     Travel to and enter wing where the fire is located 27 (7) 11.4% 73.0% 
     Search for the fire (checking rooms) 10 (2) 4.2% 27.0% 
     Go right to fire room (do not search other rooms) 6 (6) 2.5% 16.2% 
     Communicate location with collogues via handheld radios   5 (2) 2.1% 13.5% 
     Raise the Alarm / emergency message via intercom system  1 (1) 0.4% 2.7% 
     Seek information from other staff members 5 (3) 2.1% 13.5% 
     Seek information from fire marshal or drill coordinator 1 (1) 0.4% 2.7% 
Initial Securing of Environment    
 
 
     Bring fire extinguisher into wing   7 (5) 3.0% 18.9% 
     Locate/entire fire room  14 (7) 5.9% 37.8% 
     Simulate fighting fire using fire extinguisher 1 (1) 0.4% 2.7% 
     Place towels under fire room door   2 (2) 0.8% 5.4% 
     Clear all obstacles out of hallway   8 (1) 3.4% 21.6% 
     Close resident room doors (pre-evacuation) 2 (1) 0.8% 5.4% 
Resident Evacuation   
 
 
     Check rooms for residents (initial check) 16 (6) 6.8% 43.2% 
Assist residents with pre-movement actions (in resident 
rooms) 3 (2) 
1.3% 
8.1% 
     Verbally prompt residents to evacuate (not req.to walk with) 2 (1) 0.8% 5.4% 
     Guide and walk with residents to safe zone 14 (7) 5.9% 37.8% 
     Guide/assist resident back into room (still within fire wing) 1 (1) 0.4% 2.7% 
     Aide another staff member in evacuating a resident  3 (2) 1.3% 8.1% 
     Close room doors upon exit of room  4 (3) 1.7% 10.8% 
     Do not close room doors upon exit of room  2 (2) 0.8% 5.4% 
Re-Checking Rooms and Marking as Clear   
 
 
     Use Evacucheck or hanging marker to indicate cleared room  9 (5) 3.8% 24.3% 
     Re-Check evacuated rooms (once) 5 (2) 2.1% 13.5% 
Drill Closure   
 
 
     Stand around 3 (1) 1.3% 8.1% 
     Say that all residents have been evacuated, in bed 1 (1) 0.4% 2.7% 
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F.6.2 Evacuation Timeline and Order 
Figures E.7 – E.11 show the observed room exit and safe zone entrance times for Drills 5, 
through 9. Given the high dependency on staff, the pre-evacuation times were largely determined 
by when a staff member assisted or prompted a resident to evacuate. These figures show a general 
trend of evacuating residents based on their proximity to the fire room, which was in line with the 
critical triangle method and evacuation strategy mentioned earlier. The variation in time spent 
between exiting a room and entering the safe zone is also clearly visible in the graphed data. It is 
important to note, however, that this does not always correspond to the movement time and speed 
of an evacuee. As was observed during Drill 7 and can be seen depicted in Figure F.9, a number 
of residents exited their rooms independently or with prompting and then remained in the hallway 
outside of their rooms until they were prompted again or guided to the safe zone by a staff member. 
It is therefore important to make sure that when using data from a fire drill it is clear whether or 
not this is represented in the data. True autonomous behaviour is a very gray concept when 
considering elderly populations. Figures E.7 –E.11 show residents who required a staff member to 
walk with them to the safe zone (this was defined as staff-assisted for this study) and residents 
who reacted and evacuated entirely on their own or required only verbal prompting (defined as 
autonomous herein). The residents were classified this way to be able to see potential differences 
in the time spent walking from a resident room to the safe zone. This classification is useful for 
recording movement times (and therefore “agent” speeds when geometry is considered); however, 
it does not articulate the number of residents who relied upon any form of interaction with staff – 
which will also be important in modelling. In that case, the number of staff-assisted residents 
would be higher.  
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Table F.6 and Figure F.12 are provided with specific limitation, in that they implicitly 
include the movement of staff with the resident behaviour. Building geometry is not included and 
that they are only based on collected data. In all but two drills, staff were always present when the 
drill began. The latest time for the first staff member to enter the fire wing was 0:24. This tabulated 
information, based on drills with sufficient resident engagement may be useful in table form for 
practitioners developing first-stage models. The authors plan future work to study the generation 
of appropriate models. Figure F.12 provides the reader with a visualization of the evacuation 
timeline of Drill 5 through 9, though inherently does not include the effect of differences in 
architecture between each drill in different buildings which would be used for travel velocities. 
This information will be provided within future research and can be derived from the floor plan 
figures provided.  
Table F.6: Drill evaluations of only recorded residents 
Drill 
Pre-evacuation Times Time which Percentage of People Evacuated 
Avg [Min – Max] [MM:SS] 
 25 50 75 100 
5 5:36[0:47 – 10:16] 4:52 5:37 8:27 11:19 
6a 2:02[0:46-3:13] 1:19 2:45 2:47 3:38 
7 3:09[0:32-10:39] 1:20 3:16 8:14 12:16 
8 6:53[2:25-11:42] 5:28 7:10 10:15 13:55 
9 3:53[1:29-5:32] 4:37 6:52 7:03 7:32 
Average 4:18         
               a only 5 residents of 14 are recorded. 
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Figure F.12: Evacuation profile assuming implicit staff and resident behaviour (see Table F.6 for limitations) 
F.6.3 Considerations for Using Fire Drill Data  
It is evident in looking at these drills that there are numerous modifications that are made 
(intentionally or unintentionally) during a drill that would not be possible given an actual fire 
event. In some drills, more staff were noted to have played a role in the drill than were supposed 
to. These staff were observed closing doors to resident rooms, tagging doors and supervising 
residents in the safe zone. In reality, during the night shift which these drills were supposed to be 
simulating, these additional staff would not be present to assist. While it is understandable why 
these staff would be present during a drill for additional resident safety, it is not representative of 
a real fire. During such an event, the on-duty staff would be responsible for evacuating the residents 
as well as monitoring them within the safe zone. Additionally, the impact to pre-evacuation and 
preparation times, as well as the potential increase in resident resistance to evacuation as a result 
of being woken up and potentially wanting to get dressed or gather belongings, is not represented 
in these worst-case scenario drills.  
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Another trend that was seen during all but one of the observed fire drills was that of 
residents evacuating (either assisted or autonomous) to only one safe zone, regardless of their 
proximity to the second (typically the stairwell). While it makes sense why this would be done for 
ease and convenience during a simulation, given the mobility and mental state of many residents 
(e.g., having residents wait in a hallway is easier and more practical than a stairwell), it is not 
representative of all of the safe zones that residents would be evacuated to in an actual fire. Often 
not all residents were evacuated, even during worst-case scenario drills. In the observed monthly 
drills (Drills 1-4), it was seen that very few residents were evacuated at all. In the later drills where 
more residents did participate, staff stand-ins generally took the place of residents who would have 
greater difficulty evacuating (uncooperative, reduced mobility, etc.). As was seen in Drill 8, a staff 
member jogged from a resident room to the safe zone with a walker, “simulating” the evacuation 
of that resident. Given the mobility impairment of this resident, this was not an accurate 
representation of the resident’s evacuation. These resident exemptions or replacements not only 
affect the time required to complete the drill (pre-evacuation time, walking speed) but also have a 
large impact on the realism of the drill. It is understandable why LTC and retirement homes do 
this, to better ensure the immediate safety of their residents and staff as well as reduce the level of 
disruption caused to both. However, this does have an impact on the credibility of potential data 
and the use of these drills for training and evaluation of staff in such homes. 
The roles played by the drill coordinators and fire marshals present during the drills were 
also seen to impact the drills. During the worst-case scenario drills, the observing fire marshals 
and/or drill coordinators were observed to interact with or prompt the participating staff members. 
This ranged from telling staff that they should be tagging the evacuated rooms to telling staff that 
they did not have to evacuate residents to the safe zone, as was seen in Drill 8. In this specific case, 
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the fire marshal said that the only important time that the staff were being evaluated on was the 
time required to prepare the residents and bring them into the wing hallway (not take them to the 
safe zone). This information not only impacted the subsequent actions of the staff who then did 
not finish evacuating a resident (therefore impacting the accuracy of the drill’s representation of a 
“real” fire event), it also contradicted what had been observed during the other worst-case scenario 
drills. In most of the post-drill discussions with the staff, the fire marshals and/or the drill 
coordinators commented on the impact of fire compartmentalization and sprinklers, stating that in 
the case of a fire, the staff would have plenty of time based upon the fire rating of the structure 
(door rating for example) to evacuate residents. In relation to this, no comment about the impact 
of smoke on tenability in relation to the safe egress time, nor difference in real to standard fire was 
discussed. The impact of staff and resident actions, such as doors being left open or the fire room 
being entered multiple times, are not made clearly apparent.  
Looking specifically at the considerations warranted by the differences between the earlier 
and later drills observed in this study, it can be seen that each have advantages and disadvantages. 
The first four drills in this study were largely influenced by their type (monthly drills not requiring 
resident participation) and the residence type (long term care homes where residents were highly 
dependent on staff). In the case of these four drills in this study, the observation style also had an 
impact (focused on general observations, less on evacuation timestamps). These four observed 
drills did not provide the type of data that could easily be incorporated into an egress model (pre-
evacuation times, walking speeds, etc.). However, they did serve to provide an understanding of 
general fire evacuation procedures in these homes. Additionally, as the staff and residents were 
not informed of the drill prior to it occurring, the initial response to the alarm reflects more closely 
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their response to an actual fire. This realism can fade once the drill coordinator and observers were 
observed and no fire or smoke is found.  
Drills 5 through 9 in this study have their own set of opportunities and challenges that need 
to be understood when looking to use the collected data. While there were some autonomous 
resident evacuations observed, staff verbally prompting residents to evacuate or physically 
preparing them for evacuation and walking with them to the safe zone was a very prominent 
occurrence. This showed that even in retirement homes where residents do not require the same 
level of daily care as in LTC homes, staff still play an important role in fire evacuations. This 
information is valuable for models as it shows the importance of modelling the impact of staff and 
it provides examples of times associated with different staff actions. With respect to the general 
limitations of annual, fire marshal-observed, worst-case scenario drills, there are a couple key 
considerations. The staff who will be participating in the drill are aware of the drill before it 
happens. As these drills are being used for official evaluation by the fire department/province, the 
homes are also allowed to “practice” the drill before it is observed. While this is beneficial in that 
it ensures that staff (and potentially residents) are better prepared should a real fire occur, it reduces 
the realism of the drill (showing the conflict of using drills as training and evaluation tools). Staff 
stand-ins also affect the realism of the drill, given that they will not react or move in the same way 
as actual residents. 
F.6.4 Future Work 
Research into fire evacuations in LTC and retirement homes, and the inclusion of human 
behaviour in fire into egress models in general, needs to continue so as to further develop models 
that are more representative of actual evacuations. The use of the Protective Action Decision 
Model (PADM) developed by Lindell and Perry holds great potential for being used to create a 
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conceptual model of human behaviour based on data such as that collected in this study [34], [35]. 
The PADM shows the process of decision-making during emergencies, describing the steps and 
factors that influence the adoption of protective actions (in the case of a building fire, evacuating 
or seeking refuge for example) [35], [36]. Such a conceptual model could then be used to support 
the creation of computational models for use within egress software, therefore creating more 
accurate and realistic models of evacuations of the built environment.  
The authors intentionally do not provide a full agent profile for modelling herein. Such a 
full profile will be more beneficial to create along with validated and verified models which are 
intended to follow this study by the authors. 
These models must also begin to incorporate the impact of toxicity and smoke as it has 
been shown to have a large impact on evacuees [37]. The presence of smoke can not only affect 
visibility, but also response time and movement speed [38]. Our understanding of toxicity and 
smoke plays a role in building compartmentalization, which, as seen in this study, is very much 
relied upon in residences such as LTC and retirement homes. Some studies have also shown that 
certain health conditions, such as cardiovascular disease, can impact one’s susceptibility to smoke 
[39]. This may therefore have a great impact on residents of LTC and retirement homes and should 
be studied further. 
F.7 Conclusion 
This study of nine drills in Canadian LTC and retirement homes has shown that valuable 
data can be collected from the observation of fire drills. Information about residents, the 
interactions between staff and residents, the type of actions that are undertaken by staff during the 
evacuation process and the general procedures that are followed was collected. This information 
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provides a better understanding of evacuations in such care homes and acts as a source of data that 
can be used to help inform egress modelling software. These drills demonstrated that emergency 
egress in long term care and retirement homes is highly staff dependent with over 72% of residents 
requiring full assistance in evacuation.  
This study has also shown that there are a number of important considerations that must be 
made when choosing to conduct this type of data collection or when using data collected by such 
means. The use of in-person observation and written note-taking can be used in cases where 
cameras are not welcomed or allowed. When specific observation objectives are defined, and the 
observers can focus on specific staff and/or resident participants, valuable data can be collected 
from places that would otherwise not have allowed researchers access. However, if the scope of 
information sought is too broad or the situation overwhelms the observation and recording 
capacities of the observers, the completeness of the data collected can be reduced.  
It is easy to see that data from actual fire events would provide the most accurate data, and 
that collecting data from such events is important in further developing our understanding of 
human behaviour during such events. However, this data can be very difficult to come by. Over 
the course of this study, the researchers made continual efforts to reach out to the owners of local 
LTC and retirement homes that had experienced real fires in recent years for camera based and 
real event data. To date, all of these invitations have gone unanswered. Given the difficulty of 
being able to access such data, fire drills pose a more readily available source of evacuee behaviour 
information of vulnerable populations. Through drill observation, important information about the 
behaviours and actions exhibited by staff and residents in care homes and the procedures that are 
supposed to be followed during fires can be obtained.  
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